

ॐ नमो भगवते वासुदेवाय

The Philosophy O

ĀKĪYĀĪA &
NATURE

In Observance Of

Mīmāṃsā Nyāya A
Vedic Rituals (Part

मीमांसायं न किं कमयु न

आख्यात तत्त्वशोधनय

Dr Vedula Subrahmanya
READER IN SANSKRIT
ANDHRA UNIVERSITY

ॐ नमो भगवते वासुदेवाय

The Philosophy Of
ĀKHYĀTA & ITS
NATURE.

In Observance Of
Mīmāṃsā Nyāya And
Vedic Rituals. (Part-2)

मीमांसानये वेदिक कर्मसु च

आख्यात-तत्त्वशोधनम्.

Dr. Vedula Subrahmanyam,
READER IN SANSKRIT,
ANDHRA UNIVERSITY.

First Edition : 1000 copies

Price : Rs. 150/-


-: 26th July 1990 :-

This book is Published with the
Financial assistance from

Trirumala Turupati Devasthanams
Under their scheme
Aid to Publish Religious Books.

Copies can be had from

Sri V.K. Sarma
30-13-14 Madhava Road,
Dabagardens, Visakhapatnam-530020
(A P) INDIA



Printers • NANA Enterprises
VISAKHAPATNAM-530001

General Contents

Meaning of the Verbal affix "Tin"

| Chapter I | Pages |
|---------------------|---------|
| Āsraya-Bhavanā-Kṛti | 1-84 |
| Chapter II | |
| Time | 85-111 |
| Chapter III | |
| Person and Number | 112-124 |
| Chapter IV | |
| Upagraha | 130-144 |
| Chapter V | |
| Vikaranas | 145-152 |
| Chapter VI | |
| Tenses and Moods | 153-206 |

ABBREVIATIONS AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

| Abbreviations used | Name of the work in full | Author of the work |
|-------------------------------|---|---|
| 1 | 2 | 3 |
| Akv Sri Bhā Cn. Bhā Rah | Ākhyata Vade Siromani Bhatta Cintamani Chhatta Rahasyam | Raghunatha Siromani Gagabhatta Khaudadeva edited by A. Subrahmanya Sastry |
| Kasikā | Kasikavṛtti with (Nyasa and Padamañjarī) | Vamaṇa-Jayāditya Jinendrabudhi and Haradita |
| L.M (kk) | Laghu Mañjūsa with Kala & Kuncika commentaries | Nagesabhatta |
| L M (nub) | Laghu Mañjūsa with Nagesa bhavaprakasa | commentary by Peri Suryanaryana Sastry |
| La Sa Se | Laghu Sabdendu Sekhara Vol II (which comm Guṇa- rtha dipika) | Nagesabhatta |
| M B Mi Kau. Muktavali | Mahābhāṣya in three parts Mīmamsā Kaustubham Muktavali (with Dīnakari and Ramaṇudri) | Patañjali Khaudadeva Viswanatha Yaska |
| Nir | Niruktam (with Durga commentary) | |
| Ny Ku | Nyāya Kusmañjali with Commentary (Prakasa), Nyāya-kośa | Udayana Bhīmacharya Jhalakikar |
| Nya Man N B | Nyāya Mañjarī Nyaya Sūtras (with Vatsyayana Bhasya) | Jayantabhatta Gautama |
| Nys Rat P | Nyāyaratnamala Aśādhyaṣ | Parthasarathi Misra Panini |
| Pa, Va Ra P L M | Padavakya Ratnākara ParmaLaghu Mañjusā | Gokhlnath Upadhyaya Nagesa Bhatta |
| Pra Pan. | Prakaran Pancika | Salikanatha |

CONCORDANCE

- Arthavisesa tātparayagrāhakatvam dyotakatvam (Nyā Man)
Abhedātiriktasambandhena prakṛtyartha prakāraśābda bodham
pratīpratyaya janyopasthiterhetuttvam (Vai Bhū)
Ananyalabhyāḥ sabdārthaḥ (Prau Man)
Anyāyascnāekārthattvām (Nya Ku)
Bhāvaprathana mākhyaṭām (Nir)
Ekasambandhī jñāna maparasambandhismarakam (Nya Si Muk.
Comm)
Kriyāvacano dhatauḥ (Ma Bh)
Kriyāvisesaka upasargaḥ Ma Bh)
Kvacittu kriyāvisesakseapakattvam dyotakattvam (La Man
Dhāttvarta)
Kvacittu samabhivyāhṛita gata vṛttyudbodhak attvam dyotakattvam
Kriyānamabhi nispattau sāmāthyam sadhanam viduḥ (Va Pad
Sadhana samuddesa)
Na kevala prakṛtiḥ prayoktavyā nāpi pratyayaḥ (Ma Bh)
Nāmārtthayorbhedevānvayasyāvyutpannatvam (Bh Cint)
Nāmārtthayorbhedenaiva samsargattvam (La Man)
Pratyānam prakṛtyarthānvita svārtha bodhakattva vyutpattiḥ
(Vai Bhū)
Pratīpadikārtthayorbhedevānvayabodhe vibhaktijanyopa sthītirhetuḥ
(Vai Bhū)
Pramāṇīkam gauravam na dosāya, (La Man)
Prakṛtipratyayau sahartham bītaḥ tayostu pratyayārthaḥ pradhānam
(Tan Vā)
Prayogapratīpattibhyam kila sabdārtha niscayaḥ (Nyā Man)
Pararthabhidhānam Vṛttiḥ (M B)
Samabhivyāhṛitapadiya sakti vyanjakattvam dyotakattvam (La. Man)
Sattvapradhānāni nāmāni (Nir)

| 1 | 2 | 3 |
|--------------|--|--------------------------------|
| Phil Sen Pts | Philosophy of Sentence & Its parts | Prof V Subba Rao |
| Pra Man | Praudha Manorama | Bhattoji Diksita |
| R P | Rk Pratisakhya | Saunaka |
| Sa Sak Pra | Sabda Sakti Prakasa | Jagadisa |
| Sab Kou | Sabda Kaustustubham | Bhattoji Diksita |
| Sas-Dip, | Sastra Dipika | Parthasardhy Misra |
| | Samkhyakarikas (with Tattva Kaumudi Com) | Isvara Krishna Misra |
| S K | Vaiyakarana | Bhattoji |
| | Siddhantakaumudi | |
| Tat Bo | Tattvabodhinis (Commentary on S k) | Jnanendra Saraswati |
| Tan Var | Tantravartika (Comm on Sabara bhasya) | Kumari labhatta |
| Tar Sam | Tarka Samgraha | Annambhatta |
| Tar Tan | Tarka Tandava (parts II & III) | Vyasatirtha |
| TTv Cin | Tattva Cintamani (Part IV-Vol II) | Gangesa |
| TTv Dar | Tattva Darśanī (comm on Vai Bhu sara with text) | Peri Suryanaryana Sastry |
| V P | Vakypadīya part 3 (1 & 2) Commentary by Hela aja | Bhartrhari |
| Vai Bhu Sa | Vaiyakarana Bhusana Saram (with Prabha & Darpana commentaries) | Kaundabhatta |
| Si Su Ni | Vaiyakarana Siddhanta Sudhanidhi | Parvatīya Visweswara suri |
| Vi Vi | Vidhiviveka with Nyayakanika | Manana |
| Vya Vi | Vyakti Viveka | Mahimabhatta |
| Vyu Va | Vyutpatti Vada (with Adarsa Com) | Gadadhara |
| | Yoga sutra (with Bhasya) Whitney's Sanskrit Grammer | Patanjali |
| | Technical Terms of Sanskrit Grammer | W D Whitney K C. Chatterjee |

GLOSSARY

| | |
|-----------------|---|
| Adhikaranam | Substratum |
| Anukūla | Congenial to |
| Anvaya | Agreement |
| Avacchedakam | (the) Determinant |
| Avacchinna | (the) Determined |
| Avyaya | Indeclinable |
| Ativyāpti | Over applicability |
| Avyāpti | Partial applicability |
| Anumāna | Inference |
| Abhava | Non-existence |
| Anvayavyāpti | Concomitance in affirmation |
| Apoha | Negation of the objects other than the one concerned |
| Abhedasambandha | Non-differential relation |
| Arthāpatti | Presumption |
| Ākanksa | Expectancy |
| Āsrya | Substratum |
| Ākhyātam | Verbal affix |
| Ākṛti | Configuration |
| Āvapa | Inclusion |
| Dyotakattvam | Suggestion |
| Dravya | Substance |
| Dhātu | Verbal root |
| Guṇa | Quality |
| Gaurava | Prolixity |
| Jāti | Universal |
| Jñānam | Knowledge or Cognition |
| Karta | Agent |
| Karma | Object |
| Kṛt | Primary affix forming Verbal Derivations |
| Kriyā | Action |
| Kevalānvayi | Exclusively affirmative |
| Lakṣanā | Implication or Secondary significance |
| Lakṣyārtha | Implied meaning |
| Lāghavam | Parsimony |

| | |
|----------------------------|--|
| Āpata | Particle |
| Prakṛti | Base |
| Pratyaya | Affix |
| Prakara | Attribute |
| Prātipadika | Nominal base |
| Prasajyapratishedha | Absolute negation |
| Pratyakṣa | Perception |
| Rūḍha | Conventional |
| Śakti | Denotative potentiality |
| Śabdabodha | Verbal comprehension |
| Samsarga | Syntactical relation |
| Samānādhikaranyā | Having the substratum or co-existence |
| Satta | Existence |
| Taddhita | Secondary affix forming nominal derivatives |
| Upasarga | Preposition |
| Vidhi | Injunction |
| Viśeṣya | Substantive |
| Viśeṣana | Attributive |
| Vṛtti | Potentiality |
| Vyakti | Individual |
| Vyanjana | Suggestion |
| Vyaṅgya | (the) Suggested meaning |
| Vyāpāra | Activity |
| Viśiṣṭajñāna | Qualified cognition |
| Vyatireka vyāpti | Concomitance in negation |
| Yaugika | Derivative |
| Yogarūḍha | Derivative or conventional |
| Yaugika rūḍha | Derivative and convention |

A brief

This second part of the text deals with the semantics of Verbal Suffix 'Tin' in Sanskrit

The word Ākhyata is a synonym to the 'verb' in English. In Sanskrit a verb word contains mainly two parts i.e. verbal root (Dhātu) and verbal suffix (Tin). In the part-I of the book, the definition of root, classification, suffix classification, etc. and their semantics is discussed as propounded in the three main disciplines viz Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā and Vyākaraṇa of Hindu scholarship. There it is established the root denotes the result (Phala) and action (Vyāpāra).

Besides these discussions certain fundamental concepts such as Vyāpāra (action), Phala (result), Karta (agent), Karma (object), Samsarga, Abhihitā-anabhihitā system, Transitivity-intransitivity etc. as viewed by Indian scholars, are also investigated to the advantage of the reader.

Now in this second part of the book the semantics of the Suffix Tin is discussed with respect to the three disciplines said above.

I acknowledge with respect and sincerity the immense help I had from the various books both in English and Sanskrit. Of course it is true, that knowledge is nobody's property and more so of scholars. Knowledge is God. Knowledge is to be transferred continuously. So I received from my predecessors and now in turn I am distributing to the needy.

My thanks are to the proprietors and workers of the Nana Enterprises, who shared the labours in printing and bringing out this book from press to public.

Sincerely
The Author

Verbal Affix-Its Denotation

INTRODUCTION —

As regards the denotation of the Verbal affix too, there exists a vast diversity of opinion among the various scholars. It appears as though every scholar, though belonging to the same school or to a different school of discipline, represents a school by himself. No scholar is less intelligent not to project a new interpretation, or to pronounce a new thought or a different view and thus to establish the validity of his statement over the views of others. Another peculiarity is that, some times scholars belonging to a particular discipline accept the verdict of another scholar belonging to a different discipline.¹

The Verbal affix, that is enjoined after a verbal root to denote agent or object or Bhāvanā and time besides number person and upagraha, is called 'L' (lakṛāa). Certain lakāras, in addition to time denote modalities of the speaker. Such lakāras are called moods. Thus to denote the subtle shades of difference in time or modalities Pāṇini used ten types of Lakāras. Of course, all the lakāras denote agent/object/Bhāva in common, besides the particular time or modality. The verbal affix denotes the general meanings agent/object/Bhāva etc. on the strength of the Sūtra P. 3. 4. 69.² Thus according to the Grammarian, in the case of transitive roots the Lakāra denotes agent in the active voice and in the passive voice it denotes object. But if the root is intransitive the either an agent or Bhāva is denoted by the Lakāra. Such a construction of the sentence to denote Bhāva is called "Bhāve Pratyaya".

1. Vyāsātīrtha, a Logician supports the Grammarian's theory. All the latter Logicians, Mīmāṃsakas and Grammarians unanimously condemn the views of Mandana and of the old Logicians.

2. Laḥ Karmaṇica Bhāve cākarmakebhyah (P. 3. 4. 69)

The ten Lakāras are distinguished by the use of mute letter like At' N etc. The function of vowel mutes following 'L' is to distinguish affixes enjoined for particular tenses or modality. Of the ten lakāras time denoting lakāras are only six viz. Lat (Presnt) Lit (Past not witnessed by the speaker) Lan (Past exclusive of today) Luḥ (Past in general) Lut (future exclusive of today) Lit (future in general). The remaining four lakāras viz., Lin (optative or potential+Precative), Lot (imperative) Lin (conditional) and Let (subjunctive) have in common future time denoted. But in practice no importance is given to this time element but importance is given to the modality denoted by them.

It is worth noting that in our actual language this affix 'L' (Lakara) is not found after the verbal root. The affixes actually used are Tip, Tas, Jhi etc. These suffixes Tip, Tas, Jhi etc. for the grammatical purposes are considered to be the replacements of the lakāras. Hence all the meanings assigned to the lakāras are really expressed by the actual endings Tip, Tas, etc. Of course Pāṇini did not specifically say so, but it is so construed because of the maxim 'A replacement has the same meaning as that which it replaces' 1

Grammarians Kaumārabhaṭṭa argues the other way. He says it is the suffix Tip etc. has the denotative capacity. This denotative function of the Tip etc. suffixes is assumed to exist in the lakāra which is created for the sake of brevity 2. Thus lakāra is said to denote the agent etc. by the Sūtra P 3 4 69 3. Nāgesa also favours this view (Vide P L M P 138)

1. Sthānivadadea^h

2. Dyotakatāṇṇapam tībādisaktim tatsthanitvena kalpīte lakare
Prakalpya Lakārah Kartar. Karmaṇ ca nena vidhīyante
(Vai Bhūṣā)

3. Lah Karmaṇ ca Bhāveḥ Karmakebhyah (P 3 4 68)

According to the Logician the significatory power resides in the prototype 'L' (lakāra) itself. Replacements like Tip, Tas etc. denote the meanings agent, object etc. only by recalling (bringing to mind) the lakāra that they replace. This argument is advanced to serve the purpose of brevity. The assumption that the significative capacity exists in each of the replacements leads to prolixity, whereas the assumption that exists in the concerned lakāra itself, is much simpler. Thus the lakāra alone has denotative capacity and the replacements can convey meaning only by bringing it to the mind.

But this argument of the Logician is not acceptable to the Grammarian. Only that word which is actually uttered can be said to denote a meaning. It is not logical to assume that a non-uttered grammatical prototype denotes the meaning. The grammarian always has held the spoken language as of paramount importance. The grammatical prototypes have reality, only within the confines of grammar. Further the Bhaṣyakāra makes it very clear, commenting on the Sūtra P 1 1 68 1 "Meaning is understood from a word actually uttered". One may argue of achieving brevity in so far as only the original lakāra has the denotative function instead of all the replacements individually. Hence more brevity exists in assuming that the replacements denote meaning immediately upon being heard rather than assuming that they first recall the lakāra to mind and then through this lakāra one gets the knowledge of agent etc. This process of Naiyāyika is a round about and inconvenient one.

Now as regards the denotation of the verbal affix, it is like this. The sage Pṇāini enjoins 'L' as verbal affix after the root, and Tin is the substitute in its place. The Sūtras enjoined in this respect are Lah. Karmaṇi ca Bhāve Cākrmakedhyah (P 3 4 69) Kartari ki (P 3 4 67) etc. All those scholars accept these formulas but they differ in interpreting them. So, speaking in a broad and general way, to the Logician, the import of the verbal affix is primarily

1. P 1 1 68 Svam rūpam sabdasya sabda samjñā
2. Sabdenoccartena arthogamyate, (Ibid M B)

kiti, to the Mīmāṃsaka it is Bhāvanā which is different from the activity signified by the verbal root. But to the Grammarian the Tin suffix signifies the substratum (agent or object) of activity or result denoted by the verbal root. All the scholars belonging to the different disciplines (i.e. the Logician, Mīmāṃsaka and Grammarian) discussed all the pros and cons of the problem on hand in interpreting the various aphorisms to suit their own doctrines and tried to establish the supremacy of their own theories over the views of others.

Therefore in the following pages we shall now discuss the arguments and counter arguments adduced by the scholars against their rival schools of thought.

THE VIEW OF THE GRAMMARIAN—

The Grammarian, having established as stated in the previous chapter, the meaning of the Verbal root to be activity and fruit, now, holds that the Verbal affix signifies the substratum—substratum of the activity (i.e. the agent), or substratum of the fruit thereof (i.e. the object).¹ Since result and action are denoted by the Verbal root the substratum is fit to be the expressive sense of a word must be such as cannot be arrived at by any other means.²

The meanings of the Verbal root and the suffix agree with each other by the relation of the qualified to the qualifier in general. It is like this. When the verb word is in active voice, the agent meaning of the suffix is an attribute to the action signified by the Verbal root, and the object meaning is an attribute to the result. And this result is an attribute of the action. When the verb is in active

- 1 Phala vyāpārayor dhātur āsraye tu Tinah smitāh (Var. Bhū Kārika 2)

Asraye-Vyāpārasraye phalāsraye ca, phalavyāpārayoh dhātulabhyatwāt, āsraya mātramarthah, Ananya lābhyasa sabdārthatvāt (Var. Bhū P 5)

- 2 Ananyalabhyah Sabdārthah

voice, the number meaning of the affix is an attribute of agent—meaning signified by the *Tin* affix, but of the object when the verb is in passive construction. As regards the Time meaning of the verbal suffix, it is always an attribute of the action. Thus according to the grammarian a verbal suffix signifies substratum (agent or object) number, person, time and also upagraha. The person meaning is an attribute of the agent or object when the sentence is in active or passive construction respectively. And the verbal import of the sentence, "Caitra cooks rice" (Caitrah tandulam pacati), as explained by the Grammarian, would be "action of the present time congenial to softening which (softening) resides in the rice not different from the object' and which action has one agent non-different from Caitra" ²

Thus in the above sentence, the root 'Pac' expresses the action of 'cooking'. The statement 'Viklittyanukūla etc.' shows that the fruit 'Viklitti' is an attribute of the action expressed by the verbal root "Pac". "Caitra Kartīkah Pākah" and Tandulābhinnā Karmavṛttiḥ shows that the subject "Caitra" is an attribute of the action 'Pāka' and that the object "Tandula" is an attribute of 'Viklitti' (result) of the action. Ekakartīkah shows that the number meaning expressed by the Verbal affix is an attribute of the subject Caitra. "Caitrābhinnā eKa kartīka and tandulābhinnā karmavṛtti" show the non-differential relation subsisting between Caitra and the substratum of action etc. Thus the grammarian holds that a verbal affix signifies the substratum (Āsraya) i.e. Kartā or karman as the case may be

It may be observed here in the verb word, the substratum i.e. the meaning of the suffix (Pratyaya), is an attribute of the action meaning of the root (Prakṛti). As such, it should not be mistaken that it will result in contradicting the maxim 'when the

1 Tinabhihitena Bhāvena Kālapurusopagrahā Vyajyante.
(Bhāṣya on P.3 1 67)

2 Caitrābhinnāikakartīkah tandulābhinnā karmavṛtti viklittyanukūla
vartamānakāliko vyāpārah

base and affix are conjointly uttered, then, of the meanings signified by the two, the sense (or the meaning) of the suffix should be predominant" 1 The grammarian is of the view that this rule does not apply in the case of verb words in view of the notion, "The predominant element in a verb words is action" 2

According to the Logician, however, the meaning signified by the potentiality of the suffix is activity (Kṛti), which is different from the action signified by the verbal root. Similarly the Mīmāṃsaka holds that Bhāvanā is the signified potentiality of the suffix, but not the substratum. The grammarian argues that, if we are to accept the above contention, then naturally we cannot maintain the system of Person agreeing with the agent, etc. The aphorisms "Yusmadyucapad Asmdyutta, seceprathamah" lay down clearly that the agent or the object signified by the affix should be in the same substratum as the subject or the object concerned in the sentence. But if the agent or the the object is not the expressed sense of the Verbal affix then the question of subsistence in the same substratum along with the agent or the object does not arise in all the three persons (1st, 2nd or 3rd person). Hence according to the governing aphorism "when not expressed" (Anabhihite), in sentences like Devadatta cooks (Devadattah pacati) according to the Logician (or the Mīmāṃsaka) the agent Devadatta has to take the instrumental case affix, since the agent meaning is not expressed by the verbal affix 3 and in sentences in the passive construction as "Pacyate Tamlulah" and the like, the object rice (Tamlulah) has to be in the accusative case, because, the object is not expressed by the Verbal affix

The Logician explains the aphorism 'Anabhihite' as 'when the verbal affix does not express the number-meaning of the agent or the object, but the grammarian rejects such an explanation, because the number meaning is not expressed by the primary and secondary affixes and by compounds and as such sentences like

1 Prācīti pratyayau sahitṛtham brūtaṣṭayoh pratyayārthasya
prācīṇyām (Bhaṭ C P 79, and few lines)

2, Bhāva-pradhānamākhyātam

3 Anabhihite (P.2 3 1,) and Karti Karanayostitiyā (P 2 3 18)

"Devadattah pācakah" will not be rendered possible, and on the other hand sentences like "Devadattena pācakah" will have to be formed. Consequently the agent not being expressed by the Nvu affix in the word 'pācaka', the agent Devadatta is to be expressed in the instrumental case. And further if it is contended by the opponent that the agent is not expressed by the Verbal suffix then he has to admit that the primary suffixes like "Nvu" etc. also do not express the agent, because both the verbal affix and the primary affix are the substitutes in the same sense in the place of the Lakāra itself. Therefore it will be rational to accept that the agent or the object is the signified potentiality of the verbal affix.

Further the grammarian continues his arguments as follows. The verbs "Pacati" and the like are found to agree with words such as "Devadatta" and the like which are used to specify the particular agent or object. And this is possible only if we accept the sameness of the substratum between the two. Sameness of substratum is possible only between two entities which are identical.¹ Consequently, in the present instance, the necessary sameness of substratum could be obtained only if the verb word "pacati" in general denotes the agent Devadatta. The argument that the agent is indicated by the verb "pacati" in accordance with the 'Akṛtyādhikāraṇa Nyāya', is not correct, because, the agent in the sentence "Devadattaḥ pacati" cannot be indicated by the cooking (Pāka) which subsists in the rice. In fact the cooking can indicate only the number singleness inhering in the rice, but not a thing that inheres in another substratum.² Thus it becomes evident that the word "Pacati" and the like are denotative of the agent or the object.³

-
- 1 Tattu samānādhikāraṇyāt bhavati, samānādhikāraṇyam ca dvayorapyekavīsayatve kalpyeta (Tan. Var P. 930.)
 - 2 Tena yadi hi Devadattādayaḥ sāmānyataḥ pacatisabdenābhihitāḥ Tatataḥ Samānādhikāraṇyam labhyate, laksanayā ākṛtyārunādhikāranokta nyāyena bhaviṣyati cet na Tandulāstena pākena laksayitumasakyatvāt, Tatsamavetameva Dvyekatvādi laKs ayitum sakyate, nānya samavāyi (Tan Var Pa 930)
 - 3 Tasmāc pacati sabdādirvācakaḥ kartā karmaṇoḥ (Tan Var P 963.)

Further the fact that the Verbal affix denotes either an agent or an object can be established in another way. For instance let us observe the word 'pākah' which is formed by adding the primary suffix 'ghan' to the root Pac. Here the affix 'ghan' speaks of Bhāva and not of the agent or the object. Hence in these cases the sameness of substratum (sāmanādhikaranyā) cannot be brought about between pāka (cooking) and Devadatta etc.,¹ but in cases like "Devadattaḥ pacati" we can explain the sameness of substratum between pākakarta and Devadatta on the lines of the statement "Devadattaḥ Pācakah" where the Nvul affix signifies the agent. Thus the verbal affix denotes the agent or the object.

Further, let us observe sentences like "Devadattaḥ pacati, pacato Devadatta yajnadattaḥ pacanti Devadatta yajñadatta Viśnuguptaḥ". Here it is observed that the number in the word expressing the particular agent is exactly the same as that denoted by the verbal affix. And we also note that a change in the number of the word expressive of the particular agent Devadatta etc. causes, a simultaneous and identical change in the number expressed by the verbal affix in the word 'pacati' and the like. And further wherever we find such to be the case, we find the word to be actually denotative of the agent or the object as in the case of the words "Paktā" and the like, in connection of which also we have such usages as "Paktā Devadattaḥ Paktārau Devadatta yajnadattaḥ, Paktārah Devadatta Yajnadatta Viśnuguptaḥ". So also in the case of passive sentences (karmant), we find such usages as "Pacyate odanaḥ, Pacyate odanasākau, pakvaṇ odanaḥ, etc."² Thus from all the above illustrations, it becomes evident that the agent or the object is the signified potentiality of the verbal affix.

- 1 Yata ca kartṛkarma Vacanatvam nāsti tatrasāmanādhikarīyam adīśam yathā pākādisabde (Tan Var P 930)
- 2 Tacchabdopātta tadbhūtasamkhyābhedaṇuvartanāt Tathaiva vacakatvam syāt dīśtāntau tāvihāpica (Tan Var Slok 1)

The grammarian further argues that unless we accept the denotational capacity to the verbal affix in expressing the agent or the object, there would be nothing to justify the prohibition of affixes of instrumental case and the objective case after the word Devadatta and Odana in the sentences 'Pacati Devadattaḥ' and 'pacyate odanaḥ' respectively. It is found that the rules of grammar lay down the prohibition of the nominative and the objective case endings after the words denoting the agent or the object. In particular, in case this agent or the object is not denoted by other words, such as the verbal affix. Thus the aphorisms Karma Dvitiyā, Kartṛkāraṇa yositīyā, under the governing sūtra "Anabhīte" can regulate the case affixes after the agent, object etc. Thus, in as much as we find that these affixes are actually prohibited it is possible to account for such prohibition only by accepting the rule that the verbal suffixes denote the agent or the object like the primary affixes.

Further if it is not accepted that Verbal affix signifies the agent or the object, it can not be explained how it (the suffix) could denote a particular property of the agent or the object in the shape of number. To assert that the affix does not denote the agent etc., but denotes their property involves contradiction. If as the Mīmāṃsaka contends, the subject is secured by presumption from Bhāvanā, then there is the contingency of the number meaning having to agree with the agent which is not an object of Sādhādharma. Consequently the number meaning which is expressed by the suffix has to qualify the expressed meaning "Bhāvanā" only in which case the change in number would have not been possible because Bhāvanā is always single by nature (Ekākriyā) as in the case of sentences in impersonal usages. Hence in order to overcome this awkward situation, we must admit that verbal affix signifies the meaning agent or object etc., And for this reason also the verbal affix must be admitted as signifying the agent or the object.

Similarly in order to justify the qualifying nature of the adjectives, as in instances "Sobhanah pacati" Sobhanah pacyate etc. also we have to accept the denotating capacity to the Verbal affix in the agent or object. This becomes evident when we examine

the sentences "Sobhanah Pakṭi" and "Sobhanah pakvah" and 'Sobhanam Āsyate" etc.¹ Besides the meaning of the base, the number and gender of the adjective which are the expressed senses, qualify the number and gender of the agent which are expressed by the suffix in Pakṭi, Pakvah etc. Therefore in the sentence "Sobhanah pacati" the adjective "Sobhanah" cannot qualify something which is not the expressed sense of the verbal affix. Where such an agent is not expressed by the suffix as "Āsyate", the verbal affix in the impersonal mood denotes activity (Bhāva) denoted by the root but not the agent or the object. And hence its qualify is denoted by the indeclinable word "Sobhadam" as in the instances Sobhanam pacati.

Thus from all the above observations, the grammarian asserts that the verbal affix denotes the Āsiya i. e. the agent or the object etc.

THE VERBAL SUFFIX—THE MĪMĀMSAKA SCHOOL

Of the two existing schools of the Mīmāṃsa doctrine, first we will examine the views of the Bhāṭṭa School, as far as it concerns the meaning of the Verbal affix. Even in this school different scholars expressed different views regarding the denotative potentiality of the verbal affix, and also tried to defend their own stand, but there is one thing in common to all of them, i. e. none of them accepts that the verbal affix signifies the agent or the object as propounded by the grammarian.

Among such Mīmāṃsa scholars Kumārilabhaṭṭa is the first and foremost person in refuting the grammarian. The various arguments advanced by him to refute the views of grammarians can be summarised as under

¹ Viśeṣanaiśca sambandhādūcyete kartṛkarmaṇī Na hyanuktasya sambandhaḥ svagunaiḥ avakalpyate (Ibid P 965)

VIEWS OF KUMARILA

Kumarila opines that Bhāvanā is the signified potentiality of the Verbal suffix. After all, the meaning of any word is that which is not secured from any other source. And no other denoter is found to signify Bhāvanā than the verbal affix itself. Especially the time and other meanings secured from the Verbal affix are not found to be in invariable concomitance with Bhāvanā and are found to exist even without Bhāvanā.¹

Further Bhāvanā cannot be presumed either by time or by the agent etc., denoted by the Verbal affix, nor can it be presumed through the meaning of the Verbal root, because if it can be so presumed, Bhāvanā has to become subsidiary to the agent meaning as contended by the grammarian. Just as in the case of words formed by adding primary affixes after a verbal root, e.g. pīcaka, and the like. But as a matter of fact in strict adherence to the maxim "Bhāva pradhānamākhyātam" of the various meanings signified by the Ākhyāta (verbal affix) Bhāvanā is always cognised as the predominant element and hence we have to accept that Bhāvanā is directly signified by the Verbal affix itself.²

More over, of the meanings of the base and the affix, the affix-meaning should be more prominent. That is the maxim.² So in the present case, the important sense we get from a 'Verb word as a whole' is Bhāvanā. Therefore this Bhāvanā must be accepted as being signified by the suffix, failing which it goes against the said maxim. And then, the root and the affix are always found to appear in a definite order of sequence. And the knowledge of Bhāvanā comes only after hearing the verbal affix in the verb word. So this experience of ours also proves that Bhāvanā is the signified

1 Bhāvanāyastāvanna śabdavyatiriktaṁ pratyāyakam paśyāmaḥ
Tatra Kālādīnāṁ vyabhicāritvāt sambhavantīḥ vināpi Bhāva-
naya kāla samkhyādayaḥ, (Tan Vār P.940)

2 Yadyapyanyad viveka kāranaṁ nāsti tathāpi prādhānyam par-
tyayārthe dharmam dīstvā nūnamīyampratyayārtha ityavaga-
myate (Tan. Var. P 348, 647)

potentiality of the verbal affix ¹ That is to say that there is an invariable concomitance between the verbal affix and Bhāvanā is cognised only when the verbal suffix is used And hence the theory i.e. "Bhāvanā is the expressed sense of the affix" is established

Another powerful argument to substantiate the mīmāṃsaka theory is the very explanatory sentence of the meaning of the verb word For instance, the word 'Pacati' is explained as 'Pākam karo-ti' (He does cooking) The verb word has two constituent parts viz., the base 'Pac' and the suffix 'Ti' In the explanatory sentence also the meaning of the verbal base (root) which is to be accomplished is explained by the word 'Pāka' ending in an accusative case affix, and the meaning of the suffix 'Ti' is explained by the word 'Karoti' The sense that is conveyed by the word 'Karoti' is called 'Bhavanā' And therefore it is logical to accept this Bhāvanā as the one signified by the verbal affix, because it is a universal fact that the sense or import we get on hearing a particular word, is the meaning of that particular word itself

Now as regards the meaning the agent or the object unlike the other meanings (factors) of the Verbal affix, it is presumed by Bhāvanā, because Bhāvanā can not be accomplished without the agent Here the agent is cognised in a subdued form and hence can be accepted that the agent is presumed from the Bhāvanā, the denoted sense of the verbal affix. Of course it can be questioned as to how the agent Kāraka alone can be presumed by Bhāvanā, when there are other Kārakas also claiming to come up in its place. To this it is replied that the Kārakas other than the agent Kāraka are not found to be so concomittant with it, as the agent is This fact also strengthens the capability of Bhāvanā to presume primarily the agent Hence it is proved that the agent is obtained from Bhāvanā either by presumption (arthāpatti) or by inference (Anumāna) ²

- 1 Tathā karma vatorṇityaṁ prakṛtiḥ pratyayāmsayoh, pretyayaśi-tivelāyam bhāvanātmā avagamyaṭe (Tan Var P.348),
- 2 Yadiśasca guṇabhūtaḥ karta aṭravaghyate na ādisena vihā, Bhāvanopapadyata iti arthāpatyā anumānena vā saktāgamayitum (Tan Var P.914,),

The Mīmāṃsaka continues to criticise the views of the grammarian in the following way — The very fact that number is related to the agent only, also goes to prove that the agent is presumed by Bhāvanā. That is to say in instances like 'gacchet', we find that the number (meaning) is not secured by any other means of knowledge and as such it is to be accepted as the expressed sense of the suffix. Number being a quality can not exist independently and hence its 'āśraya' as the agent or object has to be presumed. But not Vice-versa. It is very unfortunate that the grammarian could not understand the spirit of the teachings of their sages Pāṇini, Patañjali etc. If we closely examine Pāṇini's style of aphorisms dealing with this subject, it will be evident that these aphorisms dealing with the verbal affixes are to be construed as forming a single sentence so that any incompatibility can be avoided by reading all these aphorisms as a single sentence. So when we examine the whole set of the aphorisms dealing with the verbal affixes, from this view point, one thing becomes clear to us that whether the relationship between the words constituting the aphorisms mentioned in the said section is either by having the same locus or otherwise, the final purport is that the verbal affixes denote only the numbers oneness etc as qualified by the agent or object as the case may be. This type of interpretation alone can avoid all the discrepancies and will be in keeping with the spirit of the section dealing with the verbal affixes. Thus it becomes established that the agent or the object is the result of presumption but not of direct denotation 1. And further Mīmāṃsaka always proves the potentiality of words or even sakti (capacity) with the help of presumption (Arthapatti) only. This being the position, in the present case, this presumption is capable of being explained with the help of

1. Tasmād karturekatva ityevamādinaṁ darśite kartṛkarma vsista ekatvādayah pratyayavācyeḥ sistrnugataḥ. (Tan Vār P.926, 11 5.6)

Bhāvanā i.e. Bhāvanā cannot exist without an agent. Hence the notion that the verbal affix denotes the agent, cannot be accepted but should be discarded ¹

The Mīmāṃsaka contends that the stand of the grammarian can be set aside on another count also. The agent or object is not expressed by the Verbal affix. The verbal affix denotes Bhāvanā with which it is invariably concomittant. And it is also an accepted fact that which denotes something with which another thing is invariably concomittant, can never denote this latter as seen in the instance of Simsupa. The word Simsupa being denotative of the class (Jāti) Simsupa is incapable of denoting the individual treehood (vyakti), the invariable concomittant of the former. Further, the verbal affix can not abandon its own denotable meaning Bhāvanā, just to express either the agent or object because these can be obtained even by other means like Arthāpatti or Anumāna. The agent or the object is cognised even without accepting a separate potentiality to it in the verbal affix. Further the agent or the object is a Kāraka just like an other Kāraka as instrument (kāraṇa) etc. The Mīmāṃsaka find no logic in the argument of the grammarian that the subject kāraka alone is expressed to the exclusion of all other Kārakas like the instrumental Kāraka. Now let us take the word Āsyate. Here according to the grammarian also, the verbal suffix does not denote either an object or an agent. The verbal affix found in Pacati or Yajate'' is just like the one found in Āsyate. And there is no logic in accepting the affix to denote Bhāvanā at one place and not to denote it at another place. If we are to accept the grammarian's theory, it would contradict all the above mentioned arguments based on inference. Hence the Verbal affix can not denote the agent or object ²

Kumārila now probes into the very roots of the argument of the grammarian i.e. the sameness of substratum of the agent or the object and Vyapāra, in Caitra. The Mīmāṃsaka question

1 Tatra yadivācaka saktyā astitvamanumīyeta tatah pūrvokteḥ ārthāptibhāṅgena sarvapramāṇa anupapatteḥ anupalabdhi virodhah (Tan Vār P 932,).

2 Anumānavirodhasca (Tan. Vār. P.932.)

whether such co-existence is directly denoted by the verbal affix or got through secondary signification 1

Neither the Mīmāṃsaka nor the Grammarian can admit that such a co-existence is directly denoted by the verbal affix (*srautam*) To the Mīmāṃsaka a verbal affix denotes *Bhavana* and to the Grammarian it is *śakti* (Potency) as such there is no possibility of direct denotation of co-existence, because one is *vyāpāra* and the other is a *dravya*

For the grammarian a *Kāraka* is nothing more than a capacity and as such we do not find capacity (*śakti*) being expressed by the words *Devadatta* and the like, since they are found to denote substance (*Dravya*) Consequently, if the affix is accepted as denoting the *Kāraka*, it must be admitted that it would denote it only in the form of capacity and never in the form of a substance, because the substance is not the *Kāraka* Hence in accordance with the law pertaining to the *Ākīyadhikāraṇa*, it must be admitted even by the grammarian, that capacity alone is the meaning signified by the affix but not the substance 2 Thus, no co-existence with the word denotative of substance would ever be possible Nor, do we find any word mentioned along with verb word, that could denote potency with which (word) there could be a directly denoted coexistence Such a word denoting potency could only be one that ends in a *Kāraka* case affix, but in instances like "*Caitraḥ pacati*" there is no word found to be ending in a case affix Thus the Mīmāṃsaka establishes that the directly denoted coexistence is not possible either for him or for the grammarian 3

-
- 1 *Tathāsamānādhikāraṇyam srautam lāksanīkam ca heturucyate* (ibid 933),
 - 2 Note Even if the *kāraka* be accepted to be a *dravya*, *śakti* has to be accepted as the attributive to it Since without *śakti*, *Vyāpāra* is impossible, Hence according to *Ākīyadhikāraṇa* only *śakti* is signified and this *śakti* can not agree by the relation of identity with a word which signifies *dravya* *Caitra* etc
 - 3 *Tatascavasthītam sīti samānādhikā anyasyobhayorapoasiddhatvam* (Op Cit)

Now if we come to the second possibility i.e. the coexistence of one that is got through the secondary signification (lakṣaṇā) then in instances like the "boy is a lion" (Simho mānavakah) you have to accept the coexistence of boy-hood and lion-hood in the boy inspite of the fact there exists no such idea of the expresser and the expressed (vācya-vācakabhava). And such an acceptance leads to the fallacy of Anaikāntikatā. Thus it is established that co-existence can not be proved with the help of secondary signification.

Now as regards the citations of Pakti, Pācakah etc., quoted by the grammarian to prove his stand that the verbal affixes have denotational potency in the agent etc. the Mimamsaka says such an argument is not valid because words like Pacati etc. do not purport to signify sakti but because they agree with some other sakti, they should be construed as signifying the saktimat. Thus all the fallacies pointed out in the first few arguments of the grammarian can be extended even to the other arguments. For instance contrary to the contention of the grammarian we say that the verbal affix can not express the number of the agent. It is like this. Numbers always belong to substances but not to capacities. The grammarian admits it. And as such numbers do not belong to Karakas like the agent etc. which are of the form of capacities.² And if we are to hold that the verbal affix denotes the substance whose number it would express, then there would be a conflict of its not agreeing with a dravya as no grammarian accepts that the verbal affix is denotative of a substance.³

1 Atha lakṣaṇayā sāmānādhikāraṇyamavisesitam vā hetuḥ tataḥ simho mānavaa ityādi-vantare'nāpi vācya-vācakabhāvam sāmānādhikāraṇyam dīṣṭam ityanaikāntikatā (Op. Cit. P 934)

2 Saktiḥ Sādhanaṁ (M. B.)

3 Tadgata saṁkhyopadānamapi sakti-gatatvena tavadasidham. Nahi kascirdvayākṛmah akhyātasya dravya vacanatvamicchatī (Tan. Vā. P 969)

Now as regards the contention¹ of the grammarian that the Anabhihitādhikārasūtra itself is a proof to establish that the verbal affix denotes agent or object, the Mīmāṃsaka replies as follows - The contention that "other designations like kāraka, karma are prevented since the verbal affix denotes the agent etc, is not a sound argument. Here it is to be noted clearly that, if the prevention meant by the grammarian, be the prevention of all other kāraka (case) affixes, then the argument is subject to the fallacy of the unestablished (asiddha) in the given example "Devadattah pacati" the nominative affix too is a denoted kāraka case affix¹

Further if the grammarian opines that the Nominative and other case affixes drop on account of their being denoted by the verbal affix etc then such dropping of case affixes is found even if the subject etc is not denoted by others, as in instances governed by the Sūtra "Ubhayaaprātau karmān" Here in sentences like "Paśya Sitāyāḥ haraṇam Ravanaena" the genitive pertaining to the object does not denote the agent but it prevents the sixth case affix from the agent² Thus the mere prevention of kāraka affixes laid down by the grammatical rules cannot substantiate the contention that a verbal affix denotes agent or object

Now to the argument of the grammarian that in instances like 'Devadattah', Pacati and Pacyate odanah Devadattena', the instrumental and accusative case affixes would have been appended after the words Devadatta and Odana respectively according to the governing aphorism 'Anabhihite' were not the agent and object denoted by the Verbal affix, Kumārila replies that such an argument is not valid. It is clearly to be noted that enjoining a Kāraka affix is to bring the number meaning and the Kāraka meaning. This being the position, in the present examples "Devadattah

1 Yadapi kāraka vibhakteḥ pratibandhanam, tadāpi yadi tāvat sarvaṃ syat tato'siddham, prathamāyā api anabhihitakāraka-vibhaktitvat (Tan Vār, P 935)

2 Ubhayaaprātau karmān (ibid)

pacati etc " the agent is found to be secured by Bhavana denoted by the verbal affix and the number meaning is secured by the verbal affix. Then what is left unexpressed? and what is that? Which compels the grammarian to create another denotative potentiality in the verbal affix? Since the agent and the number are expressed directly or indirectly by the Verbal affix, the words *Devadatta* and *Udara* cannot take other case affixes 1

As for the argument of the grammarian that the verbal affix has to denote the agent or object since it (the verbal affix) signifies their particular qualification (number), the *Mīmāṃsaka* points out such an argument suffers from the fallacy of *Anaikāntikatva* as is clear from the instance of '*Simsupā*'. The word *simsupā* is not denotative of the class, tree, earthly substance etc though it is found to denote a particular phase of these, the class *simsupā*. And just as in this case (1) we find that the denotation of the particular is not opposed to the non-denotation of the general. (2) In the case of the Eye also we find that its non-perceptionness of impermanence, is not opposed to its perception of colour. (3) Even according to the grammarian, the Verbal affix does not denote the generic element of 'substance' but denotes agenthood a particular phase of it in the form of the agent. So in the same way even without the denotation of the agent there would be nothing incongruous in expressing the number without expressing the Agent.

Further the argument of the grammarian that the expressed qualities cannot agree with the presumed individuals and therefore it is obligatory that the agent or object also should be expressed, is not tenable. This can be answered following the

- 1 *Samkhyāyam karakevā dhirvibhaktyaḥ pravartate Ubhayam citra tatsiddham Bhavanā tūvibhaktikāḥ* (Tan Vār P 935) and also last but two lines
- 2 *Yattu tadviśeṣabhidhānaditī tatsimsupā śabdāḥ anaikāntikam* (Tan Vār P 940,)
- 3 *Yadapi gamyamānasya viśeṣaḥ sambandhaḥ nāsti, atastat sambandha darsanā dābhidhānamiti* (ibid)

Ākityadhikarāṇa Nyāya or Arunādhikarāṇa Nyāya In a statement like 'Arunaya ekahaayanyā pingakṣyā somam kṛmāti', we find that the qualification Ārunayā (Redness) etc. agrees with the agent presumed by the Tin suffix (of course through the medium of the cow).

Further the grammarian's argument suffers from the fallacy of Anaikāntikatva. Let us examine the sentence "Madhurarasaḥ snigdho sito guruṣca". Here the madhurarasa (Sweet taste), being a property, does not agree with other properties such as sneha and the rest. But all these properties exist in that particular object presumed by the phrase Madhurarasa etc.. And certainly nobody would admit the word 'Rasa' is denotative of the substance directly. Similarly we can show another example where expressed meanings agree with presumed objects. For instance in the sentence "Asvasahasreṇa musitam nagaram" (The city was robbed by a thousand horses), the action of robbing is connected with the raiders presumed by the word horses (Asva) ¹. Thus Kumārila says all the arguments of the Grammarian are fallacious.

Now the opponent may question why in the case of verbs like Asti, Bhavati Jāyate etc. no Bhāvanā is cognised from the verbal affix and as such there can be concomitance between the suffix and the Bhāvanā, hence it cannot be admitted that Bhāvanā is cognised only after hearing the suffix and consequently the affix cannot denote Bhāvanā.

To this objection Kumārila replies that the objection holds good even to the grammarian who argues that Bhāvanā is denoted by the root or the root meaning ². So what the Mīmāṃsaka argues is that, whenever Bhāvanā is cognised, it is always expres-

1 Tathā asvasahasreṇa nagaram musitamiti gamyamānānāmeva sādīnām mosakriyāsambandhaḥ (Tan. Vār. ibid P.940)

2 Yattvastyādiraparāḥ pratyayopi bhāvanām jahātīti tulyam Dhātu samudāyapaksayorapyetat, Sarvathā Yatra pratīyate tatra tāvat pratyayārthatvam niscīyate (Tan. Vār. P.381.)

sed by the affix and where it is not cognised there is no scope for the discussion as to by what it is expressed.¹

Though Kumārila gives the above reply he does not seem to be satisfied with it probably because in the case of Asti, Bhavati etc he has to provide for an exception. So now he offers an alternative argument to the opponent. In the case of the words, Asti and the like, also, there exists Bhāvanā in the form of accomplishing the agent himself who is still in an unaccomplished state. And this Bhāvanā cannot be distinctly cognised apart from the Agent.² Though there is no functioning of the agent that can be specially cognised, the element of Bhāvanā can be cognised due to the very innate potentiality of the affix itself.. This Bhāvanā has evidently generic nature present in both the birth of the individual (the former being Siddha) and the latter being sādhyā

The Mīmāṃsaka admits frankly the fact that Bhāvanā is never cognised apart from the signification of the verbal root, but he humbly argues that the Bhāvanā proper that is cognised in a general form covering many particular actions, is something entirely different from the action denoted by the root.³ That is to say, in all the particular actions viz laying the vessel upon the fire, fanning etc, a common generic action in the form of Karoti (does) is always perceived. And among all these actions the mere action of "cessation from inactivity", the mere 'moving' towards the performance of an action is what is meant by the word Bhāvanā.⁴ And all the particular actions which inhere

- 1 Sarvathā yatra pratiyate tatra tāvat pratyayārthatvam nisciyate. Anyatratvayam vicāra eva nāsti (Tan Var P 281)
- 2 Astyādāvapi kartramse bhāvye asthyeva hi Bhāvanā, Anyatrāsesabhāvattu na tathā sa prakāśate (ibid)
- 3 Dhātvarthātirekena yadyapyesa na labhyate, tathāpi sarva-sāmānya rūpeṇa anyāvagamyate. (Tan Var P 382)
2. Tatra yādrusī pracyutimātreṇa paṇispanda rūpam nirūpyate sā bhāvanā (ibid P.382)

A K H Y Ā T A

in the object as well as in the agent, become related to it (bhavanā) either in the form of the instrument or in that of Process.

The Mīmāṃsaka here cautions us not to mistake in the above case that Bhāvanā is nothing more 'than a generic denotation of the verbal root' No doubt Bhāvanā appears in generic form but always in the form of "Something to be accomplished and never in the particular forms of the sacrifice etc Yāga etc also are called particular Bhāvanās because of the attributiveness in the form of Kāranatva etc

Further, strictly speaking the Bhāvanā, signified by the verbal affix cannot be expressed in the same form by any other word This Bhāvanā signified by the Verbal affix is entire free from any element of gender and number. Thus the Bhaṭṭa mīmāṃsaka in general and Kumārila in particular asserts that the Verbal affix has potency in denoting Bhāvanā but not the agent or object which (in his view) can be had through presumption

MANDANA MISRA —

Mandana Misra, a great Mīmāṃsaka, contrary to every other one, pursues an altogether different line dealing with the meaning of the Verbal affix He says that "The activity, like blowing the pipe etc, in the form of activityhood, congenial to the fulfilment of the result is the meaning of the Verbal affix", and the result is the meaning of the root He is so unfortunate that the theory propounded by him has been severely criticised by the scholars belonging to every school or discipline His views in detail have already been mentioned while discussing the meaning of the Verbal Root, as it is related to it (the meaning of the Verbal root

-
- 1 Anyadevahi Bhāgadāu sāmānyam kāranātmakam
Anyacca Bhāvanā nama sādhyatvena vyavasthitam
(ibid P 383).

PĀRTHASĀRATHI MISRA'S VIEW :—

Kūmarila did not specify whether Bhāvanā exists in the form of activity in general as denoted by 'Karoti' or in the form of "effort" (Yatna) as denoted by the word 'Yatate'. So now Pārthasārathi Misra, an ardent follower of the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā school and the author of the Śastradīpikā takes the responsibility of determining the character of this Bhāvanā, whether it is of the form of activity in general as denoted by 'Karoti' or 'Yatna' (effort) as expressed by 'Yatate'.

According to this scholar the verbal affix denotes "activity in the form of generality" congenial to the fulfilment of the result which is called Bhāvanā and is denoted by the verbal affix. He is of the firm opinion that there is nothing as Bhāvanā over and above the meaning of the verbal root, but it is only a variation of the meaning of the verbal root. He analyses action, the meaning of the verbal root, as having two aspects in it, one is peculiar to the verbal root itself denoted by it as not having any activity in the accomplished form. The other is that which is found commonly in all the verbal roots. We can cognise it in its form from the sentence "He does" (Sah karoti). It is in the form of accomplishment of something. Now let us observe the sentences, 'He shakes, He sacrifices, He speaks etc. when we put the question Kim karoti, to each of these the answer is shakes, sacrifices etc. Now "Karoti" expresses an action and so the question 'kim karoti' also expects an action in reply. And all the specific actions have in them a type of generic action. That is why when we put the question in terms of action in general, the reply "pacati" etc., speak of action in particular, not devoid of action in general. And this action in general is to be called Bhāvanā and is denoted by the verbal affix. Thus it is cognised from the cognition of the verb (he) 'does'.

1' Apāram tu saryadhātvarthānuyāyi karoti-pratyaya vedyam kriyātmakam sādhyasvabhāvam anyotpādānukūlātmakam ākhyā-tābhīdheyam .Tadeva bhavituh prayojakavyāpāro Bhāvanē-tyucyate" (Sas. Dip P 199).

Now the meaning of the verb 'karoti' is not effort (yatna) but activity (vyāpāra) only. Otherwise even the verb 'karoti' would become intransitive like the verb 'Yatate'. Such a meaning i.e. a generic action is accepted as the denoted sense of the verbal affix, because it is cognised in the presence of the verbal affix and it is not cognised in the absence of the verbal affix as in instances like 'Pāka'. The activity, in particular actions like yāga etc., denoted by the verbal roots, gets syntactically connected with the meaning Bhāvanā denoted by the verbal affix, by the relation of karaṇa or karma according to the desire (Vivakṣa) of the speaker, taking the latter as objectness (Karmatva) as is seen in the instances 'Pākam karoti' and yagena svargam bhāvayati and the like. The expressed sense of the affix is in the form of generality and when the question of particularity comes it is supplied through another means (i.e. root) but not by the verbal affix.¹

Parthasarathi opines that the determinant of Bhāvanā is Vyāpāratva in general but not Yatnatva. If we accept that Bhāvanā is of the form of Yatna as denoted by the Verb Yatate and also as the activity in general as denoted by the verb 'Karoti' then the roots K₁ and Yat' become synonymous. So much so the root K₁ is also to be reckoned as intransitive like 'Yat', but in fact the root K₁ is transitive as it always speaks of something to be brought into existence. Further the root K₁ always has the expectancy of an object. And Bhavana has always an expectancy of the object, in the form of the activity, denoted by the Verbal root. That is why even in intransitive verbs like 'Sete Patati etc.' we have Bhavanā denoted by the verb karoti as 'Swapam karoti, etc.

Thus Pārthasarathi Mīśra concludes that the activity in general is the determinant of the Bhavanā by being its theme and this Bhāvanā is always denoted by the verbal affix only.

1 Tasyāpi vyāpārasya viśesarūpam prāmāṇāntareṇa vedyam nā akhyātena (Śās. Dip. P 199,)

THE VIEW OF KHANDADEVA —

So far we have observed that the Mīmāṃsāla arguing against the Grammarian, takes it for granted that there exists something called Bhavana, denoted by the verbal affix. Now let us examine what actually is meant by Bhavana and the validity in accepting it, its nature and character. These aspects of Bhavana are lucidly explained by Khandadeva in his Mīmāṃsā Kaustubham.

According to the Grammarian the meanings of the root are the result (Phala) and activity congenial to it (Tadanukūla vyāpāra). Khandadeva raises a question as to what is meant by congeniality? Does it mean mere productivity (janakatvamātram) or engagement in general (Prayojakatvasadhāraṇam va) 1. Evidently it is not the former because even after the direct activity ceases, usages like 'he cooks' are rendered possible. Effort etc exist in ones self, which effort produces the particular activity in the body which (activity) in its turn produces the particular result. The nature of productivity exists even after the activity ceases. It may not be urged that the word 'cooks' does not include that part of the meaning also because it is not experienced. For, we explain the word 'cooks' as Pake Yatate and hence Yatna is also included in the meaning of the verb word.

By not accepting the 'congeniality to produce the result' as the determinant of the denoted meaning in the case of the word "cooks" and accepting efforthood and the nature of heating from underneath etc, by themselves as the determinant of the denoted meaning, if it is to be maintained that only those activities alone which are responsible for cooking, constitute the denoted meaning, and as such there is no overlapping, then the objector has to explain how the word Pacati is explained as 'Pake yatate' where 'Yatna' is separately spoken of from Paka,

and also he has to explain how yatna etc are not included in the meaning of the 'pac' 1

It may be argued by the opponent (Grammarian) that, in the explanatory sentence 'Pake Yatate' the root where conjointly uttered with Kṛt suffixes like Ghañ etc denotes merely the result part and so the activity part is explained by the word Yatate etc But this argument lands us in many undesirable consequences The one that we have to accept that the activity denoted by the concerned causal aggregate (Sāmagrī) and the conjoint utterance of Ghañ etc, is an impediment to denote activity, Secondly if Śakti is accepted in activity when the root is conjointly uttered with Tip, then, not only is there prolixity in the determinant of the denoter-hood, but also the acceptance of two separate cause-effect relations Thirdly there is the contingency of the root appended with Ghañ etc not denoting Vyapara, which is in common experience

If, on the other hand, the grammarian argues that then the activity of the karaka is intended to be expressed by the root 'Pac' and hence there is no intention to speak of the other meaning, effort etc and hence it is separately expressed in the statement 'Pake Yatate', the Mīmāṃsaka rejoins that in the explanatory sentence there is absolute necessity to accept the presence of 'effort' in the part of the Agent Otherwise the word denoting the agent, cannot claim the nominative case affix because he is not the substratum of the activity denoted by the root Nor can it be stated that some other activity in the agent is desired to be expressed by the word 'Yatate', since in that case the explanatory sentence 'Pake yatate' itself will not be rendered possible So from all these points the opponent has to accept that there exists in the verb word something in the form of effort etc different from and independent of the activity expressed by the root And that is called Bhavanā Since the Verbal root denotes activity

1 Evam Tarhi pacati=Pake yatate, Pākam bhāvayati ityādivivaraṇat yatnādīnām pākāt pīthakkaraṇena yatnādīnām pacau saṃgrahānupapatteḥ (ibid P 17)

congenial to produce the result, one has to accept this Bhāvanā from which the said activity is produced. This Bhāvanā which the root fails to denote is denoted by the verbal affix

According to Khanda Deva effort-hood (Yatnatvam) alone is fit to be the determinant of the potentiality of the Tin affix. He does not accept the theory of Parthasarathi Misra. According to Khanda Deva there is no single factor simple in nature worth to be the determinant of the meaning of the verbal affix because different verbs denote different activities and results. The explanatory sentence of Pacati is also formed to be Pāke yatate or Pākam karoti. Taking all these factors into account it is prudent to accept (Yatnatva) effort-hood alone as the determinant of the potentiality of the affix ¹. Further the argument that karoti is the root K₁ does not denote 'yatna' (effort) is also not correct. For instance when a man is suffering from gout (vātaroga) there may be usages like 'Naham spandām karomi kintu vātarogena mama dehasspandate' (I am not moving but my body moves (shivers) due to gout), from which it is evident that root karoti has the meaning of effort. Further it is parsimonious to admit that effort-hood is the determinant of denotative meaning-hood. Therefore, consequently, usages like Ratho gamanām karoti etc are explained by taking recourse to the secondary signification for the root K₁ in the meaning 'congenial to movement'.

We have observed Pārthasārathi arguing that if the root 'K₁' denotes 'effort' then it becomes intransitive because the root 'Yat' denoting effort is an intransitive root. So with the same 'effort', being denoted by both the roots, they become synonymous and hence the root K₁ becomes intransitive. To this Khanda Deva replies 'it is not so'. It is an accepted fact that if the activity and the result denoted by the root subsist in the same substratum then the root becomes intransitive, otherwise transitive only. As

1 Vastutastu tattatphalabhedena, tad vyāpārabhedena ca anugatika laghubhūtasakyaatāvachedakābhāvāt, Pacati pāke yatate, Pākam karoti ityādivivaranācca ākhyātasya yatnatvameva sakyatāvachedakam (Bhā. Rah. p. 61)

regards the meaning of the root 'Yat', the result is the activity subsisting in Caitra and yatna concerned subsists in (him) the same substratum. Hence it is intransitive. But in the case of the root 'K₁' the result is in the form of production (utpatti) which cannot subsist in the same substratum along with activity meaning. It is due to this peculiar nature of the particular roots, they become transitive or intransitive. So it does not matter even if we admit that the root 'K₁' denotes effort ¹

Strictly speaking, a root is said to be transitive when it has the definite expectancy of an object. Where such an expectancy is absent, the root is said to be intransitive - (Of course the grammarian does not accept it ³). Here the expectancy is the inherent quality of the root word (Root) itself. That is why in certain instances there may be an expectancy of the object and in certain cases it is not. When we say karoti, the expectancy is kim karoti? This expectancy can be satisfied by the supply of the proper object word ghaṭam, hence the root 'K₁' is a transitive root. The form of the word denoting the object also should be 'ghaṭam' (Ghaṭa-Am) with Am in its own form 'Am' (objective case affix concerned) but not its meaning e.g. Ghaṭa karmatvam karoti does not mean ghaṭam karoti though the affix 'am' may signify the meaning karmatva⁴. Thus the root K_r does have the expectancy because we do not put the question 'kim yatate' but 'Kasmin yatate'. In the case of the roots 'Pac' and the like, though originally transitive by nature, if the speaker does not want to treat it as transitive by mentioning the object, it is treated as intransitive. Similarly it is found that certain roots originally intransitive, are

- 1 Phala vyaparayoh samanādhikāraṇye akarmakatvam, Utpatyanukūla vyaparah kiñarthah Phalavyaparayoh vyadhikāraṇatve dhatoḥ sakarmakatvam.
- 2 Vastutastu , avivaksā viraha viśiṣṭa karmakāṅksā dhātutvaṁ sakarmakatvam, tadabhāvasca akarmakatvamityevam kaustubhoktalakṣaṇam yuktam (Bhā. Rah. P 62,).
3. For details see First Part Chapter 3-7
- 4 This is what is designated swarūpa yogyatā for the affix.

treated as transitive, for example, the root 'As' when spoken with the words denoting time etc are treated as transitive as in 'Māsamaste, Caitrena pśyate mīsa h' and the like

Therefore inspite of the fact the root Ki denotes yatna it does not become intransitive it is not dependent on the mere meaning of the root Hence the affix which is explained in terms of 'Karoti' also denotes 'Yatna' only but not activity in general ¹ Of course in instances, like 'the car goes, he knows, desires, etc where 'Yatna' cannot be explained as the meaning of the suffix, we take recourse to secondary signification in activity in general, ² or in substratumness as the case may be

THE VIEW OF PRABHĀKHRA —

The Prabhākara takes an altogether different stand As regards the denotation of the Verbal root he admits that a root denotes both the result and the activity congenial to it. He is also of the view that there exists nothing specially as Bhavanā either in the form of activity in general or 'yatna' to be denoted by the affix All this is included in the activity part of the meaning denoted by the root Thus he agrees with the grammarian But as regards the denotation of the verbal affix is concerned, he is of the opinion that where the sentence is an injunctive one there only the Tin suffix denotes Bhavana and in all other cases, he states, that the verbal affix denotes only the number meaning and the Tense meaning - Thus from the Tin suffix in 'pacati' we understand that the activity is of the present tense, and its agent is a single person (Vartamana Kalikah Ekakartikah vyāparah)

- 1 Ato yatnārthakatvepi karoteḥ sakarmakatva akṣateḥ tena vivriyamana akhyatasyāpi yatnārthakatvam (ibid Bhā Rah P 63 Para 3)
- 2 Yatra yatnasya bādah tatra anukūla vyāparasya asrayatasya vā Lakṣaneti drastavyam (ibid P 63)
- 1 Nanu kityadikam nakyatasyārthah kintu kalah samkhyā ca; Prakāraṅtaralabhyatvat (Sab Sak Pra P 399).

In as much as it is concerned with the Agent or Object, the Prabhakara joins hands with the Bhatta Mimāṃsaka, to the extent that the agent or object is obtained by presumption (Ākēpa). Therefore what is left to be accounted for is the number and tense only. So the Prabhakara advocates that the Verbal affix denotes this number meaning and the tense (Past present etc.) because this much only is not secured from any other source.¹

Further, non-acceptance of the Bhavana as the denoted sense of the verbal affixes in any way does not obstruct usage. And the acceptance of the number meaning and tense alone as the denoted senses of the verbal affix, does not result in any wrong usage. And if it so urged that without yatna, no activity is possible it can be explained as secured with the help of presumption from the meaning denoted by the verbal root.²

Now as regards the practice of putting a question with 'karoti' a word which denotes activity in general, and getting a reply with a word like 'Pakam' (karoti) does not have way to establish the denotation of activity or Bhavana by the verbal affix. As a matter of fact the question 'Kim karoti' is intended to know the particular type of the action one does. Because no one can be without any action at any moment. Hence the intention of the person who puts the question 'Kim karoti' is just to enquire into that particular action of the person. Therefore there is no possibility of denoting action of the form Does (karoti) by the verbal affixes which action is different from that denoted by the root.³ Now the question raised by the opponent is like this—the question and answer is possible where the action or effort lies in human beings or animals, because they can perform many activities. But we find in sentences like 'Ratho gacchati' also this type of questioning and getting the answer. Therefore the affix

1 Vide Pra. Pancikā P 425 and also Tar. Tan. P 74

2 Pacati ityatra yatnadhistu dhatvarthena ākēpadityāhuh,
(Tar. Tan. Part 3 p 75)

3 Tathā ca na sidhyati dhatvarthatirikta karotyarthavacanata
akhyātānam (Pra. Pan. P 425) Edn 1962

denotes action. But the Prabhākara asserts such type of question itself is irregular.¹

Now summarising the entire discussion on the denotation of the verbal affix in accordance with the Mīmāṃsakas we arrive at the following observations

1. Māṇana opines that the activity congenial to the production of the specific result as signified by the verbal root, is the denoted sense of the verbal affix.
2. Prabhākara Mīmāṃsakas accept only the number meaning and the tense meaning but not Bhāvanā as the denoted potentialities of the verbal affix. For the Bhāvanā is expressed by the TI affix in the case of injunctive sentences only.
3. The Bhāṭṭa mīmāṃsakas in general argue that there exists some activity called Bhāvanā, different from that which is denoted by the verbal root, and this Bhāvanā besides number meaning and tense, is the denoted sense of the verbal affix.
4. Pṛthasārathī Mīśra a Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka, argues that the activity in the form of generality alone is fit to be accepted as the denotation of the Verbal affix.
5. Kṛṣṇadeva says that this Bhāvanā is of the form of Yatna and its determinant is effort-hood (Yatnatva), but not activity in the form of generality.

Thus all these scholars except Māṇana Mīśra unanimously agree on the point that there exists something called Bhāvanā in the form of either activity or effort and it is the denoted potentiality of the verbal affix, with the exception of the Prabhākara as detailed above.

1. Gacchat ti cottare gamanātinkta vyāparābhāvat anupapattireva syāt (ibid).

Refutation of the Mīmāṃsaka Theory —

The Grammarian does not accept this theory of the Mīmāṃsaka. They criticise this theory severally. Now let us examine their arguments in this regard.

If it is argued by the Mīmāṃsaka that the agent is somehow presumed by Bhāvanā denoted by the Verbal affix, we have to say such an argument does not pave way in establishing the arrangement for forms expressive of different persons (Abhidhāna vyavasthā).

In the case of the passive construction the suffix denotes only the result, but not Bhāvanā. And if it is argued that Bhāvanā is expressed here also, then according to the Mīmāṃsaka since the agent is obtained by presumption, the word denoting agent cannot take the instrumental case. Hence wrong usages like 'Caitraḥ Tandulāḥ Pacyate' instead of 'Caitrena Tandulāḥ pacyate' will result. Otherwise it is to be admitted that the verbal affix in the active construction denotes Bhāvanā and in the passive construction denotes the fruit.

And if the Mīmāṃsaka fears that if Bhāvanā is presumed by the agent or by the root meaning, it could be cognised only in a subdued form and may lose its predominance in the verbal import. The grammarian assures that there would not be such contingency. There is no impediment for the meaning got through the means of presumption to be the predominant factor. Otherwise if the Mīmāṃsaka argues that only the expressed sense will have the predominance over that of which is obtained through presumption, then all his efforts made in the Ākṛtyadhikarana to establish the universal as the meaning of the nominal

1 Val. Bhū P 11.

2 Ākṣepa lahyasyapi pradhānyena bhāne bādhakabhāvāt.
(Val. Bhū P 11)

base will go in vain ¹ Here the idea is like this In the parlance of Mīmāṃsaka the nominal base expresses the universal (Ākṛitī or Jati) i.e. words like Cow, Horse, etc denotes cowness, horseness etc universals but not the individual But when we use the sentences like 'Bring the cow, 'Take the horse' we cannot bring cowness or horseness So the Mīmāṃsaka accepts that the individual is obtained through presumption Thus the expressed sense is the universal, but the predominance is only to the individual which is obtained through presumption ²

As for the argument of the Mīmāṃsaka in the case of the primary affixes, the denotation of the agent by these affixes is enjoined by a special aphorism "kartari kṛt, so only in those cases Bhāvanā is got through presumption, but in the case of the T_{in} suffixes there is no such an aphorism specifically enjoining the denotation of the substratum by these affixes hence there is nothing to prevent us from accepting Bhāvana as the expressed sense of the suffix and the agent through presumption, the grammarian replies as follows Even in the case of the affixes T_{in} and the like, there is a specific aphorism 'Lāḥ karmanī ca bhāve cākar-makebhyaḥ' which enjoins the lakāras (T_{in} affixes, Ṣaṭi Śanac etc) only in the sense of the agent etc Of course the word 'in the sense of agent (Kartari) is supplied into the aphorism from the previous aphorism 'Kartari Kṛt' Such being the case, we find no logic in discriminating between the kṛt and T_{in} affixes on this point, because in both the cases the maxim that 'the expressive sense of the word must be such as cannot be arrived at by any other means' applies equally Otherwise the Mīmāṃsaka suffers from the fault of partial acceptance (Arthajarāṇiyatā)

Further Nāgesa question the validity of accepting Bhāvana as the denoted meaning of the verbal affixes and accepting the

- 1 Vācyena kartrā lakṣhita bhāvanāyā api prādhānyopapattēḥ anyatha vyakterapi vacyatvapattaḥ akṛtyadhikarāṇocchedaḥ L M (NBP) (p 38)
- 2 Detailed discussion can be had in Ākṛityadhikarāṇa of Purva-mīmāṃsa (Sūtras 3-1-6)

agent etc as the denoted potentiality of the K₁t suffixes. The agreement of the gender and number will be with the agent only in either cases (i.e. in accepting the agent as the denoted meaning of the verbal affixes or K₁t affixes or accepting the Bhāvanā as the denoted meaning of the verbal suffixes as well as K₁t suffixes). In the latter case the gender and the number meaning agree with the agent obtained through presumption.

Further it is evident from the Bhāṣya on the sūtra 'Bhūvādayo Dhātavaḥ' that the root 'K₁' denotes Bhāvanā. Since the meaning of the root K₁ is coextensive with the meaning of other roots, it is logical to accept that Bhāvanā is expressed by the root itself. And it is also admitted by the Mīmāṃsaka that the roots K₁, Bhū and As which are co-employed (Anuprayukta dhātavaḥ) also denote Bhāvanā. So we can take that all roots express Bhāvanā¹ everywhere i.e. where ever the root ends with the T_{in}, K₁t or Sanādi affix etc.

REFUTATION OF SABARASWAMY'S THEORY :—

As for the objection of the Mīmāṃsaka that a critical examination of the Pāṇinian sutras dealing with the verbal affixes leads us to conclude that the aphorisms above mentioned do not express the sense of the agent etc, but its number and consequently the agent cannot be the expressed sense of the verbal affix, the grammarian meets him with the following reply. The appellations "Ekavacan, Dvivacna, and Bahu Vacan¹" relate to the substitutes Tip etc. The aphorism Dvyekayoḥ etc, forms one syntactical whole only with the sūtra Tiptasjhi, etc, but not with Lah Karmanī, and there is no such word as 'Kartari' in the Vidhi Sūtra Tiptasjhi etc. which word may somehow or other be connected with 'Dvi and Eka as adjectives of Dvitya etc. The Sūtra 'Tip tasjhi' predicates substitutes 'Tip' etc for the Lakāras taught by the Sūtra 'Lahkarmanī'. So there is no logic in saying that the word 'Kartari' qualifies the number (samkhyā)

1. Kimca k₁dhātorbhāvenārthatvasya dīstatvena sarvatra dhātorev tadarthatvam yuktaṃ (ibid L M nbp) P 38 and commentary Nāgesa bhāvaprakāśa P.39 last few lines

because the sūtra 'Lah Karmani' where the word 'Kartati' is to be supplied has no word showing Number. Hence the interpretation given by the Mīmāṃsaka to the above mentioned sūtras is wholly improper

Further the Grammarian questions the Mīmāṃsaka whether, if the affixes denote Bhāvanā and presume the agent etc, is it the qualified agent (qualified by Bhāvanā) or a pure agent that is presumed. According to Nāgasa neither of it is possible. If we accept a qualified agent (Bhāvanā viśiṣṭa karta or Kṛti viśiṣṭa kartā) then it becomes predominant and Bhāvanā becomes secondary. The Mīmāṃsaka cannot accept this position. If the pure agent only is presumed then in the verbal import it cannot qualify the Bhāvanā since it is never found that a secondary meaning qualifies a primary meaning ¹. We see that in sentences like 'Gangh-yām ghosaḥ' the denotative meaning of the word 'Gangā' qualifying the secondary meaning 'bank' (Tīra), but not vice versa. Nor the Mīmāṃsaka is at liberty to argue that in the above case i.e. Gangāyām ghosaḥ, there is a difficulty to accept the primary meaning and hence it qualifies the secondary meaning, but here in the case of the verbal affix it is not of that position. But this argument is not logical, because there lies the proximity in accepting different denotations ².

Further let us take the two aphorisms 'Lah Karmani ca.. "and Lataḥ Satṛsānacāvaprathamā sāmānādhikarane". When we read these two as a single sentence we get the meaning that the lakaras are enjoined in the sense of agent etc. And the Satṛ etc. suffixes are enjoined in its (lakāra) place as substitutes. So these suffixes also denote the agent like the lakāras. This is accepted even by the Mīmāṃsaka also. Now the Grammarian says that in a similar way the verbal affixes which are enjoined in the place of lakāra, express the same meaning agent etc. And we have no valid reason to reject this analogy

-
- 1 Kṛtau saktiḥ, nāraye lakṣaṇa, tatra lakṣyarthasya sakyarthe viśeṣanateti na kwāpi dīṣṭacaram (L.M. nbp P.40).
 - 2 Vyutpatti Kalpane gauravam (ibid)

Of course the Mimāṃsaka may say that the suffixes *Satī* and *Sānac* denote the agent by being governed by the aphorism *Kartari kṛt*. But it is not logical. In that case in words like 'Pacyamāṇaḥ (Passive) and Sayyamāṇa (Have) we can not have *Sānac*. And if the Mimāṃsaka tries to argue taking recourse to the aphorisms 'Bhāva Karmaṇoḥ', 'Tanānāvātmanepadam', that also becomes improbable. In that case, i.e. *Sānac*, subject to the governing aphorism *Bhava Karmaṇoḥ* has to occur in the case of transitive roots also, but it is not accepted by any one including the Mimāṃsaka. Therefore the Mimāṃsaka has to admit that the verbal affixes denote the agent etc.,

Further the Mimāṃsaka fails to explain these two suffixes *Satī*, and *Sānac* though they are enjoined in the place of *lakāra* and these suffixes do not have the number meaning as two etc. Similarly the Mimāṃsaka cannot explain the meaning of the *lakāra* which is an object of the affix. As in words like *Edhāmāśre* etc. According to the Mimāṃsaka this *lakāra* has to denote the agent as governed by the aphorism 'Kartari kṛt'. But it is not so. Further this *lakāra* denotes *Bhāva* or object (Karma) also, depending upon the following root (Anuprayukta Dhātu) as in the words *Edhāmāśa*, *Bibharām* *bādhuvire* etc.

Further Bhattoji Dīkṣita makes it clear in his *Sabda Kaustubha* that effort (*Bhavana*) cannot be the denoted sense of the verbal affix as argued by the Mimāṃsakas, for in words like *Bhoktavyam* the meaning, *Bhavanā*, is 'cognised even without the verbal affix'. That is to say, in the above instance, we have the expectancy of a *Kāraka* and its coexistence with the verb 'karoti' as instanced in 'Kīm kartavyam? Bhoktavyam, Kīm kṛtavan-Bhuktavan' etc. And on the other hand if we accept the stand of the Mimāṃsaka then we must have usages like 'Bhavatī ghaṭam' on par with sentences like 'Ghaṭam Bhāvayati', Because both the sentences give a similar meaning. But nobody accepts the former sentence. In the instances "Ghaṭam Bhāvayati" the causal affix

-
1. Kīṇca Bhāvayati ghaṭamitvat tvanmate Bhavati Ghaṭmityapi syat tulyarthatvat (Sab. Kau. P.1 3.1.,).

'Nic' expresses the meaning of the action of the potter, while in the sentence "Ghaṭam Bhavati" the verbal affix expresses the same meaning. And the pot is the object in either case. It can not be argued that the causal affix 'Nic' expresses the meaning of the causal agent (Prayojaka) while the verbal affix denotes the meaning of the agent and thus there is no similarity between the two sentences cited above. If the word agent (Karta) means one who sets to action the whole circle of objects that are connected with the action, then 'Ghaṭa' is not such an agent. If, on the other hand, it is considered that the agent is the principal entity which has the action expressed by the verbal root as advocated by (Bhartrhari) the Grammarian, then what could be the sense of the verbal affix since the action has already been denoted by the verbal root? That is to say, in the former alternative the definition given to the agent does not cover the pot (ghata) and in the latter case Bhāvanā becomes the meaning of the verbal root itself.

Further in the Mimāṃsaka theory the formation of the word "Jyotiṣṭomayajin" becomes impossible. The affix 'Nmin' enjoined by the aphorism 'Karane yajah' becomes applicable only in accordance with the theory of the Grammarian because the root 'Yaj' as a root (Dhātu) express Bhāvanā and the root as 'Yaj' denotes 'Sacrifice' (Yāga) which latter serves as the efficient cause Karana concerned. But in the Mimāṃsaka theory this formation is not possible because the element expressive or Bhāvanā is not present in the root and as such 'Karmatva' cannot have agreement with it.²

Another objection is that there cannot be the agreement of the number meaning denoted by the verbal affix with the agent

1. Yadi tu-Dhātunoktakriyā nityam kārake kartṛtesyate iti Bhartrhari Prātipādita rītyā, prādhānyena dhātūpātta vyāpāratva rūpam kartṛtvam tavāpi sammatam. Kāstarhi idānīmā-khyātārthaḥ (Śabda Kaustubha-under Sūtra 1-3-1, P 51)
2. Dhātutvena dhātūpattām Bhāvanām prati yajitvena tadupātta-sya amsāntarasya karmatvāt (Sab Kau. ibid P.52).

presumed by the Bhāvanā because these two are secured through different means of knowledge !

Further take the sentence "Caitraḥ pacati" Here everyone including the Mīmāṃsaka, accepts that there exists identity between Caitra denoted by the word Caitra and the agent denoted by the verbal affix. Now the Mīmāṃsaka's theory compells us to accept that this identity (Samānādhikaranyā) exists between the denoted sense of the word Caitra and the agent obtained through a secondary signification (Lakṣitakartra) of the affix i.e. agent obtained by lakṣanā. If the Mīmāṃsaka means this, then he has to forego several other tenets of his Śāstra like the (pūrvapakṣa of) Arunādhikarana' and Guṇādhikarana etc

ARUNĀDHIKARANA AND THE GRAMMARIAN —

Arunādhikarana is explained in this way. There is an injunction "Arunayā Ekahāyanyā Piṅākṣyā Somam Krināti" (one should purchase some with a cow red, one year old and tawny eyed). As the Mīmāṃsaka says the words Ekahāyanī and Piṅākṣī agree with the verb since they are Dravyas and they have the identity of case relationship with the cow. But the word Ārunya is not a substance but quality so it cannot independently agree with the verb. On this point the Mīmāṃsaka formulates his purvapakṣa that the ārunya agrees with every thing used for the purchase of Soma. There he clearly rejects the argument that the word Arunayā denotes substance through implication and that substance obtained through implication agrees with Bhāvanā (verb). Thus taking it granted that a substance obtained through implication cannot agree with that obtained by direct expression, the Mīmāṃsaka formulates the purvapakṣa. At this point the Grammarian questions how the Mīmāṃsaka can take a different stand regarding the denotation of agent etc by the affix and argue there that the agent obtained by implication can have agreement with that expressed by Devadatta etc in sen-

tence like "Devadattah pacati" The Grammarian insists that he should take the same stand in both cases. So as regards the denotation of Agent etc. by the affix the Mimāṃsaka has to accept the Grammarian's theory at least in his own interest. Otherwise the formation of the *Pratipad* itself becomes less meaningful and il-logical.

Now if the Mimāṃsaka comes forward to accept the "identity of the subject or object with an entity obtained through (*lakṣaṇa*) secondary signification, then his explanation of the *Guṇādhikāraṇa* becomes improper, because in his final view the *Viśvedevah* secured by implication from the word *Vājibhyah* should agree with *viśvedevah* secured by direct assertion from the word *Viśvadevi*, in which case the entire karma will have to be considered as one, much against his own theory.

Further Nāgeśa urges upon the Mimāṃsaka to explain both the *Kartrādhikāraṇa* and *Jañjabhyamānādhikāraṇa* on the same lines, and there is no justification in following double standards. Nāgeśa argues with the Mimāṃsaka that there is no difficulty for him even if he (Mimāṃsaka) accepts the agent/or object as the denoted meaning of the *Ti* affix, in properly explaining the *Kartrādhikāraṇa* and the *jañjabhyamānādhikāraṇa*.² Hence the Grammarian's theory is more logical in explaining the *Mimāṃsaadhikāraṇas*.

1. Kincaivam dandī pingākṣyādī padānāmapi sambhandhe eva saktiḥ, laksitena ca sambandhinā samānādhikāraṇam syāditi Arunadhī karanoccedan itī samāse nirūpayisyāmaḥ
2. For details vide L M (nbp) P 44 to 52 (Tīnārtha)



VYĀSATIRTHA'S SUPPORT TO THE GRAMMARIAN -

Vyāsātirtha, a neologician belonging to the Mādhva school and author of the *Tarka-Tāṇḍava* extends a staunch support to the grammarian's theory regarding the denotation of the verbal affix. He too advocates the theory that the verbal affix denotes the substratum i.e. the agent or the object,¹ because in instance like 'Caitra cooks rice (*Caitra tāṇḍulam pacati*)' we find agreement between the number meaning denoted by the verbal affix and the agent Caitra, and in instances like 'rice is cooked by Caitra (*Caitrena pacyante tāṇḍulāḥ*)' the number meaning of the verbal affix agrees with the object 'Tāṇḍula'. Such an agreement as witnessed between the number meaning and the agent or object is not possible unless the substratum is also accepted as the denotation of the verbal affix. Further if the number meaning agrees even with those, not denoted by the verbal affix, it should agree with even the object in the active voice and with the subject in the passive voice, thus giving rise to a wrong construction of sentence as "Tāṇḍulan pacati" in the sense of 'Tāṇḍulan pacati' and *Caitrena pacyate* and *Caitrena pacyate tāṇḍulāḥ* in the sense "Caitren pacyante tāṇḍulāḥ".

Of course the opponent (Logician) may argue that though the agent or object is not accepted as the denotation of the verbal affix there is no incongruity found in respect of the agreement of the number meaning with the agent, for, the number meaning agrees with what is syntactically connected with *Bhāvanā*.

Bhāvanā by itself is of the form of activity (*Vyāpāra*), and hence does not have expectancy with that which possesses the activity. That being the case, in the instance 'Caitra cooks rice', rice, which is an object, possesses certain activity in itself. So *Bhāvanā* of the form of activity agrees with mere Caitra (devoid of any activity) cognised from the word 'Caitra' ending in the nominative case affix which does not possess any action. Similarly in the passive construction the *Bhāvanā* leaves off Caitra, the agent, secured from the word 'Caitra' (ending in

1. *Evam karti karmaṇi apilakara vacye* (*Tar. Tan. Vol. 3, p. 78*)

the instrumental case affix) as he possesses activity and agrees with rice (Tandulāḥ) which is got from the word ending in the nominative case affix. Consequently on observation we find that, in each case the number meaning agrees with that with which the Bhavana agrees.

Vyāsatīrtha says such an argument (as above) of the Logician is not logical. The number though follows kṛti it cannot agree with the meaning denoted by the nominal base with which kṛti agrees. Of the two number meanings, one of the Sup suffix and the other of the Tin Suffix, the nominal base has the expectancy of the number meaning denoted by the Sup suffix, only. This being internal and close to it, readily agrees with the nominal base. Then the nominal base does not have any expectancy of the number meaning of the Tin suffix to agree with.¹

So far Vyāsatīrtha supports the Grammarian. Now he goes a step further and accepts the movent (Spanda) favourable to the meaning of the root as the denoted sense of the verbal affix, besides the agent or object and the number meaning. And this meaning agrees with the agent as subsisting in it.²

NĀGEŚA'S CRITICISM OF THE MIMĀṆSAKA-VIEW.—

Nāgeśa bitterly attacks the Mimāṃsakas and goes deep into the very roots of the Mimāṃsaka's arguments. He opines that the Bhāṣyakara Śabara and Kumārila have drawn such conclusions from the Sūtras of the sage, Jaimini, which the sage has never intended. Nāgeśa says that there is no specific sūtra of Jaimini stating that Bhāvanā is different from action and it is denoted by the verbal affix. And further the Purvamīmāṃsa

1 Bhāvananītya aor samkhyayā nirākamksena Prātipadīkarthena anvayasyoktatvat (ibid P 86 2nd para)

2 Tasmāt phalanukūlo adhaḥ santāpanādih dhatvarthaḥ Tadanukūla spandadisca ākhyatārthaḥ, Sa ca kartrādheya tayā, anveti ityeva yuktaḥ (Op. Cit. P 95 last para)

sūtra (2.1.1),¹ never gives such an import, which by Bhāṣyakāra and others that Bhāvanā is different (denoted by the root) and is denoted by the affix. When we examine the said sūtra the word Karmasā words denoting action i.e. verbs like yajeta, Dadya, Bhāvarthāḥ means Kriyarthāḥ, because Bhāva, Karma, all used as synonyms. It is evident from the word vāpradhānamakhyātam' kriyāpradhānamākhyātam.² this sūtra never speaks of any thing about Bhāvanā as by the Mīmāṃsaka. Hence from the words Dadya alone is predominantly understood. That is the reason words are only used but not the nouns like yaga. Of course since action gets destroyed quickly and does not the result swarga etc. is attained, the Mīmāṃsakas consider a new entity 'Apūrva, and deem it to last till swarga etc. (the object) is achieved. So it is evident that there is no meaning in the sūtra which gives even an indication that Bhāva meaning of the affix but not that of the root. No wonder the reason why these latter Mīmāṃsakas try to establish Bhāva which has not been said by their sage. Of course the Mīmāṃsaka may take his stand on the maxim 'I kriyāpradhānam'.

Refutation of "Pratyayarthāḥ Pradhānam" —

The Mīmāṃsaka argues that of the base and the affix jointly uttered the meaning of the affix is predominant in a verb word also the meaning of the affix should be predominant and the meaning of the root should qualify it.

Nagesa says that the very notion "Pratyayarthāḥ Pradhānam" as a universal fact, itself is a wrong conception. This maxim is only a casual statement which fails in

1 Bhāvarthāḥ karmasabdāḥ tebhyāḥ karmapratītye vidhiyete

2 L.M. (k.k.) P. 774

Bhatta Kumārila develops all his arguments based on this maxim Nāgesa says that is a high handed argument (Praudha Vāda) For instance let us take the word Ajā, Chāgī etc., Here the suffix denotes femininity and the base denotes the substance. Here everyone admits that the Predominance is only to the meaning of the base but not to that of the suffix.

Nāgesa puts a shrewed question as to what the Mimāṃsaka means by the maxim 'Pratyayārthah, Pradhānam. If it means that the meaning of the suffix is predominant then the maxim has failed in its purpose in the above cited examples. Or, on the other hand, if it means that whatever is predominant that should be the meaning of the suffix, even then the maxim does not apply, because in the above example the sense 'goat' is predominant but it is not the meaning of the suffix. Thus either of the interpretations of the maxim does not hold good.

He further argues that the question of Pradhāna and Apradhāna arises only when there is an agreement of the meaning of the base and the suffix. In words like Pakvavān the meaning of the root is the object Paka (Karma kāraka) and that of the affix is the agent (Kartā kāraka). Thus they cannot have mutual agreement because both of them are Kārakas. These are expected to agree only with the meaning of the root. As such there is no agreement at all, much less a case of predominance of the one meaning over the other. It should not be urged that "Sambandha Sāmānya" may exist between the two as 'Pakasya kartā', for there is no *yogyatā* in-as-much as they are only kārakas which cannot mutually agree.¹ So this theory has no scope at all.

And in a word or sentence the question "which is predominant and which is not" does not depend on the maxim. That is what Pāṇini states in unequivocal terms in his aphorism P 1 2.562

1. Var. Bhū - Karika 8, P 43;

2. Pradhānapratyayarthavacanarthasya anyapramānatvāt (P 1 2.56).

which means "it should not be construed that the meaning of the suffix is predominant because the knowledge of Predominance or otherwise depends on actual experience ¹ And if we accept the maxim then the Bhasya on the Sūtra P 1 3 1,2 cannot properly be explained

Thus Nāgeśa opines that this maxim is applicable only in the case of suffixes which have an expressed sense as in the case of Kṛt etc And if we accept it, then in the case of Pācaka, Lāvaka etc there will not be any incongruity As far as verbal affixes Tin etc are concerned they are not expressive but indicative (suggestive) of their meaning Hence their meaning is subservient to that of the base And suggestiveness to these suffixes is amply explained in the Mahābhāṣya at several places like "Kartari Karmavyatīhāre" 'Ṣeṣātkartari Parasmaipadam' Hetumatī ca' 'Lāh Karmaṇi ca Bhāve cā Karmakebhyaḥ' etc sūtras Of course strictly speaking it is only the root that has a denotative potentiality in action, result, number, tense, and substratum. Such a potentiality in number, tense and substratum is suggested by the Tin suffix It has been established in the Bhāṣya on Pāṇini's aphorism "Hetumatī ca" that a suggested sense cannot have predominance over the expressed sense As for the meaning of the word Bhāva it is maintained by the Vaiyakarana that it is only Kriyā but not Bhāvanā This has been amply explained by Kaiyata also So from the Bāṣya and all other commentaries it becomes evident that

- (1) Bhavanā is not denoted by the suffix but by the root alone
- (2) The suffix denotes the agent or object but not Bhāvanā
- (3) The maxim 'Pratyayārthah pradhānam' applies only in the case of Expressive suffixes

Thus to conclude, it may be stated that the Mīmāṃsakas invented something which is not expressed by the sage Jaimini To substantiate their incorrect-interpretation of their texts, they did not

1 Pradhānam pratyayārthah iti Na kāryam, Arthasya = Arthavabodhasya, Anyapramāṇatvat = Vyutpatyanusāritvāt iti tasyārthah (L M nbp P 75)

2 Bhūvadayo Dhātavaḥ (P 1 3.1)

hesitate even to misinterpret the grammatical aphorisms without studying the entire Mahābhāṣya. And further their interpretations land them in troubles as explained in Arunādhikaraṇa, guṇādhikaraṇa etc. But if they accept the grammarians explanation there will be no infringement of their fundamental theories

THE VIEW OF THE LOGICIAN —

According to the Logician there is something called 'Kṛti' a particular type of activity different from the action denoted by the root, but congenial to it, and this kṛti is denoted by the verbal affix, besides number and tense. Now we shall examine their arguments and counter-arguments.

UDAYANA'S THEORY :—

Udayana, the first among the neologicians propounds that there exists two types of action in a human being. One is the external i.e. Physical activity (Cestārūpa bāhyavyāpāra) and the other is internal activity (Ātmanistavyāpāra) such as thinking, desiring, making effort etc. This second type of activity is called yatna, kṛti, bhāvanā and all these words are synonymous. Udayana discusses all this in the 5th Chapter of his Kusumāñjali, while discussing the sense of potential mood affix 1. According to him the meaning of Vidhi is not effort (Prayatna) because effort is the potentiality denoted by all verbal affixes in general 2. The arguments, offered by him in establishing yatna or kṛti as the denotation of the verbal affix are the same as those already enumerated while discussing the Mīmāṃsaka theory. Udayana says that this 'Yatna' itself is otherwise called Bhāvanā by Mīmāṃsaka s and kṛti by the Logicians.

Of course, some like P.ṛthasārathy, argue that the suffix denotes activity congenial to that denoted by the verbal root

- 1 Under the kṛtika 8 i.e. istahāneranistāpetarapravṛtṭe ḥ etc
- 2 Nāpi tatkāraṇam prayatnaḥ, tasya sarvākhyāta sadhāranatvāt

favourable to produce the result. Otherwise there is prolixity. To this Udayana reacts that neither congeniality alone nor activity congenial to, can be accepted as the denotation of the verbal affix. And there is also no prolixity in accepting effort-hood (Yatnatva) as the determinant of the potentiality of the verbal affix. Further it is evident that 'Yatna' is the denotation of the suffix on the basis of explanatory sentence "He does cooking" (Pākam karoti). Otherwise we have to accept irregular sentences of the form "Pākena Odanam Karoti" on par with sentences like 'Kāstena Pākam karoti', but it is not tenable. So from the explanatory sentence we are to accept something congenial to Pāka' as denoted by the root. And that something is 'Yatna' itself and nothing else, otherwise sentences like 'Pākena odanam karoti' are inevitable.

Now the question is whether the word 'Karoti' means mere 'effort' whose adjunct is effortness or effort having both effortness and congeniality (of action towards the result) as its adjuncts. In the former case the word 'Karoti' becomes synonymous with word 'Yatna' and in the later case there is prolixity. Therefore the opponent demands basing on the principle of brevity, to accept 'activity congenial' as the denotation of the verbal affix, so that we need not take recourse to the meaning by implication in sentences like 'Ratho gacchati' etc., where effort in its form of effortness cannot be cognised.

Udayana refuses such an argument of the opponent on two counts. One is the established experience of ours in the usage that "such and such a thing is produced and such and such is not produced" "Kṛtākṛtavibhāgena" and the other is the way in which agent-hood is determined by Pāṇini 1. For example from the sentence 'Ghaṭah kṛtaḥ' (The pot is made) we cognise 'Yatna' existing in the potter in bringing out the pot into existence, but

1 Kṛtākṛta vibhāgena kartṛrūpa vyavasthaya, yatna eva kṛtiḥ pūrva parasmin saiva bhāvana (Kusumanjali V 9). Here the words Pūrva refers to Logicians and Parasmin to Mīmāṃsakas.

there is no such experience when we hear sentences like Ratho gamanam karoti. So it is evident only in such cases where 'Yatna' is specifically experienced we make use of the word Kṛtā (produced or made). We do not find such usage in the case of a sprout from a seed i.e. there is no usage as 'Āmkuṛaḥ kṛtaḥ Bījena' (Sprout is made by the seed). The reason is that no effort congenial for the production of the sprout is witnessed in the seed. Of course there may be congenial circumstances or conditions (Anukūla hetavaḥ). Therefore, from such well-established usages it is evident that the meaning of the word karoti is kṛti. Otherwise if it denotes some congenial action in general, then in case of sprouting also, there exists some congenial action whatsoever it be, consequently we have to admit sentences like 'Bījenāmkuraḥ kṛtaḥ' which are far from experience. Further, the fact, that the word 'Kartī' ending in the affix 'Tī' and derived from the root kṛ, is found to denote the substratum of effort, also goes to prove the contention that the verb word karoti denotes the sense of effort (Yatna). If, on the other hand, it is accepted that the root kṛ is merely denotative of 'Kriyā', then 'Kartī' being the substratum of Kriyā, all the kārakas would end only in kartīkaraka, because every karaka possesses some activity of its own which helps to produce the result. Thus it becomes clear that the verb Kṛ is denotative of the sense 'effort'. And all the verbal affixes are explained away with the help of the verb word 'Karoti' so that we can safely conclude that all the verbal affixes denote the sense of 'Effort' only.

As a matter of fact, Udayana says an affix in general has a denotation in all the three factors combined together i.e. in 'a state of beginning and ending, effort and congeniality (Purvāparibhūtatva, yatnā anukūlatava samudāye śaktiḥ)' ¹. And it need not be doubted how the suffix can denote all these three meanings in sentences like 'Ratho gacchati'. There the suffix does not denote all the meanings (Samudaya) but has denotation in

1 Tena ca sarvamākhyata padam vividyate iti sarvatra sa eyaṛtha iti nirṇayaḥ (Nyā Ku V 9)

a part i.e. 'congeniality' (Anukūlatva) just as the¹ word 'Śrotriya' used to denote Brahmin²

And in the case of insentient beings and usages as 'He knows, desires, stays, etc.' are all to be explained taking recourse to the secondary signification i.e. through implication. Therefore in the case of 'Ratho gacchati' also we explain by taking recourse to the secondary signification. Hence it is established that the affix has denotation only in Yatna and all other meanings which are, required depending on the nature of the agent, can be had through implication³. Otherwise if you accept activity in general, congenial to action, as the denoted meaning, then when a man is sleeping or taking rest, which is required for a later work such as cooking etc. we are to make sentences as 'he cooks', because he has activity in general congenial to cooking⁴. Thus when one possesses the effort congenial to cooking, we use the verb in the present tense as 'Pacati'. When the effort is over we use the verb in past tense as Apāksīt etc.

Further the root Kr denotes activity (Kṛti) subsisting in the agent. And the agent is always a sentient being. And the meaning of the root 'Kṛ' in the word Kartā is of the form of knowledge, desire and effort. If meaning of the kṛ is something different from any of these, we have to accept insentient objects also as being denoted by the word agent (Kartā). And it cannot be argued that an agent is one whose action is primarily denoted by the

1. Tatha cā samudite pravṛttam padam tadekadese api prayujyate Viśuddhimātram Puraskṛtya Brahman śrotriya-padavat (Kusumāñjali ibid V-9-Explanation)
2. Here the idea is this. The word Śrotriya strictly denotes a Brahmin who is well versed in Vedic texts. But it is also generally being used to denote a Brahmin even if he is not well versed in Vedic texts.
3. Na ca vityantareṇapi prayogasambhava śakti kalpanā ayuktā, Anyayāścaṇekarathatvamīṣṭiteḥ (Kusumāñjali V-9)
4. Anyatha atitavapi parīśramasayane pacatīti pratyayaprasaṅgāt (ibid)

root or the affix it does not matter whether the agent is sentient or not. Then, when such a root or suffix is not used, the person who is actually at work will not get the designation 'agent'. Nor it can be argued that agentness means 'possess an activity (suitable to) worthy of being expressed by the suffix', because the nature of such worthiness itself cannot be established.

Further Pāṇini's aphorism 'Svatantrah Karta' (P 1 4 54) clearly lays down that the agent is one who is independent. The nature of the independence is nothing but the inherence of knowledge, desire and effort i.e. *kṛti*. Therefore it goes without any doubt that one of these must be the denotational potency of the suffix. Thus one who is the substratum of all these three, can act independently and can be called an agent. Thus, the way in which we can arrive at the nature of the agent also testifies, to the fact that *yatna* or *kṛti* is the denoted meaning of the suffix.

Now as regards the argument that this *yatna* or *kṛti* is obtained through presumption, Udayana states that this cannot be presumed by the action congenial to the fruit nor through congeniality, because this action in general congenial to the fruit or congeniality exists even in the action subsisting in insentient beings. Further there is no coextensiveness between congeniality and efforthood. So it cannot be through congeniality.

Nor it can be presumed through number, because number subsists in substances that can be counted, but not in effort which is always single.

Nor it can be presumed through the agent. Every agent may not possess effort'. So through such an agent effort cannot be presumed. And if the agent is one who has action, is it action in the form of activity (*Yatna*) or something different from it, because action may subsist even in insentient objects, but through such an agent effort cannot be presumed. And if it is accepted that action is of the form of *Yatna*, then it can be stated to be the denoted meaning.

Nor it can be presumed through the action denoted by the

verbal root In sentences like 'Vidyate Ghalah' etc , the meaning of the root 'Vid' is Being and it is permanent Being permanent by nature it does not comprehend any yatna Hence through this also, Yatna cannot be presumed

Now the question is if kṛti or yatna is the meaning of the affix, then in words like Karoti, Yatate etc , we must get the knowledge of kṛti twice in the explanatory sentence i.e one denoted by the root and the other being denoted by the affix, To this, the Logician replies that in the above cases the suffix does not denote kṛti or yatna (except number and tense) but it is added after the root in accordance with the maxim ' Mere roots are not to be used' 'a non-word should not be used' ¹ So here the surfix is only just to get wordness i.e grammatical correctness, just as the grammarian explains the validity of number meaning to Sup suffixes in words like Ekah Dvau etc

THE VIEWS OF GANGEŚA AND GADĀDHARA .—

Further some scholars are of the opinion that this kṛti is denoted by the 'L' (lakāra) but not by T_{in} suffixes, which are enjoined in the place of 'L'. Though the lakāra is not found in the word the knowledge of it is obtained through recalling Thus kṛti is the denotational potency, of lakāra But Gadādhara does not accept this view, because the original and substitute are not definitely determined He argues that the suffixes are not uniformly enjoined by different grammarians in the place of lakāra so they cannot make us recall the original 'L' Further we have to create so many cause and effect relations to explain the system Hence taking brevity into consideration, Yatna is the denotation of the substitute only but not of the lakāra ³

So far we have seen the Logician arguing to accept the secondary signification of the affix in sentence like 'Ratho gaccha-

1 Na Kevalaḥ prakṛtayah prayoktavyah, Apadam na prayuñjeeta

2 Vyu Vā. P 574

3 ibid P.575

1) Now the question is whether to accept 'activity congenial' as the secondary meaning of substratum-hood (Anukūla vyāpāreṇa raye valaṇaṇa)

A section of the logicians (old) argue that it is logical to accept 'activity congenial' as the secondary meaning so that the sentence 'Ratho gacchati' can be explained as 'Gamanānukūla vyāpāreṇa rathah'. Gangesa Raghunāthaśrīromāṇi upholds this view. But the later logicians like Gadadhara¹ and Jagadisa² favour the other view i.e. Lakṣaṇa substratumness (Āsrayatva) as the secondary signification or by established implication (Nirūdhā Lakṣaṇa).

If āsrayatva is not the secondary signification, then the following inconsistency arises. Suppose a person pushes the cart, the cart moves but the person stands. So when the cart is in motion, because the activity congenial to the running of the cart exists in the person also, we will be constrained to accept a statement like 'the man goes' when the cart is actually moving, but the man stands. But if we accept substratumness as the secondary signification, then, because the person is not the substratum of motion, such a contingency will not arise.

And now take the sentences 'Caitro janāti', yatate etc. where we cannot notice any activity that can be assigned to the affix to be expressed by implication. And even if it can be explained in these places, in sentence like 'ghaṭe ghaṭatvam vidyate' (Pot-ness exists in the pot). Here every one should accept implication in Āsrayatva alone. Therefore instead of accepting different secondary significations at different places, it is better to accept substratumness as the secondary signification of the affix, in a uniform way. But however in sentences like 'ghaṭo Naśyati' (the pot perishes) the suffix expresses the counter-positive of destruction by implication.

1. Vyākhyāṇa P. 563

2. Sabdārtha Prakāśha P. 398

55174
Rājagopālamakḥin, the author of the *Maṇḍarpana* accepts both the views ¹ However he finally favours the view 'Āsraye Lakṣanā'

The View Held by the Author of the *Ratnakosa*.—

Almost all the later logicians are unanimous on the point that the verbal suffix denotes *katī*. And where there is a stultification in such a denotation, they accept secondary signification either in substratumness or activity congenial to the action denoted by the root

Now, here is an instance where the Logician falls out of the general tradition. The author of *Ratnakosa*, a Logician himself is of the view that the verbal affix has its denotation in the sense 'Utpādanā', and that agrees with the meaning of the verbal root by being its (of the meaning of the verbal root) theme (*Viśayin*) and with the meaning of the nominal base as its (*Utpādanā*) substratum ². By accepting such a denotation and argument, he is of the opinion, that the contingency of the use of the verbal affix being rendered secondary in the case of insentient entities like the car goes etc., can be avoided, because productivity (*Utpāda-katī*) of the meaning of the verbal root is commonly found alike in the sentient as well as the insentient entities. And on the other hand, if activity (*vyāpara*) or effort (*Yatna*) be accepted as the denoted sense of the verbal affix, in instances like 'Yatate' *Jānati* etc., there would be prolixity in accepting *Lakṣana* in all such large number of cases. But by accepting 'Utpatti' as the denoted sense of the verbal affix, since there is a possibility for effort (*Yatna*) and knowledge (*Jñāna*) to be the objects of 'Utpatti' the affix is enjoined in the sense of productivity, which is

1 *Jānāti icchatī yatate ityadau jñānādyanukūla manassamyoge lakṣanā, Na caivam gamanasyapi jānatīti prayogāpattirīti vacyam. Taiḥ Karotītyatreva Jñānādhyāsrāye lakṣana astu* (*Maṇḍarpana* P 199)

2 *Utpādanarva akhyatīrthah* (*Tār Tan Voi* 3, P 72)

valid from the point of view of meaning because both *yatna* and knowledge deserve to be produced, but in a very few cases like *Utpādayate* we have to accept simple grammatical correctness to the affix. The advantage of this view over the other is that we can avoid secondary signification in the words like *Janāti*, *icchatī*, *yatate*, *nidrati* etc. Hence on grounds of Parsimony 'Utpādanā' is to be accepted as the denoted sense of the verbal affix. However this view is severely criticised by Vyāsātīrtha 1

The Logician's Criticism of the Grammarian's View —

The Logician is very critical of the Grammarian's theory. He argues that the Grammarian's argument that if substratum is to be accepted as the denoted sense of the verbal affix, in order to secure the agent and the object in instances "*Pacati Devadattah* (Devadatta cooks), *Pacyate tandulascaitrena*" (the rice is cooked by Caitra)" etc., is not correct, because the agent and the object can be secured from the verb through syntactical relation. Therefore acceptance of such a potentiality for the verbal affix is to be rejected on the grounds of prolixity. As for the argument of the Grammarian pertaining to the governing aphorism "*Anabhihite*" the Logician argues that the rule is to be interpreted to mean, when the number meaning of the affix is not denoted 2. The words '*Kartari*' and '*Karman*' in the sutras '*Ksrtari Kṛt*' '*Lah Karmanica*' do not express the agent and the object but their properties (Dharma) agent-hood (*Kartitva*) and object-hood (*Kar-matva*). The seventh case affix, in the words *Kartari* and *Karman*, is used in the sense of "being understood" but not in the sense of "being expressed." Again if agent etc. be the meaning, then the agents being different in each case their determinants also will be manifold, but if agent-hood, is taken as the expressed sense of the suffix there is no prolixity. Such an interpretation avoids all the contingencies urged by the Grammarian

1 For details see P 60-63 of this book.

2 *Anabhihite kartari ityāderanabhihitāyām kartrādī samkhyāyām ityatraiva tatprayaditī dīk* (Maṇḍarpana P 120)

Now we can summarise the whole argument of the Logician as follow.

The meaning or the denotated potentiality of the verbal affix is yatna called Kṛti. The agent and object are secured through syntactical relation. The word 'Kartari' in 'Kartari Kṛt' means 'agent qualified with activity', but mere agent-hood (Kṛti) only. Acceptance of the agent or object as the denoted sense leads to prolixity. The determinant of denotative potentiality is of the form of the Universal Kṛtitva. This is proved from the explanatory sentence Pacati-Pākam karoti, wherein Kṛti is exhibited as distinct from the action denoted by the verbal root. However in the case where there is stultification of Kṛti as in sentence like the 'Car goes' (Ratho gacchati) we accept secondary signification in the verbal affix in substratumness. The tense meaning agrees with Kṛti denoted by the suffix. The number meaning agrees with the agent or object as the case may be.

The Logician's Explanation-Passive Construction :-

In the case of the passive construction i.e. in sentence Tandulāḥ pacyate Caitreṇa etc. the result and the action (Vyāpāra) are denoted by the verbal root. And the action agrees with the result, being an attribute to the latter. The affix, denotes substratumness (Āsrayatva). The result meaning of the root becomes an attribute to the meaning of the verbal affix i.e. Kṛti. And this meaning of the affix, being an attributive of the word in the nominative case affix (but not qualifying another word), agrees with its meaning. The meaning 'Time' agrees with the action denoted by the verbal root. Thus the verbal import is of the form 'Rice is the substratum for the softening produced by action, of the present time, which (action) inheres in Caitra' 1

Some Logicians of the earlier period opined that in the passive construction the root denotes activity qualified by (the

1 Caitravṛtti vartamanakālīka kṛtijanya vyāpārajanya
vikṛittyāśrayastandulāḥ

determinant of which is) result. The meaning of the affix is result. But their view is not correct, because in the verbal import we hear the result twice ¹. In the practical experience it is not so. Hence the affix denotes substratumness.

The Logician's view in the Impersonal Construction —

The lakaras are enjoined, after an intransitive root, in the impersonal sense² (Bhave). What we mean by the word Bhāva here, is, the meaning of the root itself. For example take the sentence "Caitrena sayyate". Here the verbal suffix does not have any meaning but simply repeats (by Anuvāda) the meaning of the root. The affix is only for the sake of grammatical correctness of the word. Since Bhava is always unitary by nature, the affix always is in singular number but never in the dual or plural. Again the affix denoting Bhava in such sentences is always in the third person. Thus the verb word is always in the third person singular number ³. Hence the suffix does not denote either the agent or the number in the agent. Therefore the agent always takes the instrumental case ⁴. The meaning of this instrumental case is attributive to the meaning of the root. Thus the verbal import of the sentence 'Caitrena supyate' is of the form 'Caitravitti swāpah'.

Here we can easily note that there is a departure from the general stand taken by the Logician, that the prathamānthārtha is the main substantive in the verbal import of a sentence.

Refutation of the Logician's Theory —

The much argued Logician's theory was subjected to seve-

- 1 The verbal import is of the form 'Viklityyanukūla vyāparajanya viklityāśrayastandulah
2. Lah karmanica bhave cākarmakebhyah
3. However the Bhasyakara gives examples in plural number also "ustrasikah sayyante" etc
4. Anabhihite-Kartā Karanayostṛtiyā

ral criticisms not only by the Mimāṃsakas and the Grammarians but also by a section of Logicians themselves. Now in the following pages we will discuss them in brief.

Vyāsātīrtha's Criticism —

The Logicians' theory received a severe criticism at the hands of Vyāsātīrtha, who was a good Logician among the Dvaita Vedāntins. He does not accept the general theory of the Logicians in so far it concerns the meaning of the verbal affix. Some of the arguments advanced by him against the Logicians' theory deserve mention in this context.

According to Vyāsātīrtha, as already stated, the verbal affix denotes activity in general congenial to that denoted by the root. Besides this, it denotes the substratum also i.e. agent or object as the case may be. We have seen that Gaṅgeśa, the author of the *Tattvacintāmaṇi* declares that the verbal affix denotes *Kṛti* or *Yatna*.¹ But Vyāsātīrtha opines that this *Yatna*, obtained by presumption through activity in general, is the meaning of the verbal affix, because *Yatna* is the cause and Activity in general is the effect. So from the effect, we can presume the cause,² but not viceversa. And the example 'Chataḥ kṛtaḥ Amkuro na kṛtaḥ' cannot be helpful to the Logician. Because usages like 'he makes a pot,' 'the seed makes the sprout' makes it clear such a division of *Kṛta* and *Akṛta* is made only with reference to the productivity involving physical activity, and in its absence, i.e. where physical activity is not found, we use *Akṛta*. Therefore the root *kṛ* denotes activity in general only but not *yatna* or *kṛti*. And

1 Tasmāt tadākhyatam yatnavācakaṁ, ākhyatatvat, linākhyatatvat ityuktam (Tar. Tan. Vol. 2 P. 66.)

2 Vyaparasya kāryatvena svakarane yatnakṣepakatvat (ibid P. 68)

further even the word Kartā is not a derivative word but only a conventional (Rūḍha) 1

If it is argued that the word 'Kartā' is derived by adding the suffix T_{1c} to the root K₁ then in that case the root K₁ should not be accepted as denoting the sense 'effort' and the affix 'T_{1c}' as denoting the sense 'substratum'. If it be so the word 'Kartā' means 'the substratum of effort (Kṛtyāśraya^h)'. Then consequently from the word 'Paktā' we get the meaning in the form of 'substratum of cooking (Pakāśraya^h)' but not the substratum of the effort of cooking (Pakakṛtyāśrya). Further the affix T_{1c} is also not denotative of sense 'effort', because, in such a case the meaning of the 'T_{1c}' cannot agree with the effort secured from the verbal root meaning through the relation of Viśayatva or Janakatva. In the word Paktā, if it be accepted that the meaning of the affix T_{1c} i.e. Kṛti agrees with the meaning Kṛti of the verbal root through the relation of identity, then we get the cognition of the effort, but not of substratum of effort. If the meaning of the T_{1c} Pratyaya is considered Kṛti, it cannot agree with 'Kṛti' the meaning of the root by any relation Viśayatva or Janakatva. If identity (Abhedānvaya) is accepted, then finally Pāka Kṛti alone is denoted by word 'Paktā' but not the agent of Kṛti, which is necessary to be accepted. Therefore there is no other way but to accept Kṛtimān as the meaning of the affix T_{1c}. Thus from the word Paktā we get the import in the form 'Pakakṛti' but not the sense as one possessing the effort related to cooking ('Pakakṛtīmān'). Therefore to avoid such an inconsistency the Logician is forced to accept that the affix 'T_{1c}' is denotative of the substratum of the effort. Then the word Paktā gives us the sense "substratum of the effort of cooking". Then take the word "Pāka

-
- 1 Pratyuta nāyāyikānām ghaṭamkurayoḥ kṛtijanakatva sāmye apī Sarīra vyāpāra janyatvājanyatvābhyāmeva kṛtākṛta vyavahāra darsanāt kṛtī dhātoḥ vyāpārārūpa kriyārthatvameva yuktaṁ Kartipadamapi na yaugikam (ibid P 64)
 - 2 Tathā ca pakakartetyatra dhātoḥ kṛtirarthascet, tījarthena kṛtyāśrayena saha kṛ dhātvarthasya anvayaḥ syāt Na hi kṛtyāśrayasya punaḥ svakṛtyanvayaḥ (ibid P 65)

Kartā" Here if the meaning of the affix is "Kṛtimān, (as the Logician is forced to accept as shown above) and the root Kṛ also denotes Kṛti then the meaning of Tṛc (Kṛtyāśrayaḥ) has to agree with the meaning of the root Kṛ (kṛti) But it is not possible, because the substratum of Kṛti (of others) cannot agree with its own kṛti for a second time Thus it becomes clear that the word Kartṛ is conventional in the sense of kṛtyāśraya or kṛiyāśraya, but not derivative (Yaugikā) as urged by the Logician

Now, as regards the argument of the Logician that in instances like 'the car goes' (Acetanasthale) the use of the verbal affix is to be explained by taking recourse to the secondary signification Vyāsātīrtha replies that there is no such need, because in the same manner as the word 'Ganga' is found to have the potentiality in signifying the meaning in Tīra (Bank) due to its frequent usage in that sense, in the same manner the verbal affix is not found to have the power of expressing the sense effort, and as such there should be necessity to accept lakṣaṇa in vyāpāra etc. But in this view he says there is only one mode of explanation, because he accepts Dhātvarthānukūla vyāpāra which commonly exists in both the sentient and insentient objects Hence the contention of the Logician that that the verbal affix has denotative potentiality in the sense 'effort' does not stand to logic

RATNAKOSAKĀRA CRITICISED .—

As already mentioned the meaning of the verbal affix according to Ratnakosakāra is utpādanā and that agrees with the meaning of the verbal root by being its theme (Viśayin) and with the nominal base meaning by being the substratum But Vyāsātīrtha criticises it¹ severally stating that if we are to accept the above contention, then in sentences 'Caitraḥ pacati' etc , we get

an import of the form "Caitra is the producer of the production of pāka"¹ but not the "producer of pāka".²

Further in the case of non-sentient things also we get usages like "the sense organ knows" (indriyam janāti, Caksurjānāti) i.e. the instruments are said to be producing the knowledge. And also in cases "Caitro ghaṭam janāti", we have the doubt "whether Caitra possess the knowledge of pot or not", because even those which cannot possess knowledge i.e. Caksus etc. are said to be the substratum of knowledge. Therefore it is not possible to accept that the verbal affix denotes "Utpādanā" and it agrees with the nominal base meaning as the substratum.

THE MĪMĀMSAKA CRITICISES THE LOGICIAN :—

The Mīmāṃsaka differs with the Logician to the extent that the root K₁ does not denote the sense of effort (Yatna), because even without intending to convey the effort (Yatna), there are usages found in instances like 'the sprout is made of the seed (Bijenāṅkurah kīṭaḥ³) and Happiness is made by heaven' (Svargādina Sukham) etc. Further in the instances 'Karoti' and 'Yatate', there can be no agreement between the meanings secured from the base and the affix, because, both, the base and the affix denote the same meaning viz effort (Yatna). Further it is an unnecessary redundancy. In order to avoid such a redundancy, the Logician has to admit that here either the affix merely restates (Anuvāda) the meaning of the root or that, only those affixes which follow the verbal roots not denoting the sense of effort (Yatna) will be denotative of the sense effort (Yatna).⁴

- 1 Caitra^h Pakotpatyutpādaka itidhī^h, na tu pakotpādaka iti (ibid)
- 2 Utpatterakhyātārthatve tayā saha Caitrasya janakatva rūponvaya iti
- 3 We cannot speak of any effort on the part of the seed, in producing the sprout
- 4 Bhā. Cin P 81

Further the use of the verbal affix in the case of non-sentient objects like the car etc. in sentences like "the car goes" (Ratho gacchati) is rendered secondary in its signification, because the car, an insentient entity, is incapable of undertaking any effort. Similarly in instances like "He knows (jānāti)", "He wills (icchati)" etc., where no effort can be cognised, the use of the verbal affix will be rendered secondary in its signification. In order to avoid all these defects, the Mīmāṃsaka urges upon the Logician to accept activity (Vyāpāra) as the denoted sense of the verb Kṛi. Thus all the verbal affixes, denote the sense activity only but not Yatna or Kṛti as held by the Logician.

The Logician Criticised by the Grammarian —

Grammarians like Jñānendrasarasvatī, Buttoji, Kaundabhatta, etc. in their respective works the Tattvabodhinī, the Manoramā and the Bhusana etc. have amply and aptly refuted the theory of the Logician. Nagesa, also did not spare pains in reasserting the Grammarian's theory and refuting the Logicians' theory. In the following pages we critically examine their views in brief.

The Grammarian says that in instances like 'Pacati', etc., our normal expectancy is about the agent who does the act of cooking. In compliance with that expectancy, it is proper to take the expressive power of Lakaras to be the agent (Kartā), but not effort (Kṛti) as urged by the Logician¹. If the verbal import of the word 'Pacati' is taken as effort congenial to cooking (Pākanukūlākṛtiḥ) as urged by the Logician, then one's expectancy would naturally be either in whom (Kasmin) or of whom (Kasya). The Grammarian replies that it is against popular experience, because when the word 'Pacati' is used, one is normally enthusiastic to know 'who cooks' but not in which or for whom unless otherwise warranted by the context.

1 Tattvabodhinī p 318

Of course it may be argued by the Logician that even by accepting the Grammarian's theory there is no possibility for such an expectancy regarding the agent to arise because the knowledge of the agent is already clear in the import of the word Pacati¹. But it is not acceptable. Though we know from the verbal import that the action has an agent and it is one, yet we do not know who that particular agent is. Thus though the expectancy regarding the agent in general is satisfied, the expectancy with regard to the particular agent remains unsatisfied. Hence there is a possibility for the question 'who cooks'. Further the Logician cannot object that even after knowing that the action of cooking has Devadatta as its particular agent, the expectancy in which or 'for whom' still remains unsolved, for, the action of cooking (Pakakriya) means 'an action favourable to softening (Viklittyanukūlavyapara)'. The substratum of this action viz. Devadatta is its agent. And when the substratum of the action is decided upon, the expectancy "in whom" or "of whom" does not arise at all.

Further in instances like 'Pacantam Devadattam paśya' Pacamānasya Devadattasya dravyam, the primary affixes 'Ṣatī and Śānac' in Pacantam and Pacamānasya respectively, just like Tip etc., should denote the sense of effort (Kṛti) only. But it is not so, because it is undisputedly accepted even by the Logician that Ṣatī and Śānac affixes are enjoined in the sense of agent only. And if we are to accept that from the suffixes 'Ṣatī' Śānac etc. too, we get the import of Kṛti only then, in the above given instances i.e. Pacantam Devadattam etc. the Logician cannot accept the agreement of the meanings of the two words with the relation of identity². So in order to admit that the meanings of the two words agree by the relation of 'non-differential identity', (relationship) the Logician has to accept the primary suffixes Ṣatī etc. denote the agent only. Further the Logician cannot accept that in spite of the proximity involved, he is prepared to accept that the primary suffix which comes in the place of the

1 Ekakartṛika pakakriya.

2 Praulhamanoramā, unber p 3 69,

Lakāra denote the agent and the T_{in} suffixes denote Kṛt, because such a prolixity is not a prolixity when it is justified. But this acceptance does not save him. Because it is an accepted principle of both the Grammarian and the Logician that the "Sthāni" alone is denotative but not the substitute (Ādesa) which comes in its place. So the Grammarian questions what is the validity for the Logician, to say that Satṛ etc. suffixes alone, which come in the place of Lakāra, denote agent but not the T_{in} suffixes and that these T_{in} suffixes denote kṛt. Therefore the T_{in} suffixes too denote agent etc. but not kṛt. Acceptance of many potentialities for a word is not proper.¹

Further the interpretation offered by the Logician to the aphorism "Anabhihite" is also not correct. It suffers from the fault of partial application inasmuch as it concerns the words ending in primary and secondary suffixes (Kṛt and Taddhita) and also in the case of compounds, because the number meaning is not found to be expressed by them. The Logician explains the above śītra, 'Anabhihite as Saṃkhyānabhidhane'. Consequently in instances like 'Paktavyastandulah' 'Prāptodako grāmaḥ' etc. since the number meaning is not expressed (Anabhihite) naturally the aphorism "Karmāṇi Dvitiyā" etc., operate and no scope is left for the nominative usage. It cannot be argued that by supplying a word like 'Tisthatṛ' we find even in the instances cited above number is expressed, because, if the word supplied is not 'Tisthatṛ' but 'Sthitah', then the number meaning is not found to be expressed. Thus the interpretation of the aphorism 'Anabhihite' as given by the Logician is untenable² and the Logician has to admit "Anabhihite as Anabhihite Kartarī" etc.

Similarly even in the case of the T_{in} affixes, kṛt cannot be the denoted sense and we need not accept Lakṣaṇa (implication) in instances like "The Car goes" (Ratho gacchati) by accepting the 'substratum' as the denoted sense of the verbal affixes.

¹ Prauthamānorama under P 3 4 69

² Tattvabodhini P 319, P 3 4 69 Tasmād anabhihite kartarī ityadi vyākhyānamevabhyupetavyaḥ.

The incongruity anticipated by the Logician which forced him to accept a secondary meaning (Lakṣanā), can be warded off, because though the car is an insentient object, there is nothing wrong in its having activity (Vyāpāra) like movement of wheels etc congenial to going. Hence just as the primary affixes express the substratum, so also the T_{in} suffixes too denote the substratum. And there is no valid and substantiating reason to discriminate between the primary affixes and T_{in} suffixes ¹

Nāgesabhaṭṭa, in his Laghumāñjūsā gives a systematic criticism against the Logician's theory. Though Bhaṭṭoji, Kaundābhaṭṭa Jñānendra etc' had amply refuted the Logician's theory, it is Nāgesa who, finally completed the task.

The objection of the Logician to accept Ṛsraya i.e. the agent etc. as the denoted sense of the verbal affix, is based on the principle of prolixity. If the agent is the denoted potentiality of the verbal affix, then the determinant of this potentiality is agent-hood (Kartṛtvam) i.e. in other words it is kṛtṛ only. Since kṛtṛs are many in number, there can be no single common determinant of the denoted-sense of the affix. So the Logician argues that if 'Kṛtṛ' is accepted as the denoted meaning of the affix, then the determinant of the potentiality, by being its them is 'Kṛtṛvar' (activity-hood) which is singular in nature and common in all activities (Kṛtayah). Hence it is logical to accept kṛtṛ (Yatna) as the denoted meaning of the affix.

For the objection raised by the Logician, the Grammarian Nāgesa criticises him severely. He questions him when the Logician has no objection to accept Cumber-someness (Prolixity), in the case of the determinant of the secondary meaning, as in instances like 'Gangāyam Ghosah' then what prevents him from accepting the same even in the case of the meaning directly expressed. And when the Logician has accepted 'Kṛtṛ' as the expressed sense of the verbal affix the Grammarian has gone one step

1 Tasmāt karta tīnā ca vallakṣaṇyaṃ durlabhamiti kartrārtha-katvamabhyupeyaṃ (Tat Bo P 3.4-69)

forward and accepted *kṛtyāśraya* as the expressed meaning of the verbal affix in order to obtain *Samānadhikarānya* with the subject of the sentence. And further there is no hard and fast rule laid down in any philosophy that, when a more concise property (*Laṅghudharma*) is available, more prolix property should not be taken as the determinant of the meaning. And there is no logic in saying that a more prolix property is to be taken as the determinant of the potentiality, only in the case of secondary meanings. In fact the determinant must be such that it is free from all the faults such as over-applicability, partial applicability etc. Hence when the determinant does not suffer from any of the said faults, when it does not matter whether it is concise or not. Nāgasa does not accept that determinant-ness is a different category. He views it as 'Svarūpa sambandha, not different from svarūpa and that svarūpa is present even in a *gurudharma* 1

And further, the question of taking the concise property or the prolix one as the determinant, arises only when both are possible 2. And these two would be possible where the meaning of a word is settled either as the expressed or otherwise. But in the present case of the verbal affix, the very expressed meaning is under dispute i.e. whether the agent is directly expressed by the verbal affix or *kṛti* alone. Unless it is settled, there is no meaning in arguing about the nature (i.e. cumbersome or simple) of the "determinant". And the Grammarian has not accepted *kṛti* as the denoted sense of the verbal affix, because to him it is denoted by the root itself 3.

Nāgasa further argues that no actual heaviness is experienced by, such as when carrying a load on the head. The only difference is that the Logician accepts plurality in the case of *kṛti* which is the expressed meaning, the *Viśeṣya*, and in the Gramma-

1 K M (nbp) P 12, 11 13-14

2 ibid

3 *Prakṛte ca pratyayāt kṛtitvena bobhah savivādah, Dhātutaḥ eva tadbodhāt* (L M (k k))

rian's view it is the *viśeṣa* (*kṛtyaśraya*) which has plurality. It does not matter whether *Viśeṣya* is manifold or *Viśeṣana* is manifold. There is no deciding criterion as to which should be manifold. I.e. the *viśeṣya* or *Viśeṣana*. Hence is the Grammarian's stand.

And as regards the argument put forward by the Logician, that from the explanatory sentence, (*Pacati = Pākam karoti*) it is evident that *Kṛti* is the denoted sense of the affix. The Grammarian comments that the Logician is wholly mistaken and far from a logical stand. The Grammarian says that to him a root denotes both the action (*Vyāpāra*) and *kṛti*. And as such in the explanatory sentence the former is explained by the word 'Pāka' and the later by the root *Kṛ*. Hence the explanatory sentence cannot be helpful to the Logician. Further the Logician cannot demand that all the meanings expressed by a single word need be explained by a single word only. If he insists on this point, it is harmful to himself, because he too explains that of all the meanings expressed by verbal affix (i.e. *kṛti* number tense), *kṛti* is represented by the root *Kṛ* in the explanatory sentence 'Pākam karoti' and the rest i.e. number and tense, by the suffix 'Ti' in *Karoti*. Thus there lies the fault of self-contradiction. Further the Grammarian says that, if we are to accept the Logician's principle, then we interpret it as "the meaning of the root shall be explained by the root only and that of affix by affix. Thus the root *Kṛ* stands for the meaning of the root 'Pac' only but not of the affix.

Further the Logician, taking it for granted that the root *Kṛ* denotes *kṛti* alone, develops his arguments. But in fact there is nothing to substantiate his contention and on the other hand there is much evidence against it. In insentient objects no effort (*kṛti*) is witnessed. And as regards the usages "Nāham spandam karomi" etc., they are explained on the same lines as the sentences "Kāṣṭhāni pākam kurvanti" etc., are explained by the Logician. He accepts activity in general to be denotation of the affix in these sentences i.e. *Kāṣṭhāni pākam kurvanti* etc. So also to the Grammarian *Kṛti* (*Yatna*) is denoted by *karoti* in sentences like 'Nāham spandam karomi' etc.

Now as regards the argument put forth by the Logicians (author of Ākhyātavāda Sīromani, Udayana etc) that the usages like "Ghataḥ kiṭaḥ Ankuro na kiṭaḥ", etc. is proof in support of his theory, the Grammarian says that by accepting kiṭi (Yatna) as the denotation of the affix in some places, and in some other places the action in general, then there is a possibility of sentences "Bījadinā ankuro kiṭaḥ" (Sprout is made by the seed) And another argument of the Logician is that the root K_i denotes yatna alone but not action (vyāpāra or Bhavanā) which is congenial to it, because, if it be so, every kāraka gets the designation agent' (Kartṛsamjñā) The Grammarian replies, that is an welcome feature in language and the BhāṣyaKāra, Patañjali accepts and allows such a possibility as in sentences quoted by him Sthālī pacati, Tandulāḥ pacyante svayameva, Kāsthāni pacanti etc

For a while let us set aside these arguments and counter arguments of the Logician and the Grammarian with reference to the meaning of the root K_i and let us investigate the opinion of the Mahābhāṣyakāra in the matter

The Mahābhāṣyakāra Patañjali, while commenting on the sūtra 'Bhūvādayo Dhattavaḥ, (P 1 3 1) lays it down very clearly that all the roots like Pac etc., have identity of meaning with that of the root K_i, i.e. the root K_i expresses only action in general (vyāpārasāmānya), and the roots 'pac' etc., specify the particularity in action. Further the sentences 'Kim karoti' gives an import to the effect 'what is it he does', thus the question has import in knowing the Particularity of the action. Here the sāmānādhikāraṇya (Identity) is explained in the form of generality to particularity ²

1 Katham Jñāyante kriyāvācīnaḥ pacādayaḥ iti, yadesam karotina sāmānādhikaranyam (M B on P 3 1 3)

2 "Sāmānyavisesāna bhāvena sāmānādhikaranyāt kriyā viśeṣa vācīnaḥ pacādayaḥ pratiyanta iti (Kaiyata on the above Bhāṣya)

Now as regards the argument of the Logician that in sentences like 'Vikso vardhate, (the tree grows) Ratho gacchati (car goes)' etc., the affix has secondary signification in substratumness, the Grammarian objects that, it is far from any accepted principle because the substratumness, qualified by the growth and movement existing in the tree and the car respectively, has no direct relation with kiti, the denoted sense (in the Logician's theory) of the affix. And even if the Logician tries to explain through some indirect relation (Paramparā sambandha), it cannot come under the scope of "sakya sāksāt sambandha". There is no secondary signification in the meanings which are indirectly related to the object i.e. we resort to secondary signification only in those cases (meanings) which are directly connected with the primary denotation. And this has been clearly explained by Mammata in his Kāvya-prakāśa 'Prayojane na lakṣanā sambandhābhāvat' while dealing with Lakṣana in words like gangā in "gangaṃ ghosaḥ" 1

Of course the Logician may argue that there is no hard and fast rule to accept the above statement of the Kāvya-prakāśakāra which has its say mainly limited to poetics alone. It is true. Then Nāgeśa explodes his last weapon on his opponents. Grammar is the science which deals with words, their derivations, meanings, agreements etc. Hence one has to abide by its rules and its interpretations as given by the authoritative people in that science like Pāṇini, Patañjali, etc. And everything is clearly mentioned in this sūtra, which word, or suffix has a particular

1 Here the idea is this. In the sentence "Gangasyam ghosaḥ", the word Gangā has secondary signification in Tīra (bank) and the coolness, holiness etc. are obtained through suggestion (Vyanjana vyāpāra). But a question is raised why not we accept lakṣanā for the word Gangā directly in the coolness and the holiness, and why we need this vyanjana. To this the answer is "Hetvābhāvat pāvanāt vādau na lakṣanā, yogaphalena no, na ca sabdārthasya tatasya and "Sāksāt sambandha eva lakṣanā prayojaka iti bhāvaḥ (Commentary on the above)

sense Hence to use a word in a particular sense other than that permitted by this s̥āstra or vice versa (i.e. to assign a particular meaning to a word contrary to this s̥āstra) leads to confusion and the whole system of grammar becomes void The meanings and explanations of words, suffixes and sutras etc. as given by the Grammarian should be accepted by all and one should not create or assign meanings as one likes, taking recourse to primary or secondary significations This is evident for those who are conversant with the Bhāṣya on sutras like Pratyayah 'Pumyogadākh-yāyām' 'Parasca' etc. Otherwise, if one goes on creating and accepting secondary significations, then the sutras 'Kartṛkarmāṇoḥ kṛti' 'vyatyayo bahulam' etc. become null, because there also we can resort to secondary signification thus avoiding the actual meaning of the sutras Therefore the Logician has to accept the suffix as denoting the substratum of action of result i.e. agent or object

In Pāṇinian grammar the arrangement of person (Purusavyavasthā) is governed by three sutras 'Yusmadyupapāde samānādhi-karane sthāninyapi madhyamah' 'Asmadyuttamah' 'Sese Prathamā' i.e. when Kāraka (agent etc.) expressed by the affix has identity with the word Yusmad then the root takes the second person etc. suffixes Similarly when the identity is with 'Asmad' it takes first person suffixes and in all other cases it takes the third personal affixes This is possible only in the Grammarian's theory, because to him the suffix denotes the agent or object kāraka And this system fails if we accept the Logician's theory that Kṛti is the denoted potentiality of the affix because there is no identity between the 'Kṛti' and 'Yusmad' etc. words

And suppose the opponent argues that on hearing the word 'Pacati' without any word in the nominative there does not arise any doubt whether the agent is one or not This is possible only when the number agrees with the agent Unless the agent is expressed directly or indirectly (through secondary signification) the number cannot agree with it Since Kṛti is denoted by the affix, there is no alternative except to accept secondary signification to the affix in the agent.

This argument of the Logician is based on the theory that the affix denotes Kṛti, but it is the very subject which is under dispute. And as already mentioned it is now here experienced that Kṛti is the denoted potentiality of the affix. Further the Logician takes it for granted that on hearing the word 'Pacati' there is no doubt regarding the number meaning of ONE. But such a contention is also not correct. For instance, when one says Anekaḥ Pacati definitely there arises the doubt whether the agent is one or not (i.e. one or two or more). Hence it is better to accept that the suffix denotes the agent etc.

Further according to the Grammarian, on hearing the word 'Pacati' there rises an expectancy with reference to the particularity or quality of agent in the form 'Kah or Kidāṣah', because to him (the Grammarian) the agent is already denoted by the affix. This is common experience. This is not possible unless the Logician admits that the agent etc. is denoted by the suffix. Otherwise the nature of the enquiry should pertain to Kṛti i.e. in the form 'Kidāṣi Kṛtiḥ'.

Further in words where suffixes are not found e.g. **Ajaghāḥ**, **Acakat**, **Ahar** etc. the Logician explains that **Yatna** (Kṛti), number and tense meanings are being denoted by the verbal root and in other places they are denoted by the affix. Thus all these meanings are denoted by the affix in certain cases and by the root in some other cases. Thus it is a clear case of prolixity. But to the Grammarian all these are denoted by the root itself and the suffix is only indicative (Dyotaka).

Suppose the opponent admits that according to him too the affix is only suggestive i.e. all these meanings are suggested by the affix then Kṛti or Bhāvana, which you (Logician or Mīmāṃsaka) argue as the expressed sense of the affix has to become attributive to the meaning denoted by the root contrary to your view because a suggested meaning, in the presence of an expressed meaning cannot be a substantive. Otherwise the import 'Pākanukūlā Kṛtiḥ' where Kṛti is substantive will not be possible.

Pāṇini has laid down the following aphorisms in his case system 'Anabhihite (if the agent or object not expressed) Karmanī Dvitiyā, Kartīkaraṇa yostitīyā etc. Here the Logician explains the sūtra 'Anabhihite' as the 'number of the Agent or object not being expressed' ¹ (by the affix lakāra). Thus he tries to explain the case system. But he cannot absolutely maintain it. Because in instances like 'Caitraḥ Pakṭā', 'Caitrena dīṣṭo ghataḥ' etc. the Kṛt suffix does not denote the number of the agent or object. Hence according to the Logician the word 'Caitra' and 'Ghata' in the above sentences should take the instrumental and objective case affixes respectively, in which case the sentences become absurd. But according to the Grammarian the suffix denotes the agent or object itself, hence the said sentences are correct. And it cannot be argued by the Logician that the Kṛt suffix also, though there is no specific rule to that effect, denotes the number as well, by virtue of its nature ². If we accept this argument of the Logician, then there will be no need to formulate sūtras like 'Kartari Kṛt' wherein it is clearly laid down that Kṛt suffixes are enjoined in the sense of agent i.e. Kṛt suffixes denote agent alone. Here also by accepting "svabhāvat tadvācakatvam" we can drop the aphorism. Further these aphorisms are laid down to restrict a word in its denotation, otherwise there will be a state of chaos.

Of course the Logician may argue that in sentences like 'Caitraḥ Pakṭā', even the Grammarian cannot avoid instrumental case for the word Caitra, because the word 'Pakṭā' is a complex word (vṛtti padam). So the whole form has meaning but not parts and as such the agent cannot be denoted by the affix. And the Sūtra Kartīkaraṇayostitīyā has scope for operation there too. To this the Grammarian Nāgeśa replies that it is grammar which governs or controls the behaviour of words i.e. it governs the base or suffix etc. to express certain meanings in certain contexts. And the Logician (or the Mīmāṃsaka) must be aware of the fact

-
- 1 Kartīkaraṇī lakāra vācye ityasya yamarthaḥ. Tadgatasamkhyā Vacyetī (Śabdacintamānī)
 - 2 Anusāsanābhāvepi svabhāvat tadvācakatvam

if all the means to arrive at the meaning of a word, grammar
 'foremost one'.

And the Logician may argue that he is prepared to accept
 affix to denote both the agent and number so that Anabhihite
 is 'if the agent or the number of agent etc. is not expressed'
 in the instances 'Caitraḥ pakṭā', Dṛṣṭo ghataḥ' Caitrena etc.
 will be no impropriety of case suffixes. But this proposition
 the Logician is not genuine, because such an acceptance is
 iter of prolixity. And even if the porlixity is tolerated by
 opponent, since the necessary word-formation is explained,
 it leads to too many undesirable results.

Further if 'Anabhihite' means when number is not express-
 y the affix then in instances like Caitra iva Maitraḥ pacatī
 the number in Caitra is not expressed by the suffix 'Ti' the
 Caitra is to be used in the instrumental case.

Further even in sentences like 'Caitraḥ pacatī' etc. the
 ry of the Logician does not hold good because the number
 essed by the suffix cannot agree with the word in the nomi-
 ve because it is prevented by the number of the nominative
 affix. Nor can it agree with Kṛti. Hence in the sentence
 above the Logician cannot prevent the instrumental case
 for the word 'Caitra'. It also cannot be argued by the Logi-
 that the number expressed by the case affix is only for gram-
 ical purity so that the number expressed by the Tin suffix
 es with the word in the nominative (Caitra in Caitraḥ Pacatī)
 ch (word) is not attributive to any other word. To this Gra-
 arian replies such as argument is far from logic because the
 e meaning and the number meaning are expressed by the same
 d, so the number meaning of the case suffix quickly agrees

Vyākaraṇopamāna koṣṭhata vak it vyavahāritasca, vakyasya
 sesad vivātervadanti sannidhataḥ siddhāpacasya vidhāḥ
 Sāṃkhyā kartrādyanyatarānabhidhāne ityartho gauravam
 durjñeyatvam ca, Tadbhinna bhinnasyaiva anyatara rupatvāt
 (L M (nbp) Tīñārtha P 23)

with its base meaning whereas the number meaning, expressed by the verbal affix does not have such an affinity to agree readily with the nominative base meaning. But to the Grammarian the number expressed by the affix agrees with the agent itself (because to him, the agent is denoted by the affix) and to the Mimamsaka, too it agrees with the agent obtained through presumption. Thus the arguments of the Logician that the word 'Caitra' etc. takes the nominative case, if its number is not expressed by the verbal affix, is not correct. Here the idea is this. According to the sūtra the second and third personal or first personal affixes are enjoined when there is an identity between the karaka agent etc. with the words yusmad, Asmad etc. But in the given instances no such word is there and 'Parama tvam,' 'Tvat kalpaḥ', 'Ati tvam' are not the words Yusmad etc. So how can you justify the personal affixes? To this the reply given by Kaiyata is that in the sūtra the word Yusmad means not only the word form yusmad but where the agent etc. expressed by the verb word has an identity with one possessing the meaning Yusmad word. Thus Ati tvam does not have a meaning equal to that of the word Yusmad. In this the third person is justified. In other cases second person is justified.

Now as regards the validity of system of person in sentences like 'Parama tvam pacasi', 'Tvatkalpaḥ pacasi', 'Ati tvam pacati' etc., the Grammarian explains the word Samanadhikarana, in the sūtra 'Yusmadyupapade samanadhikarane sthāninyapi madhyamah' (P 14105), as identity with action because of non-difference between the action and its possessor. Of course the Logician may argue that grammar is only to teach the purity of words but not to decide the meanings or give interpretations as he likes. But he is totally mistaken. Because it is clearly said by the Nyayabhaṣyakara that 'Padasamaya jñānartham vyākaranam saktigrahakam

-
- I Paretu yusmadī kriyā samanadhikarane iti vyākhyānam, kriyā kriyavatośca abhedāt tatsulabham (L.M (kk) P 746.)

1 Therefore the Logician is not at liberty to interpret the orisms of grammar as he likes to suit his arguments

Now the Grammarian argues that the explanation of the Logician regarding the denotation of agent object etc by Kit suffixes is not satisfactory

In the Ākhyatavāda Siromani the argument put forward by Logician as regards the meaning of the Kit suffix is the experience of identity between the substantive and the attributive as in sentences like 'Caitro ganta, gato grāmah' Mitrāpektrī, 'gatam am' etc And the other argument is the identity in number and gender as can be witnessed in the above words These two arguments, as the Grammarian feels, cannot help the Logician, on the other hand they are more in favour of the Grammarians' theory.

If experience is the authority then, in the case of suffixes too we have the same experience of denotation of agent, object etc, as in the case of the Kit suffixes So therefore (i.e. in the case of Tin suffixes) the Logician has to admit the agent etc, as the denoted sense of the Tin suffix, because the same logic applies there too

And secondly, as regards the identity in number and gender the Grammarian points out that the Logician's argument suffers from the fault of partial applicability There are many sentences, here, in spite of the identity between the base meanings there is identity in number and gender, e.g. Vedāḥ Pramāṇam, Gavo anam, Jātyakṛtivyaktayastu Padārthāḥ (Nyāyasūtra) etc, Furthermore there are instances where the Kit suffix denotes mere activity e.g. 'Paktā jātaḥ' which means 'pako jātaḥ' Here the Kit suffix does not denote the agent because of the saying 'utpanne vidyane vā tathāprayogasambhavana, kṛtyāśrayasyātmanā janana-nbhāve ca'

Samaya palanārtham cedam padalakṣyaṇāyāḥ,
Vaconvakhyānam vyākaranam (Bhāṣya on the Nyāyasūtra
2.1-56).

It is not open to the Logician to argue that in such cases there is a possibility of forming sentence like 'Caitre gantā' instead of Caitra-ah gantā because Caitra being the substratum of Kṛti the word takes the locative case. According to the Grammarian such usages can be warded off in the same way as the Logician wards off such usages in the case of Tin suffixes i.e. the meaning of the kṛdanta i.e. kṛti agrees by the relation of substratumness with the meaning of the noun word which (word) is in the same substratum as in the case of the kṛdanta word. This kṛti has its substratumness in the denotation of the noun ending in the same case affix as that of the kṛdanta word ¹. If the Logician argues that since no kṛdanta is used to denote Kṛti therefore a Kṛt suffix does not denote Kṛti, but kartā etc., on the same lines the Grammarian also argues that no Tinanta word is found used to denote mere kṛti so a Tin suffix too does not denote kṛti but agent etc. Further in the absence of the denotation of the agent by kṛt suffix the Logician cannot argue that the case-system (Abhidhānanabhidhāna vyavasthā) fails. We explain it if the kṛti is not expressed, then the agent takes instrumental as in the instance "Caitrena pakvaṣṭandulāḥ" and where the kṛti of the agent is expressed it takes nominative as in 'Caitraḥ pācakah'. Then the Logician may question the agreement of kṛti in sentences like "Bhokta tīpyati", for that the Grammarian says in such stray cases we accept lakṣaṇā to denote agent. Thus the Logician cannot maintain that a kṛt suffix always denotes agent only but not kṛti. Hence the Logician has to admit that Tin suffixes too denote the agent, object etc. which fact is cognised in the experience of the sages. And to the Grammarian, the kṛt suffix denotes agent object etc. based on the aphorisms 'Kartari kṛt' etc. If the Logician says that for him too, this aphorism authorises the kṛt suffix to denote agent etc., what harm is there for him to accept the same dictation of the Grammarian in the case of Tin suffixes too?

1 Ākhyatārthakṛteḥ prathamānta padopasthāpya iva kṛdartha kṛteḥ kṛdanta samāna vibhaktikanāmārthe eva astayatayā anvayasvīkareṇa doṣa it (LM (kk) P 746)

Further, in the passive construction, according to the neo-an the activity *kiti* (or *kartitvam*) is the denoted sense of instrumental (*Tititayarthah*) and the suffix denotes the difference and the result. The non-denotation of the result by the is deemed to be the non-denotation of the object (*Karma*). This view is not acceptable to the Grammarian, because he says that when a question like '*kim kriyate*' is put, generally the reply is something like '*Pacyate*'. But to the Logician it is possible to reply like that because for him, the root *Ki* denotes (*Kṛti*). To the Grammarian it is only action in general. So the expected answer is with reference to the particularity of the action. Hence the question and answer as above are possible in the Grammarian's theory.

Of course the old Logician may say that to him the *Kṛti* is the denoted sense of the suffix even in the passive construction, and he has no difficulty in the question and answer cited above. But if he says so, there comes another difficulty. The Grammarian argues that in such a case he (old Logician) cannot identify the instrumental case in the case of the agent, in, sentence '*Caitreṇa kim kriyate*'. In the active construction, to the Logician, the agent is deemed to have been expressed, because its substantive (quality) i.e. number, is expressed by the affix. Similarly here also since his (agent's) attributive i.e. *Kṛti* is denoted, the agent is deemed to have been expressed. Hence the word denoting the agent '*Caitra*' cannot take the third case affix.

As regards the agreement of '*Time*' meaning also the Logician's theory suffers prolixity. Normally in all verbs the time or agrees with *Kṛti* denoted by the affix, but in the case of verbs like *karoti*, *yatate* etc., it agrees with the root meaning itself. So he has to accept two different '*Kārya-kāraṇa*' relations. But this is not the case with the Grammarian, because to him the time meaning always agrees with the meaning of the root only.

Further, if the Logician's theory is accepted we cannot justify certain generally accepted propositions. For instance, when the effort, subsisting in Caitra, congenial to cooking (inflaming etc.) is withdrawn, and while the rice is boiling and the cook (Caitra) is standing, watching the rice, then if anybody puts a question "what does Caitra do" normally the reply is Caitra cooks (Caitraḥ pacati), but according to Logician's theory this reply is not possible because the effort (Yatna) is not there i.e. the verb cannot be in the present tense and the reply must be in past tense, because the 'Yatna' is a matter of the past ¹. But to the Grammarian there is no such difficulty. Because all that the cook does till the softening (Vikṛitti) is produced, comes under the meaning of the root. Since such an activity (vyāpāra) is there in Caitra, a root can take the present tense.

Now Nāgesa silences both the Logician and the Mīmāṃsaka with his shrewed arguments. The Logician and the Mīmāṃsaka based their theory that the suffix denotes Kṛti or Bhāvanā, on the explanation of the word 'Pacati' as 'Pākaṃ karoti'. Nāgesa says that, if it be so, to him the explanatory sentence of 'Pācaka' as 'pacati iti pācakah' is an authority to show that the affix denotes the agent. The tenor of the argument is the same as that of the logician in the case of 'pacati pākaṃ karoti'. In pācaka there is the root and the suffix. In pacati also there is the same root and the affix. The meaning we get from both the suffixes must be the same. And in the case of the word 'pācaka' you accept the suffix denotes the agent. On the same lines here also the suffix Tṛi should denote agent only. Thus the suffix denotes agent etc. The import we get from the dissolved constituents of a complex word must be identical with (import) that we get directly from that word. We cannot and should not get different imports from the explaining words and the word explained. Hence the Tṛi suffix denotes agent etc. but not Kṛti or Bhāvanā,

1° Kim ca kṛtau kartranvaye pakesatyam kāṣṭha jvalanādyanukūle yatne naste, pacyamanamodanam pasyati Devadatte pacati-tyanapattiḥ (LM(kk) P 747,)

Here, the Logician, of course may object that he cannot accept the explanation offered on the basis of 'Pacatīti' 'Pacakah'. He says the import we get from both the words is not the same even if it be accepted that the *Ti* suffix denotes the agent. Because the import from the word 'pacatī' according to the Grammarian is 'Eka kartikāpakabhāvanā' i.e. here the agent is an off relative and the action is the substantive. But the import we get from 'Pacakah' is 'Pakakartā' i.e. here the agent is the substantive and the action is the attributive. Thus the relation between the substantive and attributive is reverse in the imports. Hence there is no identity in the import from the words explaining the complex word and the word explained.

This objection of the Logician is set aside by the Grammarian. He argues though the relation between the attributive and the substantive is reverse it is not an impediment in cognising the compound as in the case of 'Āksikah' or 'Kumbhakara' or 'Citra-

raha' etc. Nagesa goes a step forward and argues that here the *Ti*anta word expresses the sense of complex word. For example, as in 'pacatīti-pacakah', there in the import of that word the *kārika* is predominant and the action is subordinate, but if the *anta* word is an independent one i.e. does not form a part of the *anta* word, there the action is predominant and the *kārika* is subordinate. In fact, Nagesa says that 'the sense of the complex word is some as that conveyed by the constituents of the *vigraha* and there is no change in the substantive-attributive relationship.

-
1. 'Tatn ca viśeṣa a viśeṣya bhavamse samānārthatva virāhe adanyamse vivaranatvam sakfinirṇāyaktvam ca samānārthatva' ityaditi bhvaah (Bhūṣana under kārīkā 34.)
 2. Here the idea is this: 'Samasta padāt citrābhinnā gosvāmīti samitvā-yako bodhah, Tadvigraha vākyaāt yatsambandhinyasodhā giva iti go viśeṣyakāsca bodho jāyate Tadvatprakṛtepi vastutastu samana eva viśeṣya viśeṣanabhāvo vṛtyarthopadā' (see 'U'ye (LM (kk) P 748) Further details vide Bahuv-
 3. 'Tatn samāsa prakara a P 1485

Thus the Grammarian establishes, with all these arguments, that a verbal suffix denotes substratum of the form agent or object but never does it denote *kṛti*, *yatna* or *Bhāvanā*

The Meaning of the Verbal Affix - A Critical Assessment :-

The whole discussion on this subject can be summed up as follows -

Let us take a sentence like 'Caitra cooks'. Here from the verb word we get the various notions such as action (*vyāpāra*), result (*phala*) substratum (*Āsraya*) in the form of agent or object, Time (*kāla*), number (*samkhyā*) etc. According to the Grammarian, action and result are expressed by the root, hence the remaining are to be accepted as denoted by the verbal affix say *Ṭin*. Now as regards the denotation of Time and number there is no difference of opinion among the Grammarian, the Logician, and the Mīmāṃsaka, but as regards the substratums of action and result, denoted by the *Ākhyāta* they differ. The Grammarian, speaking in a general way, argues that in the active construction the verbal affix denotes the agent, and in the passive construction the verbal affix denotes the object. In the impersonal form of the verb, the meaning of the affix is simply the meaning of the root-- 'Bhāva' as it is called. The Grammarian argues that his conclusions are based on the authority of Pāṇini's *sūtras* like *Laṅ Karmāṇi ca*, *Dvyekayoḥ*, etc. and the *Nirukta*, and the *Mahābhāṣyakāra*'s clarifications. Thus according to the Grammarian the import of a sentence like 'Caitra cooks' would be 'activity favourable to cooking having a single substratum non-different from Caitra'. In passive voice too the import is activity (favourable to softening) which (activity) has for its substratum one non-different from Caitra (favourable to softening) and which result has rice as its

substratum¹ In sentence like 'the pot perishes (Ghato Nasyati) the import is "activity favourable to disappearance" (Nāsānukūlo vyaparāḥ) The activity mentioned here is nothing but the existence of a collection of materials of destruction which are of the nature of the counterpositives With reference to sentences like 'He knows (Janāti) similar is the import i.e. activity favourable to knowledge, is the meaning of 'knowing'

The Mīmāṃsaka and the Logician do not accept the above theory of the Grammarian

According to the Mīmāṃsaka the verbal affix denotes Bhāvanā but not the agent or object He opines that this Bhāvanā is different from the action denoted by the root This Bhāvanā produces the action denoted by the root Thus in the verbal import Bhāvanā is the primary substantive He arrives at this conclusion based mainly on the explanation of the word 'pacati' as 'pakam karoti' The word 'karoti' expresses the meaning of the suffix *ṭip* in 'pacati' And according to the Nirukta, this is Bhāvanā (effort or activity) and it is primary The agent or the object is obtained by presumption (Ākṣepa) The agent so obtained agrees with the word in the nominative by the relation of 'identity' Thus the import of a sentence like 'Caitra cooks' would be 'effort (which exists in the agent not different from Caitra) congenial to softening (Eka Caitrabhinnakartṛsamaveta viklityanukūla bhavanā)' In the passive voice the import is

1 Tāndulāśrayikā yā viklityā tadānukūlo Caitra nisto vyaparāḥ Vai Bhu P 28 Here it is to be noted that according to Dīkṣita and Kaundabhaṭṭa even in the passive construction, the activity part of the root meaning is the primary substantive But according to Nāgesa the result part of the root meaning is the primary substantive, This later view (i.e. of Nāgesa) is more correct than the other one as it supplies the appropriate emphasis on the result part According to Nāgesa the import in the passive is of the form "Eka Caitrāśrayikā yā vartamānabhavanā tajjanya ekatāndulāśrayikā viklityā"

'Effort which produces the result subsisting in a substratum not different from rice (Tandulabhinn-sritatvakarmatva samānādhikāra -naphalaprayojikā bhavana) 1 In the impersonal form of a sentence like 'Caitreṇa supyate' the import is of the form "Ehāvanā of sleeping having Caitra as its agent (Caitrakartika' svapah)" The word Bhāvanā (effort or activity) has been explained as "the particular activity of a doer conducive something to be (being) 2 This Bhavana is causal in form and as such is always transitive

Further the Mimamsaka takes the 'age old maxim 3 'pratyayārthaḥ pradhānam' as an authority for his theory Reading this with the Nirukta words Bhavapradanamākhyātam he arrives at the conclusion that the affix denotes mainly Bhāvanā In fact from a verb word the action is primarily understood But Mimamsaka cannot accept the entire action to be denoted by the affix for the reasons already explained So it appears he has taken action to mean physical activity This physical activity is produced after some inner action (Antah vyapara) and physical action (Bahya cetā-rīpa) This physical action is denoted by the root as (vyapara) effort, the internal activity is called Bhāvanā and is denoted by the affix And to substantiate it, he says the root Kṛ denotes it in the explanatory sentence Pakam karoti Besides this, we find no valid reason or argument on the part of the Mimamsaka The Grammarian does not accept this argument of the Mimamsaka After all the explanatory sentence, according to Nagesa shows that both the internal and physical activities are contained in the root meaning itself Thus the root Kṛ shows the action in general and the root 'Pac' denotes action in particular which cannot exist without the former 4 Since this internal activity is expressed by the root itself, there is no need to accept a separate denotation of it by the affix 5 Since agent etc is not expressed by the root it is logical to accept that the affix denotes the agent

1 Bhā. Cin. P 114

2 Bhaviturbavanānukūlo bhāvaka vyāpāra viśeṣaḥ

3 Vide refutation of the old Logician's theory

4 Nirviśeṣam na samanyam bhāvecchasaviśeṣānavad

5 Ananyalabhyaḥ sabdarthaḥ

etc. Otherwise, the Grammarian argues that the Mīmāṃsaka cannot satisfactorily explain Arunādhikāraṇa, Guṇādhikāraṇa etc.

In fact Kumarila, the very propounder of the Bhaṭṭa school is not definite whether this Bhāvana is denoted by the root or the suffix or by the entire verb word. But however basing himself on the maxim of pratyayaarthapraadhānya he says, let this Bhāvana be denoted by the affix. Kumarila mentions clearly that neither the Sūtrakāra nor the Bhāṣyakāra ever said that Bhāvana was denoted by the suffix. Though there is no logical reasoning (specific reason worth to be mentioned) in stating that the Bhāvana is denoted by the suffix, still it is conventionally accepted in the Sāstra that the suffix denotes Bhāvana¹. When we examine impartially it is clear that this convention has no approval or sanction of the sage, Jaimini or Sabara, the bhāṣyakāra. The Grammarian establishes that his theory is based clearly on the Sūtras and the Bhāṣya of his sages. The Prabhākara school of Mīmāṃsaka also admits that the suffix in general does not denote Bhāvana except in the case of the Lin affix.

Now according to the Logician the suffix denotes Kṛti (effort i.e. internal action), which is not different from the subjectness (kartṛtva). This in essence is not different from the Grammarian's view point except for the fact that the former's view is less cumbersome in that subject is the substratum of activity. To the Logician the meaning of substratum which is essential for the import of the sentence, is supplied by syntactical connection. His argument is mainly based on two reasons 'Brevity vs. Prolivity'.

- 1 Kimca 'Bhāvanā gamyamanā ca dhātupratyaya sannidhau, kasya vācyeṭi vispaṣṭam na kadacit pratiyate.' Bhāvana tu samudaya vyabhicarat samudītayorevārtha ityapi sakyam vaktum. Tathā ca sūtrakarabhāṣyakarābhyam bhāvārthakarmasabdā itī samānādhikāraṇyamevasṛitam, Na bhāvārthātvena pratyayāḥ kathitāḥ. Sāstre tu sarvatra pratyayārtho bhāvaneti vṛnvahānḥ. Yadyapi anyad viveka karanam nāsti tathāpi prādhanyam pratyayarthadharmam dīstūā nūmīyam pratyayārtha ityavagamyate (Tan. Vār. on Sutra 2 1.1)

When syntax itself can supply the meaning substratum (i.e. agent etc.), it is not judicious to accept potentiality in the affix in that meaning also. Thus according to him the import of the sentence in the active voice is 'The substratum of activity favourable to cooking is Caitra'.¹ In the passive voice, however, the import is one where the object is the primary substantive and the activity qualifies the result.² The Logician fails to show any authority from the original texts to the fact that the affix denotes Kṛti but not the agent. He has no special argument except that of the Mīmāṃsaka in this matter. What is called Bhāvanā by the Mīmāṃsaka is called Kṛti by the Logician while sages like Jaimini and Gautama did not say anything regarding the meaning of the affix, but kept quiet thus accepting Pāṇini's theory, their followers tried to deviate from their sages. They started to give their own interpretation and to substantiate their stand, they tried all the means at their disposal, but in many places they failed. And in some cases they fell in line with the Grammarian,

Now leaving aside the sanction from the sages, let us examine the arguments of the three schools at their face value

Besides the meanings number and tense, according to the Logician and Mīmāṃsaka the verbal affix denotes effort (Kṛti or Bhāvanā) while to the Grammarian the affix denotes substratum i.e. the agent or the object. The Logician has to secure the substratum from other sources. To claim that the substratum of the effort is obtained through syntactical connection (saṃsarga) is not sound, because in a sentence consisting of one word like 'Pacati' there is no other word to speak of syntax. If he argues that the number denoted by the affix supplies the substratum as one (Ekah) etc. then he will almost become a Mīmāṃsaka who supplies the subject itself by implication. Further acceptance of two potentialities—one for the verbal root to denote physical activity and another for the verbal affix to denote effort involves

1. Vikṛittyanukula vyāpāravān caitraḥ

2. Caitranīṣṭa kṛtījanya vikṛittyāśrayaḥ tandulaḥ.

(constitute) prolixity Since the root denotes a part of activity i.e physical activity, it is logical to allow the other part of the activity i.e effort too, to be denoted by the root itself, so that we can secure the meaning of substratum from the verbal affix by direct denotation without resorting to other means Further the Mīmāṃsaka secures the agent through another means of knowledge viz presumption (Lakṣaṇa) and to the Logician it is through samsarga But neither of them is justifiable because all verbal import (Śābdabodha) comes under verbal testimony (Śābdapramāṇa) only

The following are a few instances where the Logician fails to give a more reasonable and satisfactory explanation

In sentences like 'Kasthāni Pakam kurvanti, Ankuro Na kīṭā, Bijādina kīṭah etc the Logician cannot admit that the root Kī denotes effort (Kṛti) Such being the position it is a poor argument to say that the root Kī in the explanatory sentence 'Pacati-Pakam karoti' denotes kṛti

To the Logician the Tīn denotes Kṛti in some places and implies substratum (Āsraya) in some other places which is a matter of prolixity

The identity of the word Yusmad with the meaning of the Tīn as laid down by the Sūtra Yusmadyupapadei etc cannot be satisfactorily explained by the Logician

And the Abhidhāna-Anabhidhāna vyavasthā also cannot logically be maintained

And in the passive construction, the suffix does not denote Kṛti So no reply can properly be given to the question 'what is being done (kim kriyate) Further to the Logician the meaning 'Time' agrees with the Kṛti in some cases and with the action (vyā-

1 Ysmadyupapade samānādhikarane sthāninyapi madhyamah
(P. 1 4 105)

para) in some other cases. It is a clear case of prolixity. And the Mīmāṃsaka also has his own drawback in answering certain questions put by the Grammarian in establishing the primary importance to that which is denoted by the suffix. Further if it is only for the sake of primary importance that Bhāvanā is to be expressed by the Tin suffix, the Grammarian says, even if it is not expressed by the Tin suffix, its importance can be claimed on the basis of his own Jāti-vyakti sakti theory wherein he posits that even though Jāti is the denoted sense of a word for him, he has no objection to admit primary importance to the individual in necessary cases. Otherwise the Mīmāṃsaka fails to show any reason why the presumed Kartā should not be predominant over Bhāvanā on the same basis of jāti vyakti theory.

The expressed number meaning has to agree with the unexpressed meaning, the agent. And also by arguing that the agent etc. is obtained by Ākṣepa or Lakṣaṇa, the Mīmāṃsaka cannot explain fairly well the conclusions he arrived at in Aruṇadhikaraṇa, Guṇādhikaraṇa etc.

Further in so far as it concerns usages like 'The car goes pertaining to insentient substances the theory of the Grammarians can offer more satisfactory explanation than the other two schools because to him (the Grammarian) activity (vyapāra) means both physical and internal activity. Thus in such a sentence, in the view of the Grammarian there is no need to resort to implication, whereas in the case of the Logician and the Mīmāṃsaka there is prolixity in taking recourse to the secondary meaning.

Further if we keenly examine the verbal import of a sentence naturally there rises a doubt as to how far there is the necessity for accepting effort also in the meaning of the sentence, when there is the possibility of explaining the meaning of the sentence with the help of simple physical activity which is the meaning of the verbal root. Of course effort can be presumed along with knowledge (Jñāna) and desire (iccha).

Thus we can safely conclude that the theory of the Grammarian appears to be sound, because, in his theory the agent

denoted by the verbal affix. The mental effort and the physical activity are denoted by the verbal root. And also the instances in this theory of the Grammarian needs exceptions are a few in compared with those of the Mīmāṃsaka or the Logician in their theory.

And again it is the Grammarian's theory alone that has the sanction of his sages while neither the Mīmāṃsaka nor the Logician has the sanction of his sages Jaimini or Gautama. Hence verbal affix denotes substratum of the form agent or object denunciated by the Grammarian but not Kṛti or Bhāvanā as claimed by the Logician.



TIME (KĀLA)

Introduction :-

As already said, of the various meanings denoted by the Tim affix, after the agent/object, the important meaning is 'Time' element. The Time is a very peculiar entity which is beyond ones ken to understand or realise. So there are many speculations among the Indian scholars. As a matter of fact its philosophy is a very interesting one. However we will review it in brief before discussing the Lakṣārtha, through which this time element is generally made known in the verbal word.

Time is a peculiar entity which drew the attention of almost all scholars and intellectuals of the various doctrines and philosophies and we observe that it is a common practice of one and all to say that time is the chief factor in bringing about existence, maintenance and destruction of things in the world. Therefore every intellectual began to think of time and tried to define it in his own fashion to suit his own philosophy. If we survey the entire literature on this subject we are to arrive at the conclusion that no one could definitely state what Time is, Time has defied a definition free of faults. There are people who do not admit any entity called Time at all while on the other hand there are people to whom time is the creator himself¹. Thus these two types of thinkers form the two extreme ends in between which all other philosophers appear to traverse.

Though the Grammarian looks at and deals with this time from an all together different points of view yet it is our duty to examine his views on this subject and the views of others as well. Before analysing the views of different philosophers, the derivational import of the word 'Kala' is to be ascertained.

1 Sankhya Sūtra does not admit time as a separate and independent entity while the Bhagavadgita says 'Kalo'ham loka kṛyakit pravḍhaḥ' (Bhagavadgita XI 32)

We come across the verbal root "Kala" in the First conjugation in the sense of to sound, count and again in the Tenth conjugation in the sense of 'movement, throw count'. Taking these meanings into account, the derivational import of the word Kala is given by Susruta as "Kalayati, Kalayati va Kalah" ² Dallanacarya the commentator explains the said sutra as follows ³ - -Kala is that which does not remain static even in its minute form. It is Kala because it throws all beings into misery and joy or because it counts the days of every creature or to be in short, because it destroys every thing gradually

Vaisesika System

According to this system kala is Nitya Vibhura^h (eternal (omnipresent), pe^h vāding (Vibhu) and single-partless (Akhaṇḍa) in character. Conventional notions as moment, minute, day, year etc. are derived by abstraction. The activity of the sun, the moon etc. is super imposed on it and is divided into parts only to conduct our worldly transactions, but in truth it is one. Sankara Misra holds that the relations of time are constant and irreversible ⁴. A clear distinction between time and direction is displayed in the Vaisesika treatises. There it is said that space (Dik) deals with coexistence and time with successions, i.e. space deals with visible objects and time deals with things produced and destroyed or rather with action ⁵. The Vaisesika Sūtras regard time as the cause of things which suffer change but denied it of things which are eternal

- 1 Kala-sabda samkhānayo^h - Bhvādigaṇa, - and kala gatau, kṣepe, samkhyane ca - curadigaṇa
- 2 Susruta samhita 1-6-2
- 3 Sa kala^h sūksmamapi stokāmapi kalām bhāgam na liyate gatimatvāt sisto na bhavayati Anyetu na liyate ityatra kalīyate samkhyayate iti pathanti Vyākhyānanti ca Kalīyate samkhyayate iti kala^h (Nibandhana samgraha, the commentary of Dallanacarya on the above Sūtra)
- 4 Kim ca Niyatopaddhyunnayaka^h kala^h anyatopaddhyunnayika dik (Upaskara of Sankaramisra on Vai. Su. II-2-10)
- 5 Janyamatram kriyamatram vā kalopādhi^h mūrtamātram digupādhi^h (Siddhanata candrodaya)

The Sāmkhya View :

The Sāmkhya Philosophy does not admit the existence of a separate entity called Time. This philosophy enumerates only twenty five original Tattvas in all. Time is not mentioned among them. They do not admit even space (Dik) among these. They argue both time and space are only manifestations of Ether (Ākasa) ¹

Vacaspati Misra condemns the Vaisesika theory regarding time. He says that the Sāmkhya Philosophers hold those superimpositions alone on which the Vaisesikas depend for the division of the time which may be the direct causes for the reference of "future" etc. Hence away with the useless Time" ²

Therefore in the Sāmkhya theory another element in the shape of time is not admitted.

Nyāya System .

The physical concepts of Nyāya and Vaisesika are almost the same. In the Nyaya system Time is the uncommon cause of all experiences as past present and future. It is the special cause of the cognition of priority and posteriority, simultaneity, non-simultaneity and of the notions 'soon' 'late' etc.

In the Nyāya system time is considered as one of the nine Dravyas and it is stated to have the qualities of number (Samkhyā) content (Parimāṇa) separateness (Pithaktva) conjunction (Samyoga) and disjunction (Viyoga) ³

1 Dikālavakasat

2 Vide Vacaspati Misra's Tattvakaumudī on Samkhyakārika.33
"kalaśca Vaisesikamite eko etc."

3 Samkhyadīpancakamī kaladīsoh.

Time is defined as the special cause of statements like past present etc ¹ It is a special cause (Asādharamakāraṇa), because without the notion of time, usages like "This is past, future etc are rendered impossible. The Muktāvalī defines it as the producer of the produced (objects) and the substratum of all the worlds ²

Now the Logician argues that time is nothing but the very cause to which such a conception of order is traceable. The existence of the cause is as real as the existence of the effect. All the order referred to in this connection is in respect of activities (Sādhya) but not in respect of things made (Siddha vastu). Thus the special cause of the order of things appears to be space and that of activities is time. This Time cannot be replaced by Ether (Ākasa).

Some Logicians like Ramakrishāndhvarin, the author of Śikhamaṇi hold that time is perceived as a qualification of objects of perception. There is nothing as such sooner or later, before or after, apart from events and actions. Hence time is a form of experience and is perceived by the sense organs as qualification of objects and actions. Thus time is substantive reality ³

Raghunātha Śiromaṇi in his work argues that time is nothing different from God ⁴

Yoga System

According to the Yogasāstra, Time is an independent basic constituent. Though the followers of the Yoga system closely follow the Sāṃkhya system, they accept Time but not (Dik) Space

1 Atitādi vyavohāra hetuḥ kālāḥ (Tarkasamgraha)

2 Janyānām janakāḥ kālāḥ Jagatāmāśrayo mataḥ,
Paratvadhī hetuḥ kṣaṇādīḥ syadupādhitāḥ
(Muktāvalī-verse 4.5)

3 Nyaya Mañjarī P 136,137.

4 Dīkkaḥ nesvarādatiricyete Mānabhavāt (Padārthatattva-
nirupāṇam)

Ā K H Y Ā T A

Yoga says like an atom, the minimal limit of matter, a moment (ksana) is the minimal limit of time. Further a moment is defined as the time taken by an atom in motion in order to leave one place (ie its place) and reach or occupy the next point.¹ This moment is so infinite small that it cannot come under the purview of perception of ordinary persons but its perception rests upon the science. Further this sequence of the uninterrupted succession of moments is called Time. And the division of time into minutes, hours, days etc. is only by a mental process. No two moments can occur simultaneously because there can be no sequence between things which occur at a time (simultaneously).

Here it must be noted that Grammarians accept this theory of the Yoga system because its author Patañjali is the author of the Mahābhāṣya. Further it may also be because the time question has been sufficiently dealt with in the Yoga Sāstra, much more than is said about it in Mahābhāṣya.

These moments are not visible to an ordinary eye. Yogins with their intuitive knowledge (yogaodṛṣṭi) could comprehend them and their succession. And this succession of moments is divided into days, months etc. by superimposing the activities of the Sun, Moon etc. That is the number of moments that elapse from Sunrise to Sunset is counted and is called a day and from Sunset to Sunrise, night. Thus the succession of moments conditioned by these activities gives us the concept of time, which an ordinary man feels perceivable. In this way time is eternal, pervading and single.²

The Pūrva Mīmāṃsa View

As the Yoga system, this system also accepts the independent existence of time. To them it is a substance (Dravya). This is one of the eleven substances.³

1 Yogabhasya on Yoga sutras 3-52

2 Detailed exposition in Yoga Bhāṣya under III-13, III-52

3 Pīthivyaṭṭejo vāyurākāśakālā digātma manasāśabda Tan

But Nagesa opines that Time is not a substance but it is only a mutation of Maya. He quotes Devapurana as "Vibhūṇītyo sthiraḥ kalovasthī tasyatu hetuḥ". Another quotation he gives is from the Ramyana wherein "Kālapurusa" addressing Rama says "O Rama! Killer of enemies" I am your son when you were the Brahman in the form of Being (Sattarūpa brahma-bhave). I am born of Maya. I conduct the creation, maintenance and destruction."

The Advaita View :

In the Advaita Philosophy also time is considered as a power of Brahman. This universe which is the illusory form of Brahman is devoid of sequence. But the universe appears as having sequence i.e. there the manifestation of Brahman is irregular but this creation which is the result of such irregular manifestation is regular. That is everything in this world undergoes a regulated change as Birth, existence, growth, change, decay and destruction. It is to be noted that all these modifications do not manifest themselves simultaneously or in the reverse order. This is due to the ability of suspension and permission effected by time power. Thus Time is the power of the form of Avidyā of Brahman. A similar statement we find in the Bhagavadgita also, wherein Lord Krishna says that he himself is the Time causing the creation, maintenance and destruction of the entire cosmos.³

The Grammarian's View

Now coming to the theory of the Grammarians it is observed that neither Pāṇini nor Kātyāyana has defined time or dealt

1. Tavaham pūrvasadbhāve putraḥ parapuramajaya, Mayāsam-bhāvito Vira kalassarvasamaharaḥ (L M (kk) P 841)
2. Nirbhasopagam yoyam kramavāniva dīsyate, Akramasyāpi Viśvasya tatkalasya viceṣṭitam VP III-9-46
3. Kalosmī lokakṣayakī pravādhō lokānsamāhartumihapravīṭṭaḥ (Bhagavadgita XI-32)

with its philosophy Both these sages use the word "Kāla" many of their sutras but nowhere did they define it It may be that they have accepted "Kāla" as was accepted by the scholars of different disciplines Whether it is a substance (Drav) Power (Sakti) a unitary whole (Akhaṇḍa) or otherwise, it is an undisputed fact all disciplines accepted a factor or indicate a difference in the nature of any activity, such as a completed (past) action, continuing (Present) action or an action to be effected (future) etc Therefore the Grammarians as will be shown later are satisfied with the notion of time to indicate the tense distinctions Further Astādhyayi is mainly a "Prakriyāgrantha" concerned with the explanation of how a particular word is formed to give a particular meaning Hence these sages might have not felt the need to investigate into the philosophy of Time

The View of Patañjali

Among Pūrninians Patañjali is the first person to define Time in his Mahābhāṣya According to him Time is that which is seen as a cause for the growth or decay of objects And the time when in close association with some action such as the movement of the Sun gets the designation of day, night etc i.e. Time being delimited by the movement of the Sun gets the name day and it, in turn, when repeatedly counted, gets the name month, year etc.,¹

Thus Time is that which causes (or through which) things or objects to come into existence and undergo the six types of modifications

Again Patañjali commenting on a Sūtra P 4 2 3 says that Time is eternal² Thus reading the comments on P 2 2 5 and P 4 2 3 put together we deduce that Time, according to Patañ

1 Yena mūrtinām upacayapacayasca laṣyate tann kalamāhuḥ, Tasyaiva hi kayācit kriyaya yuktasya haritī ca bhavati rātririti ca Kayācit kriyaya, Īdityagatyā, Tasyaivāsakī dāvitā māsa iti bhavati Samvatsara iti ca (M B on P 2 2 5)
 2 Nitye hi Kālanakṣatra (M B, on P 4 2 3)

jali, is an eternal entity which causes birth, growth and decay of objects. The movements of the Sun, the Moon etc. are superimposed on it and are called day, month, year etc. As already said Patañjali dealt with Kāla in his Yogasastra in detail.

The Bhartihari's Philosophy of Time

Among Grammarians, next to Patanjali, it is Bhartihari who dealt with the philosophy of Time. The learned author devoted an entire chapter "Kāla Samuddesa" in his Vakyapadiya to explain Time in all its subtleties. There he gives an account, not only of his own discipline, but of other disciplines as well. His views are not different from that of Patañjali. The basic conception of Time is in the form of a sequence of moments (Kṣana) continuous and all pervading (Vibhu). His views can be summarised as follows.

This time notion is made use of not only by Grammarians but also by every common man in his daily life. This is the basic cause for all the six types of modifications that occur in every object.

This universe is similar to a mechanical puppet whose movements are controlled by time representing a puppet operator. Every movement of each and every object including the planets that is to say in short, of the entire cosmos, is controlled by Time. Just as a director of a play controls and directs every movement of an actor, so does time. In every object in this world there are diverse forces which can bring various changes in it. For example let us take a seed. In it there exists a force (śakti) which causes sprouting, another force causing flowering, another force budding and another force causing fruit and in like manner a number of forces exist in it. But all these forces do not act simultaneously. If so, there will be nothing but a simple state of chaos. Naturally there arises a question "what is that which prevents one after the other giving place to the next?" The reply is that supreme power 'Time'. In the absence of such regularisation in the form of suspension and permission (Pratibandha and

yanujña), all the six states may occur simultaneously or in an irregular way as fruit, sprout, flower, stalk etc ¹ Though time is single, itself is manifoldly divided by differences resting on alien activities. The true nature of a substance cannot be explained without any super imposition. Just as due to the inherence of the genus cow (Gotva) etc, the reference to 'cow' etc are understood, in the same way, with regard to time, reference is also made to 'Time of creation, time of existence, time of destruction' etc due to the contact with activities such as creation etc. But the differences of commingled activities are considered to be its peculiarities. Divided by them, this term 'TIME' effects different fixed limits. For example the super imposed division by the activity of closing and opening of eye-lids time regulates the reference to Kṣana, lava etc ²

Bharṭṭhari explains that time is similar to a water machine (Jalayantra). Here the wheel in its cyclic rotations allows only some pots to take water and some others pots remain empty. Similarly Time as it rotates allows only a few of the material causes existent in the beings, to operate while it prevents others. Another important fact is that this time follows an order or the law of sequence in permitting or prohibiting these causes. Thus by permitting and suspending (abhyānujña and pratibandha) these material causes from operation Time, causes or drives objects to undergo change. Hence only, it is called Kala ³

LIMITED INDEPENDENCE —

In this mundane world it appears as if every one acts independently of his own accord. But it is not so. Hari says that

- 1 Utpattau ca sthitau caiva vināśe cāpi tadvatam,
Nimittam kalamevāhurvibhaktenatmanā sthitam
Tamasya lokayantrasya sūtradhāram prakāśate,
Pratibandhabhyānujñābhyam tena visvam vibhajyate
Yadi na pratibaddhīyat pratibhaddham ca notsijet,
Avasthā vyatikīryeran paurvaparyavinakītaḥ (V P 3-9.3,45)
- 2 Samśarghīm tu ye bheda viśeṣastasya te matiḥ, Sa bhinnas-
thānam kalo bhāḍāya kalpate. (V P 3-2-8)
- 3 Kalayatīti kalah

no one can transgress the limitations imposed by Kala (Time) Take a bird or a cow tied with a long rope to a post and left in a field. It can move as it likes but only within a limited circle i.e. to the extent the rope permits. So also every object in this world moves freely and independently only in that limited circle as is permitted by Time. It is the case not only with animate objects but the inanimate ones also. A building, a table, chair or anything can hold its parts fast only for a limited period, may be, it is a few years, decades or centuries.

Time gives permission to such material causes which bring strength to these beings and then some other material causes which keep the strength for a limited period. Then this time withdraws permission to these and permits other material causes which destroy the object. Thus every thing which comes into existence in this creation (including planets) has to disappear one day or other and till such time its movements are governed by time.

Division of Time

Time has an eternal course through suspension and permission. Being divided by this it obtains the form of sequence. As already said it is due to the difference of superimposition of alien activities with regard to a person or an object which possesses the states of existence and non-existence. Thus single Time is called beginning, functioning and completion time. And again this time having activity as its superimposition becomes past, future and present which are divided into eleven forms. Amongst these, past Time is of five kinds. Future time is of four kinds and

1. Protibadhasya yastena citra viswasya vitrayah,
Tassa evanujanati yatha tantuh saunikah. (V P 3-9-15)
2. Vak III-9-37 Ekabasadhir akarair vibhaktah pratipadyate
Past P. 3 2 110, P 3 3 102, P 3 2 111, P 3 2 115, P 3 3 132
Future P. 3 3 13, P 3,3 164, P 3 3 15, P 3 3 135
Present P. 3 2 123, P 3 3 131

present is of two kinds. Thus all together there are eleven divisions. Of course this division of time into past present etc. is an act of mental fabrication but in reality time is single. Thus just to make clear of the distinction of the activities, this division of time is taught. In reality time is unitary, but it is called past when the activity is finished. When the activity is expected it is called future and when the activity is present in the form of a flow of moments, it is called present. Thus this three-fold division of time is possible. This is all apparent.

Power of Time :

There are three powers of the single and undivided time which remain firm. They are called present power (Vartamāna-sakti), past-power (Bhūtasakti) and future power (Bhaviṣyatsakti). Thus by coming in contact with them all the existing beings appear and disappear.

Of these three powers, two powers i.e. the past- and future powers effect concealment of existing beings, while the present power makes the form of beings visible.²

Now a question may be asked why does not the remanifestation of beings covered by past power take place in the same way as that of those covered by future power and present power? The answer is like this. Future power does not obstruct present power which is associated with creation i.e. in the presence of capable cause future-power gives permission to bring an object into perception and it (Future power) retreats from there. But the past power is not of such a nature.

1 Ekasya śaktayastisrah kālasya samavasthitaḥ, Yatsambandena bhavanām darsanāḍrsane śātaṁ (V P 3-9-49).

2 Dvabhyām Sa kīlā śaktibhyām bhavanām bhanām Varnātma-
kah, Śaktistuvartamānakhyā bhavarūpaprakāśini, (V.P 3-9-50).

Now some scholars opine that time has only two powers effecting, Suspension and Permission. The state of an object i.e. controlled by either the past power or the future power is the same i.e. invisibility. And (that) the state of an object controlled by the present power is visible. Thus there is only one power both in past and future courses characterised by suspension, belonging to time. The second power of time is characterised by permission effect the manifestation of beings.¹

But this is not correct. There is a fundamental difference in nature between the Future power and Past power. The beings or objects which are under the sway of the Future power can be brought into existence through present power. But those which are under the sway of the past power cannot be brought back into existence. Thus these three powers are distinct in their nature.

Now Bhartṛhari sums up different views on the real state of time according to their sources. Some call it 'Shakti, some Ātma and others a deity (Devatā) and some others call activity itself, is time.²

However according to Bhartṛhari, Time is an independent power of Brahman.³ This has already been established in the Brahmakanda. Due to the experience of objects (being) created, maintained and destroyed through a series of causes, it should be admitted that there is a time power. Thus it is appropriate to accept that time is the independent power of the self-existing spirit (Brahman).

- 1 Dva eva kalasya vibhoh kesamcitchaktivartmani, Karoti yabhyam bhavamunmilana nimilane (V P 3-9-56)
- 2 Saktyatmadevatapakse bhinnam kalasya darshanam. V,P 3-9-62.
- 3 Kalākhyā svatantryaktyā Brahmanan iti tatrābhavadbhartṛharerabhiprāyaḥ. For more details Helaraja's Commentary on V P 3-9-62 63,64. Ibid

Review

Thus the views of Bhartṛhari regarding the time can be summarised as follows

Time is single, all pervading and eternal. Its physical form is a *ksana* (moment) These moments continuously shoot out from Brahman They are not visible to the naked eye of a common man. Only people possessing super natural vision can see time in its naked subtlety Hence the great sages, in order to facilitate the notions of time to an ordinary man, perceived successive flow of the moments, in the mind They divided the flow into bits as Lava, Pala, Muhūrta, day, week etc with the help of the activity of the objects such as Ghaṭi Yantra, Sun's movement etc duly superimposed on time Time is different from activity and is delimited by it

Time is the material cause for the birth, existence and destruction of this mundane world The notions such as Past, Present and Future are mental fabrications only Time has many powers as "Pratibandha, abhyanuṣṭhā, krama, jara, bhūta, bhaviṣyat and vartamana etc

Reality of Time

Time is the creative power Time and its powers are the real so long a man is under the influence of Avidya (illusion) All these time divisions etc are only with reference to a common man who is under the spell of ignorance (Avidya) But once a man attains true knowledge (Brahmajñāna or Vidyā) the entire universe is recognised as mere illusion. Thus the Time which is the first creation of Māya śakti (Avidya) disappears together with the entire Universe (Vak III-9-62-72))

The View of Kaiyata

According to Kaiyata, time is not different from activity

It is unitary and eternal ¹ He looks at time as the activity of the Sun which is well known among the people All other activities are referred with respect to this (sun's) movement Further in our daily life we find people use words day, week, month etc to denote time² which (i.e. day, week, month etc) is nothing but repeated activity of the Sun Hence Kaiyata states that a particular-known activity (of the Sun etc) itself when it delimits action produces a knowledge of another activity, is called time ²

Kaiyata does not favour the view that Time is something different from activity This type of distaste is clearly indicated by him while commenting on the Bhāṣya on P 3 2 84 (Bhūte) There he says some people say that time is eternal and is the cause to permit or suspend the existence, growth and decay of objects, and there such usages as month etc and past, present, future are the interrupted limitations of the Sun's activity superimposed on it But others (Anye) say that the famous activity of the Sun, which is the cause of differentiating other inferior activities, and spoken as day etc is Time³ Here from the word 'Kechit' we can understand that the statement under this caption is not acceptable to the author Thus from the Pradīpa on P 3 2 84 it is clear that Kaiyata favours the theory that famous activity of the Sun is Time Similar views are expressed by him while commenting on the Bhāṣya on P 4 2 3 etc

It is observed that long before Bhartihari, there existed a section of people who looked upon Time as nothing different from the Sun's activity Hari records their doctrine also in his

1 Tadyuktāditi-Kalastu nityo vyāpīceti (Pradīpa on M B 4-2-3)

2 Ihetī-Prasiddha parimāṇa kriyāiva kriyāntara paricchedaḥ kālā ityuktam Tā itī tāsāmeva kālānūpatvat kālasya ca kriyādhikāranatvāditi bhāvaḥ (Pradīpa under M B on P 3 2 123 Vartamāne Lat)

Vākyapadīya.¹ And Kaiyata appears to be a follower of this section of people

Views of Later Grammarians :

Dīksita and Kaundabhaṭṭa

Even among Grammarians there exists a difference of opinion regarding the conception of Time. Dīksita and Kaundabhaṭṭa opine that time is not different from action (Kriyā), while Nāgeśa disagrees with them. Now let us examine the views of Dīksita and Kaundabhaṭṭa

According to these two Grammarians Time is not experienced as something different from actions.² There is nothing called Time which has pastness, presentness or futurity. It is only action which is spoken of as past, present or future. Therefore there is no proof to accept time as different from action. Further by accepting Time as a separate entity we have to create its determinant also which is a matter of prolixity.³ And also they argue that their theory is in conformity with that of the Bhāṣyakāra. They quote Bhāṣya on P 3 2 123. Bhāṣyakāra expresses a doubt as to 'how to justify the use of different lakaras (Tenses) in the case of eternal objects like mountains, rivers, Ātman etc. which have neither a beginning or an end', because they do not have such activities as commenced and not completed etc.

Now Kaundabhaṭṭa argues if there is Time which is different from action, then there is no need for Patañjali to entertain such

- 1 Āditya graha nakṣatra paṇispanda mathapare, Bhinnamāvṛtti bhedena kālāṃ kālavidō viduḥ (V P 3-9-76) and Kriyāntara-paricchede pravṛtta ya kriyām prati Nirjñātāparimāṇa sā kālā ityabhidhiyate (V P 3-9-77) Bhūte P 3-2-84, Nakṣatreṇa yuktaḥ kālāḥ P 4-2-3
- 2 Vyāpārasantānātirikta kālasya anabhyupagamāt, Mānābhāvat (Vai Bhāṣana-Kārika 22, Vartemāne parokṣe etc.)
- 3 Atirikta kalpane tat saktasyāpi kalpanāpattau gauravā-pattesca (ibid)

a doubt how to justify the different tenses. because they can be justified taking the time factor only into account Therefore this entertainment of doubt, confirms that Time is not different from action

And peculiarly the reply to the above doubt also confirms the view that Time and action are one Patañjali solves the problem by saying the activities of the then existing kings are taken into account, and super imposed on these objects Since the activities of these kings have a beginning ending etc. due to their superimposition, use of different tenses is justified. Thus if Time and Action are different, they argue, there is no need for Patañjali to take the actions of the then existing kings into account to justify the use of different tenses Further Kaundabhatta quotes Kaiyata on this ¹ Kaiyata says that as the state of kings varies, it is a past, future or present owing to kings that are gone or are to come or are in existence It is the difference in their states that causes a difference in the state of mountains etc Thus time is but a collection of activities As a matter of fact or practically time is not some thing different but action only ²

THE VIEWS OF NĀGESHA —

Nāgesa does not agree with the views expressed by Kaiyata, Bhāṭṭoji Dīkṣita and Kaundabhatta According to him Time is definitely different from action It is a delimitar of action He accepts the tenets of the Yoga Sāstra as far as they are concerned with Time He fully falls in line with Bhartṛhari

Nāgesa defines Time as that continuous flow of Kṣaṇa which are but a very momentary which is manifestation or modification of Prakṛti These moments continuously flow out from

-
- 1 Evameva siddhānta bhāṣyam kaiyatopī vyācāste
“Tatra rajñām sthiti bhūtādi bhedenā bhinnā Parvatādi
sthiyadeḥ bhediketī kriyārūpatvaṁ Kālatraya yogasca
upapadyate ityarthah” (ibid)
 - 2 Vastutaḥ kālo nāstīktaḥ, kimtu kriyāiva (ibid)

Brahman and so Time is eternal. The words lava, pala, day, night month etc denote different numbers of moments or to say a certain number of moments is called Lava or minute, and a certain number of minutes a day etc. And these moments are mentally perceived and are differentiated with the help of various activities.

Refutation of Kaiyata's Theory :—

Nāgesa gives a bitter attack to the doctrine of Kaiyata and his followers viz Dīksita and Kaunītabhatta. He says that if we accept their theory there is the unwelcome possibility of a statement like 'The pot exists in the sun's activity' on the lines of statement "The pot exists in Time".²

This theory of theirs receives a severe criticism from Nāgesa. Nāgesa argues that it is an accepted fact of all disciplines that an action lasts for at least three moments. If time and action are one and the same then the statement *Triksanāvastāyī Kriyā* becomes non-sensical. So this notion of moment is not possible in Kaiyata's theory. Of course it may be argued that the very contact with the later place is the destroyer of the contact with the previous place. Therefore the activity limited by it can be construed as Moment (*Kṣana*).³ But the argument is not valid. If the activity limited by the contact with later place (*uttaradesa samyoga vacchinna kriyā*) is itself a *ksana*, then the argument suffers from the following defect—

-
- 1 *Prakīteḥ parimāṇasya vivartasya vā atibhāṅgurasya vibhōḥ kṣanasya dhārayāḥ kāratvāt, Tasyaiva kṣanasya pracayavisesaḥ pala lava ghaṭī muhūrtāhorātrādī dviparārdha paryanta vyavahārah* (L M (kk) P 839).
 - 2 *Yattu Prasiddha parimāṇā sūtryakriyāiva kriyāntara pariccheda hetutvāt kalah, kālatvenaiva rūpeṇa tasyāḥ kālika sambandhāvacchinnādharatvena "Etat kriyāyām ghataḥ" iti na prayoga iti.* L M. (kk) P 847
 - 3 *Tanna Kriyāyāḥ triksanāvasthāyitvena kṣana vyavavahārānāpatteḥ* (ibid)

limited by the contact with later place exists in Firstly the activity limited by the antecedent action, Secondly activity limited by antecedent (Kṣāṇa) and finally the activity limited by this. These three stand in swarūpa sambandha, because negation also lasts till such time

Activity limited by the contact with latter place is not a moment, because it takes at least three moments. If it is argued that this 'uttaradesa Samyojya' is different from the above three types, then that activity is time does not arise¹. Therefore that time is different from action

argument that special activity i.e. the activity limited by the contact with the later place, is Kṣāṇa, is some still there lies another defect in Kayata's theory

It follows. In a single moment a number of activities limited by the contact with later place may occur. If in a Kṣāṇa then a number of Kṣāṇas occur in which is absurd. In a single moment a number of moments exist but not a number of moments. And we do not experience. Further this activity of the Sun, which is limited by the activity of some other thing, (the Sun's activity) loses its eligibility to be

viśeṣya viśeṣaṇa tatsambandharūpatve
sthīratvena kṣāṇa vyavahārasambhavāt
atīrīktaṁ tarhi paribhāṣamātramevātīrīkto na
(kk) P 847)

am jñānaviśeṣam. Tat jñānam tatsāmagrya-
cīdeva bhavati. Tathā ca vijātiya jñāna viśeṣa
na, tajjānya vibhāga prāgabhāvau kṣāṇasabdapra-
tyarūcerāha. (Kūṇḍika-Commentary-L M.

termed as Time ¹ It should not be contemplated which action can delimit the Sun's activity because the creator's activity delimits it It is well established through many Vedic scriptures that creator himself is the time (īśvarasyāpi kāla nīyāmakatvena kāla-vyavahāra² sītyadisu prasiddha^h)

Therefore the theory that Time is action itself cannot be accepted And ' it is also a single unit but differently referred owing to the various adjunctives' is also not correct as already shown

Now regarding the Bhasya concerning the usage of different lakāras with respect to eternal objects, Nāgesa claims that bhāṣya was misunderstood by them It has been already stated that Kaundabhaṭṭa etc opine that the Bhasya on Vartamane Lat, is in favour of them According to them if there is anything called time, as distinct from action, then there is no need for Patañjali to raise a doubt, Even if a doubt is raised it should have been replied as "Rājñām ye kālaṣṭe tiṣṭhateradhī karaṇam" instead of taking recourse to activities as (Rājñām yaḥ kriyāḥ taḥ tiṣṭhateradhīkaraṇa-ma) Thus the very way of doubting and the way in which the doubt is cleared, clearly shows that the Bhāṣyakāra is of the opinion on that Time is not different from action

Nāgesa refutes the above argument. According to him the words 'Yāḥ kriyāḥ' mean the time-divided activities i.e. the activities of these kings duly qualified divided by Time Thus the time-qualified-actions are superimposed on the (existence of) mountains, self etc and appropriate tenses are used Of course it is true that Bhartḥhari says "well known actions like those of kings, cooking etc have dissimilar parts Through association with them, actions having similar parts are diversified"² Nāgesa explains here the association (Sahacarya) comprises of time (Kāla-

1 Sūrya kriyāparīmanatvasyāpi kriyāntarādaḥ svikāre anavasthā pātesca (L M (kk) P. 848 last line)

2. Prasiddhābheda vyāpārā virūpāvayavakriyāḥ, Sahacaryeḥ bhidyante sarūpāvayava kriyāḥ (V P.3.9-81)

ghaṭita), i.e. here the words 'those activities' (Yā kriyāḥ) refer to time which divides the activities of the kings.¹

This argument of Nāgarka is in concurrence with the Harikarika which states "Every being is altered through alien activities but the soul of this being is not changed. Therefore the standing of mountains etc. is altered through an state".² And the commentary of Helārāja clearly states that a division of Time is applicable even to long standing objects like mountains, rivers etc. on account of a difference of existence caused by their relation with the existence belonging to other things associated with them.³ The activities such as self-maintenance (Ātma satta) and the standing of mountains etc. and their component activities similar in all the three times and hence their difference cannot be determined. Therefore the state of the three times i.e. past, present and future their sequence, the nature of their accomplishment which subsists in the activities of the kings are attributed to the standing of mountains.⁴

Another objection to accept the theory of Kaundabhatta is as follows. If kala and kriya are one and the same, then activity cannot be the differentiator of itself, and it is also not in conformity with Bhartihari's statement time is the dividing factor of activity.⁵

Refutation of the Vaiśeṣika theory.

As already stated in the Vaiśeṣika theory time is one undi-

- 1 Tatra kriyāpadasya tatparicchedaka kalāparatvena Tadiya kalāsyā parvatādisṭhītatmasattayam ca rope ityasayāt (L M (kk) P 848.)
- 2 V P 3-9-80 Paratobhidyate Sarvam
- 3 Parvata nadyānāmapi bhīna itī paropādhirityuktameva. (Helārāja on V P 3-9-80)
- 4 ibid Helārāja on V P 3-9-80
- 5 Kriyābhēdaya kālastu samkhyā sarvasya bhēdikā (V.P. 3-9-2.2). Kālo'āmūrta kriyāpariccheda hetuḥ (ibid Helārāja).

vided i.e. (Single) eternal and all pervading. But Nāgesa does not accept this theory According to him Time is the basis (substratum or the determinant) of action A single and unitary Time cannot be an attribute or adjunct to different activities More over usages such as 'Now the pot exists (idānim ghataḥ) will not be possible because it is not possible to call that Akhandakāla in terms of Khandas such as "Now, then etc" Thus the continuous and the well known activity of the Sun also cannot be the basis or the adjunct of other activities, because, 'if an activity can be a limiter of another activity then by accepting another activity to qualify this Sun's activity, it can be shown that the movement of the Sun cannot be called Time¹ Therefore it is not reasonable to say that Time is eternal, all pervading and unitary. And in support of his statements he quotes the Bhasya under Sūtra P 2 2 5 4

Thus Nāgesa establishes the existence of Time distinct from Action It is in the form of Kṣana and is the creative power of Brahman

EVALUATION

Thus summing up the views of the Grammarians we can say according to them Kṣana the infinitesimal bit, is the real form of Time This Kṣana is most unstable and perishes in the next moment But this does not mean it is nothing Definitely it is a substance (Dravya) These moments continually shoot out from the Creator This continuous flow of moments follows a sequence It is the basis of every object for its existence or otherwise This sequence of moments is cognised mentally and is divided into day, night etc. by super imposing the activities of other objects such as the Sun, Moon etc This mentally perceived time is divi-

- 1 Kāṣyādhikāranatvenaiva tattatkāryam prati kāranataya upādhyānalīngatasyedānim ghata ityādi vyāvaharopayogya-dhikāranatvāsambhavana parichinna sūryayā upādhitvāsam-bhavana tatparichedakāntara svikāre anavasthapatyadoṣat (L M (nbp) P 177)
2. P 2 2 5, Kālāḥ parimāṇinā. And also "Yena mūrtinām upacayapacayasca samvatara iti ca bhavati" (M B on P 2 2 5).

ded in the intellect as past, present, future etc to suit our daily transactions This type of Time distinctions are indicated by using different lakaras

Now on a close observation of the various theories and doctrines as propounded by the various disciplines we can deduce the following facts :

- 1 All the philosophers did unanimously accept the notions past, present and future (the distinct mental fabrications) of actions and hence justify their usages like Gacchati, Agacchat, Gamisyati etc
- 2 They differ on the point whether Time is to be reckoned as a separate entity (substance Dravya) or not
- 3 Whether Time is in the form of the sequence of the infinitesimal bits called moments (Ksanas) or is it one single unitary whole
- 4 Whether time and activity are one and the same or not

Now it may be questioned what the true nature or philosophy of time is? Strictly speaking it is not the duty of a Grammarian to investigate into this type of philosophy of Time. It is sufficient for him to accept the notion of Time based on which the different stages of the actions as past action, present action and future action can be expressed. In this connection it is worth noting what Bhartṛhari says on this point 'Whether it is only something having an existence in the mind or whether it has an existence outside the mind, expression in words is not possible without recourse to the notion of Time 4

Therefore it is enough for a Grammarian without going deep into its philosophy, to accept Time as generally accepted by society at large to explain the usage of different words such as Abhāt, Bhavisyati, Bhavati etc to indicate different activities in different stages. And this Time notion is the basis for all Tense distinctions in any language.

1 Jñānānugatasaktim vā bāhyam vā satyataḥ sthitaṁ,
kalātmanamanāsritya vyavahartum na śakyate V P 3.9.58

AGREEMENT OF TIME (KĀLĀNVAYANIRŪPAṆAM) :

According to the Grammarian the Time element expressed by the Tin suffix agrees with the action denoted by the root, by temporal relation (Kālikasambandha). The authority for such a conclusion is the sūtra of Pāṇini "Vartamāne Lat" (P 3 1 183). Thus the sūtra read with the governing sūtra "Dhatoḥ" (P 3 1,91) gives the meaning 'when the root meaning is intended to be expressed in the present tense, the suffix Lat is enjoined after the root'. The root denotes both action and result. So the question arises with which of the two the time element agrees. The Grammarian says that the time element agrees with the action denoted by the root, so that the import is that the Lat suffix is enjoined after a verbal root when the activity denoted by it is intended to be expressed in the present time.

If we say that the tense part agrees with the result part then the import of the sūtra runs 'When the result exists in the present time, then the suffix Lat is enjoined after the root'.¹ Thus when Caitra is cooking and the result 'Viklitti' (softening of the rice) has not yet come into existence, we cannot say "Caitra cooks", because the result is not present at that time. Similarly though the action of cooking is completed and the result exists, then we have to use the sentence 'Caitraḥ Pacati' but not 'Caitraḥ Apakṣiti'. Hence in order to avoid such an inconsistency we should not interpret that 'the Lat suffix is enjoined after a verbal root when the result exists in the present time'.

In a like manner we can argue that the time element cannot agree with the karaka (agent or object) because whenever the cook Caitra is there without performing the act of cooking we have to use the sentence "Caitraḥ Pacati" which usage is against experience.² Further, such usages as "Caitraḥ Apakṣiti" 'Caitraḥ

1 Phalasya Vartamānate dhatoḥ Lat syāt ity bodhah

2 In the import of the sūtra in the present instance runs as
Kartuḥ vartamānate Dhatoḥ Lat syāt

Pakṣyati' etc will not be rendered possible when Caitra is pre Hence if the time element agrees with the action, whenever action of cooking is in the present time, then the suffix L enjoined after the root, when the action is completed the root gets enjoined with the suffixes like Lit or Lan etc Thus can explain, the usages like 'Caitra cooks' etc properly in accordance with experience Therefore taking all these probable usages into account, the Grammarian decides that the time element agrees with the action denoted by the root Thus so long activity of cooking exists we use the sentence 'Caitraḥ Pa When this activity is completed we use the sentence "Ca Apakṣit" When the activity is to be brought into being, we Caitraḥ Pakṣyati (Caitra will cook) etc And it is also lo that the time element should agree with action which is pri among all the meanings expressed by a verb word 1

Appaya Dīkṣita in his 'Siddhāntaleśa sangraha' argues at least in certain cases the time element should agree with result part of the meaning denoted by the root ² It is like A man is suffering from the disease 'Vāta', He cannot stand. he makes an effort to get up So in this stage, because the an activity of the form of effort, there is every possibility of making a wrong usage as 'Ayam uttīṣṭati' So Appaya Dīkṣita contends that if we accept the agreement of the Time element with the sult, since no result is produced in the above said case, there be no possibility of making wrong usages as "Ayamuttīṣṭi This argument of Dīkṣita is not logical, Nagesa says, because speaker cannot find the effort existing in the diseased person there will be the possibility of making a usage as "He does stand" Even if he infers that the diseased man has that effort then the sentence will be of the form Ayamuttīṣṭati, kintu ph na jayate But normally in such cases the sentence will be of form "He tries to get up (Uthānāya yatate) ³ Hence even in cases there is no need of the time factor to agree with the result part

1 Gauḍa mukhyayoh mukhye karya sampratyaḥ

2 Siddhānta Lesasamgraha- Chapter IV-2 3,

3 Ata eva tatra uthānāya yatate ityeva prayogaḥ (L M p 15

The View of the Mīmāṃsaka —

It is an undisputed fact that time element agrees with that meaning which is primary among all the meanings denoted by the verb. So the Mīmāṃsaka argues that the time element agrees with Bhāvanā, because to him Bhāvanā is predominant among all the meanings denoted by a verb word. Further, since Bhāvanā and Time are expressed by the same Tin suffix, on the law of frugality, there can be an agreement between them (Ekapadābhīdhānāt). Khaṇḍa Deva says that the time element generally agrees with kṛti the meaning of the Tin suffix ¹. However in the case of verbs like 'Jānāti', 'Karoti' etc. the time element agrees with substratumness (Āśrayatva) which is denoted by the suffix. And in the case of 'Nasyati' the time element agrees with the counterpositiveness of destruction (Nasa pratiyogitva). In the case of the negative sentences like 'Caitraḥ na pacati', the time element agrees with Bhāvanā by the relation of counterpositiveness of the absence at that particular time, or may directly agree with Bhāvanā ².

Now since the Grammarian does not accept that there is something called Bhāvanā being denoted by the suffix, he does not accept the Mīmāṃsaka theory. The Grammarian points out that in instances like 'Jānāti', when Caitra does not possess the knowledge, because there always exists substratumness, wrong usages as "Caitraḥ janati" will result. Further when Caitra remains quiet without any action, simply observing the boiling rice, then the popular usage 'Caitra cooks' will not be rendered possible since there is no kṛti or Bhāvanā at that instant. Most probably to avoid the said faults, Khaṇḍa Deva seems to have reluctantly admitted the agreement of the Time element with Bhāvanā through the action denoted by the root ³. However his final decision is

- 1 Aṭṭa sarvatra kṛti sabdo bhāvanāparah (Bhā. Rah. P. 51.)
- 2 Nañ samabhi vyāhāre tu tatkālinābhava pratiyogitva sambandhena (śāksādeva vā) tasyāmeva' (Bhā. Rah. P. 51.)
- 3 Evam laḍādivācyā kālopi pāstikānvayalabhyā Dhatvarthadwārā Śāksātsambandhenaiva vā, Bhāvanānvayī (Mī. Kau. Bhāvarthādhi karana)

that the time factor agrees directly with Bhavanā as is stated in his Rahasya, which is a later work

The View of the Logician

It has been observed that according to the Logician the Tin suffix denotes Kṛti but not the agent or object, and this kṛti is primary with reference to the other meanings expressed by the verb word. So the Logician argues that the time element directly agrees with kṛti itself. Of course, in cases where the Tin suffix does not denote kṛti as in the sentences "Ratho gacchati, Caitraḥ janāti karoti" etc., the time element agrees with the meaning of the root viz. action (Vyāpāra), and through it agrees with the word in the nominative by the relation of substratumness. Thus from the sentence 'Caitraḥ pacati' we understand that the kṛti exists in the present time (Vartamanakālikī kṛtiḥ). Further in the absence of kṛti in Caitra, though there exists Vyāpāra of the form of 'flame being in the contact of the pot etc., popular usages like 'Caitraḥ na pacati' are rendered possible. And when we say 'He cooks' there will not be any doubt, whether there is an effort or not in Caitra congenial to cooking ¹

As already said in the case of 'Janāti' the time element agrees with the meaning of the root for the reasons already mentioned ². In the case of verbs Nasyati and the like as in Ghaṭo Nasyati etc. Raghunatha, the author of the Dīdhiti, is of the opinion that it is better to hold that the meaning, counterpositiveness (Pratīyogitva) of the verbal affix cannot agree with the present tense denoted by the Lat suffix, inasmuch as Dhvamsa is present in both the time present and future. Hence he proposes that the Lat affix in such cases be endowed with an additional meaning 'utpatti' with which the time element denoted by the affix may

1 Ayam pacatītyukte idānīmayam pakayatnavān na vā iti sam-saya nivṛtth (Vyu Vā. P 595)

2 Jñānādyasatve api Tadasrayatvādi sambandhe sati "janāti" ityādi prayogāpatteh (Vyu Vā' P 596)

be made to agree 1 Gadādhara does not favour this suggestion of Raghunātha, to create an additional meaning 'utpatti' in the Lat affix and he prefers 'utpatti' to be a relation instead of the expressed sense of the Lat suffix 2

The Grammarian points out that there lies prolixity in the theory of Logician, because in some places like 'Pacati' the Time element agrees with kṛti and in some instances like 'Janati' 'Nasyati' etc the Time element agrees with Vyāpāra the meaning of the root Thus we have to create two cause and effect relations³ which is a matter of prolixity, Hence if it is accepted that the Time element always agrees with Vyāpāra, the meaning of the Root, then we need create only one 'cause and effect' relation 4 Thus in view of brevity, the Grammarian's claim that the "Time element always agrees with Vyāpāra the meaning of the Root," appears to be more reasonable

- 1 Nasyati ityādaḥ kriyāyām kālanvayaśvikāre nasytyādāvapi Nasyati ityādi prayogaḥ syāditi tatra utpatterapi tadādyartha-mupagamyā Tatraiva kālanvayam Dīdhitikṛdūpa jagāma (Vyu Vā P 593)
- 2 Vartamānakālasyotpatti sambandhena dhātvarthe 'nvayaḥ ityapi Vadanti (Vyu Vā P 594,)
- 3, Ākhyātārtha kālaprakāra-ka bodham prati viśeṣyatayā Ākhyātārtho kṛti jñānam kāraṇam Ākhyātārtha kālaprakāra-ka bodham prati viśeṣyatayā dhātujanyopasthitiḥ kāraṇam
4. Ākhyātārtha kālaprakāra-ka bodham prati viśeṣyatayā dhātu janyopasthitiḥ kāraṇam

PERSON (PURUṢA)

A verb word, besides expressing Being (Vyāpāra) as process, conveys certain other notions such as Time, Person, number and aspect. Of them the time notion has been dealt with in the foregoing pages. Now we discuss the notion 'Person'.

On a close observation we find that Pāṇini did not use the word 'Puruṣa' in its technical sense anywhere in his Aśādhyaī. He simply used the words "Prathama, Madhyama" and Uttama.¹ The earlier grammarians used this word Puruṣa in its technical sense. The word 'Puruṣa' originally stands for the 'Supreme self' or active consciousness (Caitanya) which exists in every object, though it is not distinctly experienced in some cases. The Philosophy of 'Person', as viewed by the grammarian is explained by Bhartṛhari in his Vakyapadīya.² The earlier grammarians used the words "Pratyakṣa and Paratva" to denote the same that is denoted by the words "Uttama and Madhyama". The word Pratyakṣa means the supreme consciousness which invariably exists in everyone i.e. Jivatman. And this notion is called Uttamapuruṣa.³ Thus when the Tīṇ suffix can suggest this notion that the action (denoted by the root) is being co-inherent with the ego-sense in the self (denoted by the first personal pronouns Aham etc.) i.e. the speaker himself, then it is a case of Uttama puruṣa. Hence we use the first personal suffixes to convey this sense.

Similarly by 'Paratva' is meant that the action, denoted by the root is being co-inherent with the ego-sense, not in the speaker but in the one addressed. So when this notion is to be con-

Tīṇāstrīṇi prathama Madhyamottamāḥ, Asmadīyuttamāḥ,
Yusmadī madhyamāḥ, sēṣe prathamāḥ. V P 3-10-1 to 9

Pratyakṣa Parabhavaśāpyupadhī kartṛkarmāṇoḥ, Tayoh
stutivisesēṇa vacakau madhyamottamau (V P 3-10-1)

Pratipurusaṇ pratinīyatam vancatī cestatā itī pratyāṇ, antaryāṇi
jīvatma, Tadbhava uttamapurusa vacyorthaḥ.

veyed we use the Second Personal suffixes 1 Pratyaktā i.e. the fact of being co-inherent with the ego sense, and Parabhāva, i.e. the fact of being different from that are both normally possible only in sentient beings. Thus Pratyaktā as a notion is an attribute of the agent or object as suggested by the Suffixes (Mi, E) in the words Pacami or Pacye

Now as regards the second person suffixes, they also indicate that the person addressed by the speaker is the substratum of this ego-sense along with the action denoted by the verbal root concerned. The fact that this ego sense is being co-inherent with the one who is addressed by the speaker (denoted by the second personal pronoun Tvam etc.) is a property of the agent or object and is suggested by the words as Pacasi or Pacyase. Where such a fact that the ego-sense is co-existent with the speaker or the one addressed, is not definitely known (or is not intended to be conveyed) the third person suffix is used. Here the suffix denotes the agent or object but is not capable of suggesting whether the agent or the object is associated with the ego-sense i.e. sentiency. The fact that the agent or the object is sentient or not is to be known through some other word but not through the suffix 2. For example in 'Bhavan gacchati', the Tin su fix does not indicate whether this ego-sense is coexistent with the agent or not, but that fact is known by the word 'Bhavan'.

The supreme consciousness or egosense which exists in the agent who is the speaker himself is denoted by the first personal pronouns, I We etc. Similarly the supreme consciousness or ego-sense, which exists in the agent who is different from the speaker, but one who is addressed, is denoted by the second

- 1 Madhyama vacyaḥ sa hi kartṛkarma viśeṣaḥ abhūtaḥ, Prasādiviśaya bhāvopagamaṇa yogyā svātmanāḥ parā svavācakat purvavād bhinnat pratiyate (Helaraja under V P 3-10-1)
- 2 Ata eva Kartṛkarma viśeṣaṇatvat puruṣasya bhāvaviśayatanaś-
tati, tatra lakāre madhyamottamayoraprayogaḥ Pratyaktā-
parābhāvautu śabdāntaraprayogavaseyau (Helaraja on
V P III-10-1)

Personal pronoun 'thou', 'you' etc Hence where such ego sense is indicated by the verbal suffix itself then the words denoting it as I, or you are not used in the sentence

Now it may be questioned whether if the third personal verbal suffix does not denote the consciousness existing in the agent then, how is it, on hearing the verb 'Jānāti' etc we are experiencing that the agent is a sentient being To this, it is replied that such an experience is caused not by the verbal suffix, but with the help of the word 'to know' whose agent is a conscious being Thus the meaning of the root (like jñā, Budh Cit, etc) itself can only be the attribute of a sentient Being When the root itself does not mean something which is the property of a sentient Being, the Third Person suffix cannot denote sentiency as in "Kūlam patati "

Now, one may question the usage of the Second Person suffix in the Vedic sentence 'Smotu grāvānah (O! Stones! Listen) where the agent of action (hearing) is something insentient Helārāja explains this as a case where sentiency is attributed to insentient entities, The first and second person suffixes can express either type of sentiency, be it real or attributed as associated with the Ego-self (Pratyakṣa) or with the other (para) ¹ Hence in the present case, the speaker attributes sentiency to 'stones' and thus the usage of the second person suffix is justified But this explanation of Helārāja is not acceptable to Nāgesabhatta

Ngaesa explains this instance in a different way in his 'Laṅghu Mañjusā' ² According to him there is no attribution of sentiency to anything The Bhāṣyakāra explicitly states that everything in this creation is sentient in itself ³ In some objects this sentiency is clearly visible and in some other cases as in stones etc ,

1. Sva, parādhīsthānam bhāvīkamadhyaropitam vā abhyamābhidhīyate kartṛkarmopādhibhūtam (Helārāja V P III-10-2)
2. Tatrahi cetana dharmasya cetane āropamanuktvā sarvasya cetanatveyam sīteḥ sadhyasādhanatvenoktā (L M (nbp) P 246)
3. Sarvasya cetanatvat (M B under P 3 1 7)

it is not visible. But when the speaker specifically wants to draw the attention of the hearer to this particular notion also, he uses second or first person suffixes. Similarly when he wants to avoid this particular notion of ego-sense, the Third person suffixes are used as in the sentences "Bhāvān gacchati" and the like. Thus the Third Person suffix does not have any reference to this notion of sentiency or otherwise. Of course there are some persons who are of the opinion that the Second Person suffix is used only to draw the attention of a person. But this opinion is not correct, because, such an experience is not there from sentence like 'Tvam pecaś'.

Thus to conclude, the first person verbal suffix denotes the agent or object in whom the action or the result denoted by the root coexists along with the Supreme ego-sense that can be denoted by the first person pronouns. Similarly, the second person verbal suffix denotes the agent or object in whom the action or the result denoted by the root co-exists along with the ego-sense that can be denoted by the Second Personal pronouns i.e. one different from the speaker. But the third personal verbal affix does not speak of the ego-sense that can be denoted by the word 'I' or 'you' etc. Hence we cannot say whether there is sentiency or not in the agent or object denoted by the verbal affix. One thing is to be noted. The notions of Ego-sense i.e. consciousness or sentiency are attributive to the agent or object, yet they do not have a place in the verbal import.

NUMBER (SAMKHYĀ)

Of the various meanings denoted by the verbal (Tin) suffix - Number is one. Now one may ask "what is number and how is it produced?" To this we find many replies. Strictly speaking, there is nothing called Number which can exist independently. Number is a mere mental conception or abstraction. We always speak of number with respect to things as one thing and two things etc., Hence the Vaisesikas define number as a quality residing in a substance. Number can never be perceived apart from the things where it is found. Every object in this world is single in itself but only when it is in company the question of number arises. Thus the notions two, three etc. arise when there is multiplicity of things. Excepting unity the rest of the numbers exist in more than one thing, Number qualifies not only substance but also another number as one-hundred, two-hundred etc. The word 'Number' does not stand for or represent any particular numeral but it is a common name given to all numerals like one, two etc. Not only this, number can be thought of as a substance - *anta*, *śate*, *śatani* etc. Number helps us to introduce distinction in things.

Bhāṭṭihari records different views regarding the nature of Number¹. Some scholars opine that unity or oneness is the basis of duality etc., because if we want to make a distinction among the objects, this knowledge of unity preceeds all such distinctions. Without this oneness other numbers such as two etc. cannot come into existence. In this connection Hari records two views. According to the Vaisesika the two unities are the source of duality etc. Some other scholars view that duality etc. is a collection of two unities etc. related to each other by the peculiar relation called 'Paryapti'.

Geneally speaking 'Number' is defined as the special cause of counting². Annambhatta defines it as the peculiar cause of

1. Vide V P 3-2-1 to 32

2. Gaṇana vyavahare tu hetuḥ samkhyabhīdhiyate (Muktāvalī Verse 106)

the usage one-ness etc.¹ This number concept results from the 'Āpekṣābudhī' of the form "this is one, this is one" etc. Of course the Grammarian is not concerned with the question whether number can really be perceived apart from the things in which it is said to inhere. After all numerals present us some property to help us distinguish things. As a matter of fact number really belongs to substances (Dravyas), but it is the peculiarity of language which presents 'numbers' as existing in other things different from Dravya, such as qualities, universals and non-existence etc., otherwise it would not have been possible for us to make usages as 'twenty four qualities two universals, four non-existences' etc.

ABEDAİKATVA SAMKHYĀ —

Besides the number 'ONE' the philosophers accept another peculiar number Abhediakatva-Samkhyā i.e. 'the number one in general'. The nature of this number is well explained by Harī.² In compounds like 'Rājapurusa', the first number (Rājan) expresses sattva i.e. a substance which is concrete'. So it must have a number, but no particular number is understood. Hence it is accepted that it expresses "number in general". From this, depending on the context, any required number can be made out. Hence this is called "undifferentiated singular number". Some other scholars explain the nature of this number in a different way. Just as the singular number excludes duality, plurality, and duality excludes plurality and singularity etc. in the same manner the 'Abhedaikatva' excludes all particularities i.e. singularity etc. Thus it is viewed as possessing the common property of all numbers. Only the context decides what particular is denoted by this. Thus in other words it is looked upon as a kind of universal.

As already said the Grammarian is not concerned with matters like, whether numbers are real or not, whether there is really plurality or singularity in a particular object etc. He is mainly

1 Ekatvadi vyavahāra hetuḥ samkhyā (Tar.Sam)

2 V.P. 3-14.99 to 105

concerned with the notions which help in explaining the word-forms' Thus with this brief note on the philosophy of 'Number' now let us examine the nature of number expressed by the verbal (Tin) affix

Now, as already accepted, number is a quality Hence the number expressed by the Tin suffix has to qualify a substance, so much so the question is what is that which the number qualifies, or in other words what is that with which this number agrees On this point also diverse opinions exist in the scholarly world

The Logicians decide that number expressed by the Tin suffix agrees with 'the word in the nominative case which (word) is not an attribute to another

However some scholars among the Logicians argue that the Tin suffix has no denotation in the singular number but only in dual and plural numbers

Among the Mīmāṃsakas a section argues the number expressed by the Tin suffix qualifies or agrees with the agent or object (as the case may be) obtained by presumption through Bhāvanā The other section argues that this number agrees with Bhāvanā itself

Even among the Grammarians some are of the opinion that the number meaning agrees with the agent or object meaning expressed by the same Tin suffix, while some other scholars are of the view that this number agrees with 'Activity' (Vyāpara) expressed by the verbal root after which this Tin suffix is enjoined

The View of the Logician :

According to the Logician the Tin suffix denotes kṛti besides other meanings And this Kṛti agrees with the word in the nominative (which is not an attributive to any other word), because t (the Kṛti) cannot agree with any other kāraka as they do not

have the expectancy of action or Kṛti¹. Hence the number also, being expressed by the same Tin suffix agrees with the same thing with which the Kṛti agrees. Thus Kṛti and number agree with the same entity² which is an attribute to another.

Hence in the case of sentences in the active voice e.g. Caitraḥ Tandulam pacati, the Kṛti agrees with the meaning of the word Caitra, in the nominative. So the number also agrees with it. But in the passive voice i.e. in sentences like "Caitrena pac-yate tandulaḥ" Kṛti agrees with neither the word in the nominative (Tandula) which cannot be the substratum of Kṛti, nor can it (Kṛti) agree with the meaning of the word Caitra in the instrumental case the expectancy of which is satisfied by the meaning of the instru-mental case affix. Similarly in instances where non-sentient things are agents, as in sentences like "Ratho gacchati", Kṛti expressed by the Tin suffix cannot agree with word in the nomi-native. This being the position how can we explain the agree-ment of number expressed by the Tin suffix. To this it is replied that in the passive voice, Kṛti agrees with the word in the nomi-native, not directly, but through succession (Paramparayā). Strictly speaking number agrees with the substantive of 'Yatna'. This may be in the form of Yatna or Vyāpṛa. Thus in the active voice, Kṛti agrees directly with the word in the nominative (i.e. agent). In the case of the passive voice, it agrees with the meaning of of the word (Tandula) in the nominative of course through succession (Paramparayā)³. Similarly we can explain the agreement of number meaning with the word in the nominative in the case of sentences like Ratho gacchati grāmam, Rathena gamyate gramaḥ etc. where yatna agrees with Ratha, Grama res-pectively. Hence the number meaning expressed by the Tin suffix along with yatna agrees with the Ratha, grama resspecti-

1 Bhavanā ca suddham pratipadhikarthamatram akamksāti
Nahi vyāpāravantam vyāpārah sarayate (Nay Ku V-II)

2 Ekapratyaya vacyatva niyamat (ibid)

3 Caitrena pacyate Tandulaḥ ityatra caitra vittu yatnajnaya
vyāpārajanya phalasrayastandulaḥ pratiyate iti yatnasya
paramparayā tandula eva viśeṣyah (TTV Cin P 838)

vely. Hence the number meaning expressed by the T_n suffix along with *yatna* agrees with the word in the nominative only either directly or indirectly as explained

In the case of impersonal sentences like *Caitrena supyate*, *gaganena sthriyate* etc there is no word in the nominative with which *yatna* can agree. Hence K_{it} agrees with the meaning of the root itself, so much so number also agrees with the meaning of the root only ¹. Thus the Logician explains the system of agreement of the number meaning of the T_n suffix

Now the question before us is like this. Of course in sentences like *Caitraḥ pacati* the word in the nominative does possess K_{it} so it has a natural expectancy of K_{it} to agree with it. But this word (*Caitra*) does not have the expectancy of number since the number expressed by the *Sup* suffix agrees with it, whence this word does not have any further expectancy of another number. Therefore how does the number expressed by the T_n suffix agree with the word in the nominative. To this we find various replies from different scholars (Logicians)

Gangeśa records the opinion of certain scholars as arguing that T_n does not express number at all, it is not possible to say that the *Sup* suffix does not denote number, because in sentence like "*Caitraḥ Rājā* (*caitra* is a king) we have the knowledge of number even in the absence of the T_n suffix. If it is suggested that the verb word '*Asti*' is supplied then undesirable results will have to be accepted. But this argument of these scholars is refused by Gangeśa. Gangeśa points out that the *Sup* and the T_n suffixes express the same number and hence only it is the identity (*Samānādhikāraṇya*). What we mean by *Samānādhikāraṇya*, is having the same number expressed by the *Sup* and T_n suffixes but existing in different place ²

-
- 1 *Karma ca tatra nastyeva, ato dhatvartha eva bhavanavisesyah. Phalatvad visayatvādva tatra samkhyinvayaḥ* (TTV Cin P 839)
 - 2 *Esa eva rīṭirīti-Ekasamkhyābhībhayakatvenaiva samānādhikāraṇyam natvekatra vityetyarthah. Anyatheti-Idameva samānādhikāraṇyamityabhimānah* (TTV Cin Txt and Comm P 841)

Another solution to the problem on hand as suggested by some other scholars is like this ¹ They, the modern scholars, argue that the Sup suffix denotes the number of the base, whereas the Tin suffix denotes the number of the meaning of the word in the nominative. As such there is no irregularity in the agreement of the number meaning denoted by the Tin suffix with the meaning of the word in the nominative. This is possible due to the inherent nature of the two, and if you ask what is the meaning of the word in the nominative, it is Kartā or Karman. Further in sentences in the impersonal form like Caitreṇa supyate etc. the number meaning of the Tin suffix does not agree with anything i.e. even with the meaning of the root, because though there may be two or more acts of sleep yet no dual or plural number is found in usage. Thus the Tin suffix is only for grammatical purity of the word since simple roots should not be used.

Raghunātha Śiromaṇi² and Jānakīnāth Bhaṭṭācārya³ endorse the views of these modern scholars as explained above.

Gadadhara, the author of the Vyutpattivāda argues that the Tin suffix does not express the singular number⁴ since it cannot have agreement with the word in the nominative (in the singular number). For instance in sentences like ghatoasti (The pot exists) the singularity in the pot is understood from the number expressed by the Sup suffix itself. Of course it cannot be argued vice-versa; because in sentences like 'Caitreṇa dīpto ghataḥ' we have to admit that the nominative suffix in the word 'ghataḥ' denotes the singular number. Gadadhara accepts that the Tin suffix denotes dual

1 Navinīstu supaḥ prakīrtyarthagata svartha samkhyābodhakatvam Tinah prathamānta padarthagata samkhyābodhakatvamiti vyutpattireva Vyut ātīśa tatsvabhavam, tacca phalonneyam Prāthmantapadārthat karta karma vā (TTV, Cīn P 844-845)

2 Ākhyātavāda śiromaṇi P 924-33

3 Nyāyasiddhantamañjarī P 217-220

4 Ākhyātaikavacanasya samkhyārthakatve vivadante niskarsā-nusārinah (Vyu. Va P 179)

and plural number because in sentences like *Maitro Caitrasca gacchataḥ*, *Caitraḥ Maitraḥ Devadattasca gacchanti* etc, There is no Sup suffix to produce the knowledge of plural number, we have to admit that this knowledge is produced by the verbal suffix *Ti_n*. Thus in the verb meaning the duality or plurality as expressed by the dual or plural number of the *Ti_n* suffix agrees with the base meanings of *Caitra*, *Maitra* etc by the relation called *pariyāpti* but not with action, the meaning of the verbal root. Further the singular number as expressed by the *Ti_n* suffix is only for grammatical purity,¹

Of course as regards the agreement of the number with the word in the nominative, where *ki_t* also is found to agree, there is no difference of opinion between *Gadādhara* and others

Gadādhara's view--"that the *Ti_n* suffix does not denote the singular number i.e. the singularity of the singular number expressed by the *Ti_n* suffix does not find place in the verbal import or does not have an agreement with the word in the nominative, hence it does not express singular number '- is not logical. It is much porlix. To explain the verbal imports of different sentences we have to create different *karyakāraṇa bhāvas*. Hence in view of brevity, as suggested by *Raghunātha Sīromani*² and others it, is better to accept that the singularity of the singular number expressed by the *Ti_n* suffix agrees with the subject or object in the nominative affix

1 *Caitra maitrapadottara subekavacanam caitra sadhutva mātṛārthakatvāt nirarthakameva, caitramaitradvaye subekavacanārthakatvasya badhitatvena anvayasambhavādityanusandheyam* (Ādarsa Commentary on *Vyu Va*)

2 *Caitro Maitrasca gacchataḥ ityadau vināpi tādisa supam dvitvādipratyayāt laghavādeka vacanatvādinaiva ekotvādausaktatvacca* (AKV Sū)

Tathā ca āyātamakhyātaikavacanādepapi ekavacantvādisu saktiā ityārthaḥ. (ibid Comm)

Thus according to the Logician the number meaning of the *Ti* affix agrees with a word in the nominative, which (word) is not an attribute to another word¹ but a substantive of *Kṛi* or *vyāpāra* either directly or indirectly as the case may be. It is judicious that the attributes expressed by the same word should agree with the same substantive².

THE VIEW OF THE MĪMĀMSAKA :

The Mīmāṃsaka does not accept this stand of the Logician that the number meaning of the *Ti* suffix agrees with the word in the nominative. He is of the opinion that the number expectancy of the word in the nominative is satisfied by the number meaning expressed by the *Sup* suffix enjoined after the nominal base. Further it is proper in all respects that the *Sup* suffix being very close to the nominal base, the number meaning expressed by it readily agrees with its base meaning even before the number meaning expressed by the *Ti* suffix could agree with the base meaning³. Further in sentences like 'Sthālyam pacati' (He cooks in a pot) Kāstharo pacati (He cooks with fire-wood) Kṇādiram vīryakāmya yupam kuryāt etc., where the word in the nominative is not available, there is no impediment in having the verbal import. Hence it is not open to the Logician to argue that the knowledge produced by the word in the nominative is the cause of the verbal import in which *Kṛi* is a substantive. Nor can it be argued that the word in the nominative will be supplied into the above sentences. If it be so, the Mīmāṃsaka says instead of supplying the word denoting the agent, it is better to admit that the number agrees with the agent obtained through implication by the same suffix which expresses the number. Thus the argu-

1. *Tinupāttaikatvādi, samukhyā tavadanyāviśeṣanibhāte prathamānta padopasthāpye, Cāitṛa da vasrayatā sambandena, apvetitī tavadavivādam* (Bha. Rah.)
2. *Ekapadopāttānamēka, viśeṣyakatva mautsargikamitinyāyat.*
3. Bha. Rah.

ment of the Logician that the number agrees with the word in the nominative or with the substantive of the Kṛti etc. is refuted 1

Further in the Mīmāṃsaka system Bhāvanā is the main substantive in the verbal import of a sentence. So all the meanings of other words have to agree with it but not with the word in the nominative. To the Logician, the agent or the object is not obtained either by denotation or presumption but by syntactical relation. So the Mīmāṃsaka argues that since Bhāvanā is the primary substantive and the number is expressed by the same Tin suffix which expresses Bhāvanā as well, it is logical that the number meaning agrees with Bhāvanā directly or through the agent or the object which is obtained by presumption (Āksepā).

Now if the Logician demands the Mīmāṃsaka to accept that Bhāvanā also agrees with the substantive of the number on the basis of the maxim "The meanings expressed by the same word should have the same substantive" and also in view of brevity in creating a single cause and effect relation in the verbal import, the Mīmāṃsaka (Khaṇḍadeva) is ready to concede the demand and accept that both the Bhāvanā and the number meanings expressed by the same Tin suffix agree even with agent or object which is obtained through presumption but never does the number agree with a word in the nominative 2. Thus Mīmāṃsaka in general accepts that the number meaning of the Tin suffix agrees with the agent or object obtained through presumption.

Khaṇḍadeva however differs on this general line and prefers to hold that the number expressed by the Tin suffix directly agrees with Bhāvanā only. His argument is very simple. Since

1 Bhā. Cin.

2 Ekapadopattānamca viśeṣyaktva mautsargikamiti nyāyena, Ekakāryakāraṇabhāvaklīpana laghvānurodhena ca, yadīsamkhyaviśeṣe Bhāvanāuāya ityāgrahaḥ tadā astvakhyata lakṣya eva kartrādau ubhyanvayaḥ. Natu prathamāntapadopas-
thāpye (Bhā. Rah.)

Bhāvanā is the primary substantive in the verbal import, naturally the number agrees readily with Bhāvanā which is expressed by the same suffix instead of waiting for the agent or object to be obtained through presumption. He finds no reason to overlook the primary substantiveness of Bhāvanā. And this number agrees with Bhāvanā with the simple relation of subsisting in the same substratum (Samānadikāraṇya sambandha). Otherwise there results prolixity in creating too many kṛya-kāraṇa bhāvas in different instances.² Hence the number agrees with Bhāvanā only.

The View of the Grammarian :

The Grammarian also does not accept the theory of the Logician mainly on the basis of prolixity in creating various cause and effect relations to explain the agreement of number in different sentences. According to the grammarian the Tin suffix besides number, expresses the substratum (agent or object) but not Bhāvanā or Kṛi. Number also is an attributive to the agent or the object.

Now one may be inclined to accept the agreement of the number expressed by the Tin affix with its base meaning just like the number expressed by the Sup suffix which agrees with its base meaning. But Dīkṣita and Kaṇḍabhaṭṭa do not accept this suggestion. They opine that it is logical to admit the agreement of the number the 'Āsraya' due to the force of closer expectancy between the number and āsraya than between the meaning of the root and the number of the suffix.³ Kaiyata also expresses the same view.⁴ According to the Grammarian recalling of the sub-

1 Bhāva pradhānamitī smṛtisamkoce pramānabhāvat (Bhārah)

2 Kārya-kāraṇabhāvadī kalpanāgauravāpattesca (ibid)

3 Dhātvarthāpekṣayā pratyasattyaṭisaya sattvat pratyayārthe, dharmīnyeva pratyayārthasamkhyayā anvayo yukta^h (TTV, Dar)

4 Vide Pradipa on the Bhāṣya on P 2 3 1 3 'Pacatī kartureka tvam Tinabhihitamitī prathamānasyadityartha^h

stratum of the meaning of the *Tin* suffix is the cause of the verbal import wherein the number (meaning of the *Tin*) is the attribute 1

According to the Logician, the number has to agree with the word in the nominative. But this theory fails in sentences like 'Candra iva mukham disyate' because there are two words in the nominative. Similar is the case in sentences like "Devadattah bhuktva vrajati" etc. So to avoid inconsistency the Logician qualifies the word in the nominative as 'not being an attributive to another word' (*A nyavisesanibhūta*). Further in sentences like

'Caitra! Maitraḥ gramam gacchati' the Logician in order to avoid the agreement of the number with Caitra, has to further amend his definition by adding another word 'Sambuddhyanta-bhinna'. Even then the Logician cannot properly explain the number meaning agreement in sentences like 'Caitra! Gamanaya'. Thus to avoid these irregularities, the Logician has to bring in many adjectives qualifying the "word in the nominative". But the Grammarian as explained, is free from such a prolixity. Thus this theory of the Grammarian in general is more logical, simple and is nearer to experience. However Nagesabhatta differs from this general line of thought.

THE VIEW OF NĀGESA :

According to Nāgesabhatta the number meaning expressed by the *Tin* suffix agrees with the meaning of the verbal root, i.e. in the active voice it agrees with *vyāpāra* and in the passive voice it agrees with 'result'. Further it is not proved that the number expressed by the *Tin* suffix is attributive to *kartā* or *karman* in the sense of which the *Lakāra* is enjoined, even by reading the sutras *Lakṣ Karman ca Dvyekeyoh* etc. as a single sentence. Nor one can repeat the words *karman* etc. because there is no such an authority governing the repetition. Hence it is proved that the number does not agree with the meaning of the *Lakāra*. Thus the number naturally has to agree with its base meaning (Root-meaning), so

1 *Ākṣvatiṛthasamkhyāorakarakārabodhe Tinārthasrayopasṭhitiḥ karmanantya eva kāryakaramabavaḥ*

there will be similarity in the behaviour of Sup and Tin suffixes i.e. just as the meanings of the sup suffix agree with their base meaning, so also the meanings of the Tin suffix also agree with the root meaning, after which it is enjoined

Further to the Grammarian, the primary substantive in the verbal import of a sentence is vyāpāra, denoted by the root. Further among the various meanings expressed by a verb word action is primary and agent, or object, number etc. are all, attributives. Now, since agent, number are attributes they should not agree between themselves¹. Further it is more rational that the agent and number should agree with the same thing.² Otherwise we will be failing in adhering to the maxim³ "Suffixes express meanings which duly agree with their base"

Nāge-abhatṭa claims the support of Kaiyata, Hari, Helārāja etc. for his theory. Kaiyata while explaining the Bhāṣya on the Sūtra 'Sārvadhatuke yak', says that 'by superimposing the number of the subject or object on the action we find the action also is diverse'⁴. And the number of the Tin suffix expresses this diversity of the action. Here one may question since action is one, how can there be number agreement with it. That is why, when we say 'Pacanti' there will not be any doubt about the number of agents. Further Hari also clearly mentions "Though action is one, it is diversified by the number subsisting in the means (agent or object) when it is expressed by a verb word"⁵. Helārāja while commenting the said Kārikā says in unequivocal terms that the verb expresses action as qualified by the number

1 Gunanāmca parārthatvat

2 Ekapadopattināmekā viśeṣyakatva matsargikamiti nyayat

3 Pratyayanam prakṛtyarthānvita svarthabodhakatva vyutpatti virodhapatteh (L M (nbp) P 134).

4 Ata eva sādhanē na dvitvadisamsayah kriyagata sāmkyāropasya s dhanagato sāmkyājñi na nemittatvat (L M (nbp) P 134 last few lines)

5 Ekatvepi kriyakhyate sadhanastaya sāmkyaya, Bhidyate na tu linakhyo bhēdastatra tadāśritah (V P 3-12-16)

of the substrata of the means which is a power and not by number of the power (sakti) only Such is the nature of the capacity of words to convey their meaning which is not a matter to debate.

Further the statement "Hatasāyikāssyante etc of the Bhāṣyakara also strengthen the theory of Nāgesa Further Pun-*araja* the commentator also expresses that the action denoted by the root is diversified, because of its relation with the Kārakas (agent or object) expressed by the suffix ¹

Now if any one asks how action being one, it is possible to superimpose diversity on it, Nāgesa replies it is in the same way as the qualities like Rūpa, Rasa etc differentiated by number which also is a quality Thus when a quality (which is not a dravya) can be spoken of as possessing number what harm is there if action (which also is not a dravya) is spoken of (by superimposition) as possessing number, Thus Nāgesa opines that the number meaning of the verbal affix (Tin) agrees with the meaning of the verbal root

A Critical Appreciation :


When we examine the views of the Logician, Khandadeva and Nagesa it is observed that they followed a particular principle viz , the suffix meaning should agree with the primary substantive in the verbal import To the Logician the word in the nominative is the primary substantive, so the number meaning agrees with it But this theory suffers from heavy prolixity as explained and hence not acceptable

Khandadeva follows the same view held by the Logician and argues that number agrees with Bhāvanā which is the primary substantive in the verbal import of the Mīmāṃsaka And he has also an advantage that Bhāvanā and number are expressed

1 Pratyayavāeyakarakabhede tatsambandhāt dhātvarthe kriyāyā
api bhedaḥ pratiyate, yathā pacatāḥ pacanti iti (L M (nbp))

by the same suffix. But the question is whether there is anything called Bhāvana apart from Vyāpara.

Nāgesa also on the the same lines, argues that the number meaning expressed by the T_{in} suffix agrees with the meaning of the root, which is the primary substantive in the verbal import of a sentence. As already explained, Nāgesa has scored many points over the others in justifying his theory and also in porving the weak points in the theories of others. In fact when we say two or more persons are cooking, every individual agent has an activity in him. Thus this diversity of the activity only is expressed by the number meaning of the verbal affix. It is very apt when viewed from the point of logic and has the sanction of the Bhāsyakāra, Harī etc grammarians as well. Thus without prejudice to the sanction of the sages, the Bhāsyakāra and other authoritative commentators, it is more justified to accept the number meaning expressed by the T_{in} suffix, agrees with the meaning of the verbal root.



UPAGRAHA

Introduction

We know that in Sanskrit a verb word reveals a number meanings both expressed and suggested Further we know at a verb word is made up of many elements such as root suffix, prefix, infix etc Such being the case the grammarian fixes the various meanings that are either expressed or implied, to each these elements In doing so the verbal suffixes i.e. Ātmanepada and Parasmaipada express the Agent (Kartā), the Object (Karma) or the Action itself (Bhava) Tense (Kāla) Number (Ankhyā) and Person (Puruṣa) Besides these meanings these verbal endings, by implication, express a peculiar shade or change of meaning of the root This is otherwise called the sense of upagraha

“Upa gṛhṇātīti upagrahaḥ” The change revealed in the meaning of the verb either extolling, or restricting, or altogether changing its original meaning, by these Ātmanepada and Parasmaipada suffixes, when they are replaced one by the other, is called upagraha In fact this word is not found either in the works of Yaska or in the Pratiśākhyaś Pāṇini did not use this word in his Aṣṭādhyāyī But it is a word which was already popular in the times of Pāṇini Pāṭaṅjali and Kāṭyāyana.

However we come across this word in Mahābhāṣya at various places under the sūtras P 3 1 40, 3 1 67, 3 1 85 and 3 2 127 4

P 3 1 40 Kṛcchānuprayujyae Litī (Bhāṣya) Nisthaparasya anuprayoge puruṣopagrahau viśeṣitau syātām

P 3 1 67 Sārvadhātuke yak (Bhāṣye) Tinabhihitena bhāvena kālapuruṣopagrahāḥ vyājyante

P 3 1 85 Vyatyayo bahulam (Bhāṣya) Suptinupagraha linganaṛānām

P 3 2 127 kau Sat (Var)upagraha pratishedhasca (Bhāṣya) Upagraha pratishedho vaktavyaḥ

According to the Kaśika on P 6 2 134 this word is found in a variant reading of that Sūtra current in those days and the grammarians earlier to Pāṇini used it in the sense of a word ending in Sixth-case (Sastyantam Padam) 1 This word is not used in this sense (sastyantam) in grammatical literature, but was considered as a technical term used by pre - Pāṇinian grammarians Helārāja commenting on the Vākyapadiya clearly states the above fact.2 This word seems to be very popular during the period of even Kaiyata Neither Kātyāyana nor Patañjali felt any need to explain this word 'Upagraha'. Even Kaiyata explains this word only once and then he equates it with Ātmanepada 3

Different Explanations -

Now let us see what this Upagraha is

The Bhāṣyakāra says it is one of the several meanings of a verbal suffix' According to him besides other meanings the tence, person and Upagraha are the meanings denoted by a root ending in a verbal suffix, while a root ending in a nominal suffix (kṛt) cannot denote these meanings 4

According to Kaiyata upagraha is of many forms like the fruit of an action being enjoyed by the doer or the other 5

Nāgesa explaining the Bhāṣya on P 3 1 85, says that upagraha suggested by the suffixes in the place of Lakāra indicates the self enjoying the fruit or otherwise As this indication is made

- 1 Cūṛṇādīnyaprāṇi upagrahāditi pāthāntaram Tatra Upagraha iti sastyāntamevatpūrvacāryopacārena gṛhyate (Kāśika on P 6 2 134)
- 2 Upagraha iti pūrvacāryaiḥ abhyupagataḥ pūrvacārya prasādhopagraha sabda vācyaḥ ayamarthaḥ vyavahṛīyate (Helārāja on V P 3 12 1)
- 3 Upagrahasyeti ātmanepada Samñjayāḥ ityarthah (Pradīpa on P 3.2-127)
- 4 M B on P 3,1 67
- 5 Upagrahaḥ Aneka prakarakah, Svārthaparārthatvādikaḥ (ibid Pradīpa)

by *parasmaipada* and *Ātmanepada* suffixes, by implication (*Lakṣanāyā*) *upagraha* means those suffixes which convey the sense whether a thing is being done for one's ownself or for others ¹

Khandadeva also explains this word in his *Bhāṭṭa Tantra Rahasya* in a similar way. The meaning of this peculiar *upagraha* in the form of *Ātmanepada* etc (i.e. *Parasmaipada*) is of the fact whether the fruit of the action is enjoyed by the doer himself or by others ²

Jinendra Budi, the learned commentator on the *Kāśikā* explains this word in a more lucid way. For him it primarily means an action or a peculiarity in action suggested by the verbal suffixes. As these suffixes are *Ātmanepada* and *Parasmaipada*, the word is secondarily applied to these suffixes ³

The words "Upagraha viśeṣa" occur several times in *Sābara Bhāṣya* and in each case it means a particular voice (Active, Passive or Middle) ⁴

However this word, or to be precise, the various meanings that are given to the word caused great confusion. And in course of time, it became difficult to understand what the word *UPAGRAHA* actually means and its scope. According to Helārāja this word became an "Alaukika" in the sense, it was not understood by an ordinary man or scholar.⁵ Thus this word which was very popular during the period of Pāṇini, Kāṭyāyana and

- 1 Upagraho lādesavyangyah, Svārthatvādih, iha tatpratitini-
mitte parasmaipadātmanepade upagrahasābdena lakṣṇayo-
cyate (Udyota on P 3 1 85)
- 2 Upagraha Viśesarūpasya Ātmanepadādeḥ arthah, Kartṛgāmī-
vādi (Bhā Rah)
- 3 Lādesavyangyo kriyā viśeso mukhya upagraha, iha tadvyatiri-
kta nimittatvāt parasmaipadātmane padayo rūpagraha sabdo
vartate (Kāśikā on P 3 1 85),
- 4 Svārthena cāgnayah prayuktāḥ. Katham, Upagraha viśeṣāt.
Upagraha viśeṣeḥ bhavati (Sābsrabhṇsya)
- 5 Idanīm Ākhyatārtham upagraham vicarayitum, svarūpasya
alaukatvāt pradarsayati (Helārāja on V P. 3-12-1)

Pañjali, might have become too baffling to understand or might have lost its currency, so it could not properly be understood by latter grammarians. Hence Bhartṛhari took up this task of explaining it fully and devoted an entire section in his Vakyapadiya to this (Kāṇḍa III - Section 12-Upagraha Samuddesa)

It is to be clearly understood that the word upagraha is **not** the name of any particular or single meaning denoted by the Ātmanepada and Parasmaipada suffixes, but it is the particularity of the meaning caused by enjoining these suffixes after the same root. If this peculiarity of the meaning is expressed by any other element in the verb-word then that peculiarity does not come under upagraha. Another fact is that this peculiarity which comes under upagraha is said to be suggested or indicated (Dyotita) but **not** expressed (Vacya) by verbal endings. After Bhartṛhari, this topic was concisely but clearly discussed by Nagesa in his Laghu Mañjūśa. All the latter grammarians who dealt with this upagraha, have in fact explained it either by elaborating or abridging the theme of Bhartṛhari. Therefore now let us examine what Hari says on the subject.

Hari defines upagraha as that "which is understood as the peculiarity of the meaning caused by enjoining the various suffixes (Parasmaipada and Ātmanepada) ¹

As already said, this word upagraha suggests a number of meanings (ideas or notions). As Hari says, in some places these are in the form of means (Sādhana) and in some places they are attributive to the means ². Here the word "means" stands for agent or object etc. And the attribution for example, may be in the form of meaningful utterance etc. (Vyaktavak ³

- 1 Ya Ātmanepadādbhedāḥ kvacidarthasya gamyate,
Anyatascaṭpiḷadesat manyate tamupagraham (V P 3, 12-1)
- 2 3 Kvacitsadhanamevasau kvacittasya viśeṣaṇam, Sadhanam
tatra karmādi vyakta vaca viśeṣaṇam, (V P 3-12-2).

Now take the words Pacati, Pacyte, Bhāyate. In the word Pacati, the Parasmaipada suffix 'Ṭi' indicates the agent. In the word Pacyate, the Atmanepada suffix indicates the object and in the word Bhāyate, the Ātmanepada suffix indicates the impersonal action. Thus in these three words the sense of agent, object and the impersonal action are called "Upagraha". These modes of expression are called Active, Passive and middle voice. Thus these two kinds of suffixes imply three different notions. Keeping this in view Panini enjoined two Sūtras "Bhavakarmāṇoh" (P 1 3 13) Svaritaṇītaḥ Kartrabhiprāye kriyāphale (P 1 3 73) to enjoin Ātmanepada suffix after the root and another Sūtra "Sesāt kartari Parasmaipadam" (2 3 78) to append Parasmaipada suffix to roots where the Atmanepada suffix does not have scope.

Before going into further details, we have to note a few things here. Panini divided all roots into three groups (1) those which always take Parasmaipada suffixes (Parasmaipadins) (2) those which always take the Atmanepada suffixes (Ātmanepadins) and finally those which take both the suffixes (ubhaya-padins) as the case may be. Normally a root of one group does not take the suffixes of another group unless some special purpose in the form of suggesting some distinct meaning or different shade of the meaning of the root is to be served. This is possible in two ways. Sometimes by adding a prefix (upasarga) to the root. This upasarga influences the meaning of the root and causes the change of suffix. In such cases, this special meaning conveyed by the presence of the Upasarga, which effects the change of the original suffix (Ātmanepada, or Parasmaipada) into the other is not considered as Upagraha. But many times the roots take the other kind of suffixes to suggest a peculiar notion or sense independent of upasarga. All such special meanings or notions which are indicated by the change of the kind of suffix alone but not due to the influence of an upasarga, are called upagraha.

Attribute as Upagraha

Keeping these things in view, now let us see how an attribute is considered as upagraha. For example take the

words *Brahmanāḥ Sampravadante*. Here the root *Vad* (to speak) is normally *parasmaipadīn*. But when it denotes an attributive to the agent, the root takes *Ātmanepada* suffix. The above sentence (*Brahmanāḥ Sampravadante*) means 'these brahmins who have an intelligible utterance speak together'. This intelligible utterance is a qualification of (an attribute to) the agent '*Brahmanāḥ*'. It may be noted here this special notion (intelligible utterance) is not the meaning of the *upasargas* *Sam* or *Pra* or both put together but exclusively that of the *Ātmanepada* suffix. This idea is conveyed by *Paṇini* in the *Sūtra* P 1 3 48¹. Hence this "intelligible utterance" is *upagraha*. Thus even an attribute becomes an *upagraha*.

Meaning of the root as *Upagraha*

Similarly in some cases activity, the meaning of the root, itself is considered as *upagraha*². That is a particular root which normally takes a particular type of suffix (*Ātmanepada* or *Parasmaipada*) to denote a particular sense, takes the other type of suffix to denote something different from what it normally means. For example let us take the *sūtra* P 1 3 32.³ The root '*K₁*' normally takes the *Ātmanepada* suffix when the fruit of action accrues to the doer and the *Parasmaipada* suffix when the fruit is enjoyed by others. But it (the root *K₁*) always takes *Ātmanepada* suffixes only where it (the root) gives the meaning of "to divulge", or tease, revile, serve, use violence, cause change. . . etc., irrespective of the fruit of the action being enjoyed by the agent himself or by other person.

Another example is the case of the root '*N₁*'. The root '*N₁*' takes *Ātmanepada* suffixes only when used in the sense of "to guide, so as to render a person guided worthy, to lift up, to make

1 P 1 3 48, *Vyaktavacham Samuccarane*

2 *Dhatvratthastadviseśacyuktāḥ kvacidupagrahaḥ, Dhatvatho gandhanadīḥ syat vyatīharo viśeṣaṇam* (V P III-12-4)

3 *Gandhanavakṣepana sevana, sāhasikya, Pratiyatna prakathanopayogesu kīṇaḥ* (P 1 3 32)

one a spiritual guide..... etc 1 no matter even if the fruit of the action is enjoyed by others We can cite a number of instances where the roots always take only a particular type of suffix 4

Vyatīhāra as Upagraha :

Sometimes two or more persons may exchange their work to be done and discharge it Or at times one may discharge the work of another person, which he is not expected to do i e a work not worthy to be done by one may be done by one All these ideas are known as 'Karma Vyatīhāra'. For example one cuts grass which work is to be done by the servant (Vyatīlunite') This idea "that one is discharging the work of the others" is indicated by the Ātmanepada suffix This notion also comes under Upagraha 3

Mutuality as Upagraha .

The idea of mutuality (one with the other, among themselves) also is indicated by the Ātmanepada suffix though the root normally takes the Parasmaipada suffix When these notions are to be indicated the Parasmaipada suffix is replaced by the Ātmanepada suffix For example Sampraharante Rājānaḥ = kings fight among themselves

Here one may question whether the preposition and the root put together give the changed meaning of the root In other words the expression of the idea has a lexical rather than a morphological significance But whatever it be, the traditional view is that the particular notion is revealed through the Ātmanepada suffix Thus all these special ideas or notions such as means, or

- 1 Sammananotsanjana caryakaraṇa jñānabhīti viganāna vyayesu Niyah (P 1 3 36)
- 2, Spardhāyamānaḥ (P 1 3 31) etc
- 3 Kartari karma vyatīhate (P, 1 3 14) Also Dhātvarthastadvisesasācāpyuktah kvacidupagrahaḥ, Dhātvartho gandhanādiḥ syat vyatīharo viśeṣanam (V P III-12-4)

action, or attribute of action etc are indicated only in the presence of the Ātmanepada suffix Hence they all come under upagraha

Samvidhāna as Upagraha :

Sometimes the Ātmanepada suffix indicates Samvidhāna, means 'making arrangements' to perform a certain action to achieve the concerned fruit or result which is intended to be enjoyed by the agent himself, which idea normally and in short is given in the Pāṇinian Sutrā 'The fruit of the action accruing to the agent' This aspect is governed by Panini's Sutra P 1 3 72¹ As I ready mentioned Pāṇini enumerated about two thousand simple or pure roots (suddha Dhātavaḥ) I prefer to call them as simple roots because in the following chapters we discuss about the complex roots (Sanādyanta dhātavaḥ) which involve complex formation (vṛtti) and also integration of meaning (Ekārthibhāva) These two thousand roots are divided into three categories (1) Those which always take the Parasmaipada suffixes (2) those which always take the Atmanepada suffixes and lastly those which take both the suffixes as the case may be Now it is a matter to be considered, as far as the Aśādhyāyī is concerned, whether these two words viz , Ātmanepada and Parasmaipada are used in their etymological sense² or purely as technical terms, to differentiate the two groups of verbal endings, Tip tas jhi, Sip, thas, tha, mip, vas mas on the one hand, and Ta ātam jha, Thas, Āthām, Dhvam Id vahim Mahim on the other hand Again what is a technical term? It is that which is used to indicate or express a special sense, generally, other than its etymological sense, or a sense which is different from the popular one as conceived by the people When we examine the above two thousand roots, from this angle we arrive at the conclusion that the said two words viz , Ātmanepada and Parasmipaca are purely technical

- 1 Svaritañītaḥ kartrabhiprāye kriyāphale (P 1 3 72)
- 2 Parasmaipadyate Yasmat tat parasmaipadam smṛtam, Atmanepadyate Yasmat tadevatmanepadam (Katantra Vyākaraṇa 3-7-79)

Otherwise let us accept temporarily that these words are used in their etymological sense. Then it results that an Ātmanepada suffix is enjoined when the fruit of the action is enjoyed by the agent himself. And a parasmaipada suffix is enjoined when the fruit of the action goes to one other than the agent. This being the case, let us extend it a bit further. Now for every action denoted by the root there exists certain result also. So all these two thousand roots have their own activities and also concerned results. So there is a possibility for every root to take both kinds of suffixes i.e. the roots take Ātmanepada suffixes when the fruit is intended to be enjoyed by the agent himself and Parasmaipada suffixes when the fruit is to be enjoyed by others, in which case all these two thousand roots must become Ubhaya-padins. But it is not the case in Pāṇiniya, wherein only 140 verbs are classified as ubhaya-padins and others are divided into categories as Ātmanepadi-roots and Parasmaipadi-roots. In classical Sanskrit unless and otherwise specified Ātmanepada roots always take Ātmanepada suffixes irrespective of the fact whether the agent enjoys the fruit or not. Similar is the case with the Parasmaipada roots. For example when one goes to a town to join a job i.e. the fruit of his going is to join the job which is enjoyed by himself only, there cannot be the usage Gaṇhate. Pure roots which take Ātmanepada suffixes are enjoined after them with Anudatta vowel or n-kara at the end as a mute letter¹ and ubhaya-padins are uttered with Swarita as mute or ñ-kara as a mute². And the rest of the roots take the Parasmaipada³ terminations. Now the question before us is why did Pāṇini write two different sūtras to enjoin the same Ātmanepada suffixes to the roots, Is there any difference in the meaning suggested by the Ātmanepada suffixes so enjoined by these two sūtras. Then comes the answer in the affirmative. The Ātmanepada suffixes enjoined as governed by the sūtra P. 1.3.12 (Anudātta-ātmanepadam) cannot suggest this special meaning "Samvidhāna, while those roots which take Ātmanepada suffixes

1 P. 1.3.12 Anudātta-ātmanepadam

2 P. 1.3.72 Swaritañītaḥ kartrabhiprāye kṛyāphale

3 P. 1.3.78 Śesatkartā Parasmaipadam

following the sūtra P. 1 3 72 can suggest this special meaning through their Atmanepada suffix.

It may be asked from which words in P. 1-3-72 this particular import is obtained. It is answered that the two words 'Kartrabhiprāye kriyāphale' give this particular meaning, i.e. for this particular group of verbal roots the Atmanepada suffix is enjoined when it is intended to convey the import that the agent "makes arrangements" for the performance of action with an intention to enjoy the resulting fruit there of for himself.

And these roots take the Parasmaipada suffixes when they are not intended to convey that particular sense.

Now it may be asked that since every action requires its own of arrangements on the part of the doer (Agent), then how is it that only a particular group of roots is said to convey this idea through the Atmanepada suffix and why not this Atmanepada suffix in the other group of roots. It is replied that though every action requires arrangements on its part, only certain roots can convey this particular sense. All roots are not capable of conveying this particular meaning. Strictly speaking roots sometimes present action in such a manner as to imply that the agent makes arrangements so that the ultimate fruit accrues to himself, while at other time they present in such a manner as to imply that the ultimate fruit goes to somebody else. This is due to the natural power of words (śabdasaṁskṛti) which is not a matter of Logic¹ therefore Pāṇini has listed out such roots and marked them with Svarita or ṇ-kāra as mutes¹.

Therefore every root cannot convey the notion of making arrangements through its Atmanepada suffix. But wherever it is indicated, it is indicated through the Atmanepada suffix only. Hence Samvidhāna comes under the scope of upagraha.

1' Ta eva viññāsyamah, Yesam kartrabhiprayam akartrabhiprayam ca kriyaphalamasti tebhyah atmanepadam bhavati. Tathā jatīyakāḥ khalvacāryena svaritaṇṇitāḥ pathitāḥ ubhayavantāḥ (M B. on P 1 3 72)

Point of Interest :

It may be asked that be the intention of Pāṇini, then it would be sufficient to write karṭṭhiprāye kriyaphale without saying svaritaṇītaḥ. Yes, it is true it would be sufficient to say "karṭṭhiprāye kriyaphale". The Bhāṣyakāra also has clearly accepted this stand. But one thing is to be noted that only a few experts in the science of language or those who are well versed in the nature of language (vittijñā) alone can know which particular root is capable of conveying samvidhāna and which other is not, but what about a common man who is not an expert in the science of language but follows the words of the teacher (vachananusarīnaḥ). Therefore it is to help such persons, who cannot themselves find out by examining which root is susceptible to convey and which is not, the learned sage Pāṇini read all such roots either with a svarita accent or ṇī-kara as mute ² (at the end). Bhartṛhari also confirms this opinion ³.

Causal Nic and Upagraha - Samvidhāna .

Another point we have to differentiate is between the meanings of causal nic and that of the ātmanepada suffix indicating Samvidhāna. The whole problem is as follows -

A causative nic (hetumannic) expresses the sense of some one causing or inducing another to act and get a particular thing achieved. Making arrangements or Samvidhāna also implies that somebody causes another to act, so much so, some confusion prevailed among scholars to the extent that causal nic and Ātmanepada of Samvidhāna are synonyms and are interchangeable ⁴.

- 1 Svaritaṇītaḥ iti sakyamakartum (M B on p 1 3 72)
- 2 Yuktaṁ Punaryat vittinimittako nāmanubandhaḥ syāt... vittajñō hyācāryo anubandhānāsajjate (M B ibid)
- 3 Kriyā viśeṣa vācane sāmāthyamupasajjate, keśāmcit, Anyetu kṛtāḥ svariteto ṇītaṣṭathā (V P 3-12-11)
- 4 Keśāmcit kartrābhiprāye nicā saha vikalpate, Ātmanepadmanyasām Tadarthāprakṛtiryataḥ (V P 3-12-6)

But as a matter of fact they are not synonyms and cannot be interchanged.

Now let us examine the imports we get from the two words **Yajate** and **Yajayati**. From **Yajate** we understand that the agent (**Karta**) is making arrangements to bring **Yajña** into being, the fruit (Heaven) of which he wants to enjoy. In the course of making arrangements he may appoint or order (cause, induce) some one to be the priest and perform **Yajña** for him. Here the agent acts on his own intention and nobody induces him.

From the word "**Yajayati**" we understand that someone is inducing another to bring about a sacrifice (**Yajña**). Here it is not known whether the instigator wants to enjoy the main fruit or the instigated one enjoys it. Another fact is that **Praisa** (prompting or command) is the expressed sense of the causal **nic** while **samvidhana** is only a suggested sense of the **Ātmanepada** suffix.

Here it is to be noted that besides the roots having **Swarita** or **ñ-kara** as mute, all **niṣanta** roots are also **ubhayapadins**. And from the **Sutra Nicasca** (1.3.74) by reading the words **kartrabhipraye kriyā phale** into it, the whole **sutra** amounts to saying "that these **causal niṣanta** roots take **Ātmanepada** suffix when **Samvidhana** is implied, i.e. **Yajate** gives the meaning (import) that one is inducing another to bring about an action with an intention to enjoy the main fruit of the action for himself. Similarly from the word "**Yajayati**" we get an import that one instigates another to act, where in the main fruit is not enjoyed by the instigator.

Thus **causal niṣantas**, **swaritets**, and **nit** roots are all **udhayapadins** and take **Ātmanepada** suffixes when **Samvidhana** is implied (suggested). Therefore the meaning of **nic** does not come under **upagraha**. Some people being unable to make out this distinction between what a word expresses directly and what is suggested from the context, bring out this confusion, viz. that the **Ātmanepada** termination and **nic** have the same scope and are interchangeable. This whole confusion has arisen from misunderstanding the famous usages **vapate**, **kṛmīśiva**, **Dhatte**, **Cinute** etc. These words depending on the context are interpreted as **vāpayati**.

krāpayati dhāpayati, and cāyayati respectively. Here the causal sense is from the context but not what the ātmanepada suffix suggests. As such nic and ātmanepad are not synonyms that is why Bhartṛhari expresses his displeasure at such confusion and says it as keshānchinmate¹. Strictly speaking the above word means only Samvidhāna. If sentence context requires a causal sense, then the meanings should have been given as vāpayate, dhāpayate, cāyayate in which case there will be no confusion.

Suppose it is accepted that both nic and ātmanepada are synonymous and are interchangeable then there result some irregularities. This causal nic is enjoined after any root (Parasmaipada or ātmanepada or even a complex root etc.) to express the sense of causation. But the ātmanepada suffix is enjoined after only certain roots. A nijanta root takes both ātmanepada and Parasmaipada suffixes, alternatively to convey either Samvidhāna or some other meaning. Therefore if nic and ātmanepada are synonyms the sūtra Nicaśca³ becomes redundant. Hence in view of the above impropriety it is to be accepted that nic and ātmanepada suffix indicating Samvidhāna are not synonymous and also not interchangeable.

We will now consider one more peculiar case and then wind up the discussion on the Upagraha'. Consider the following sentence "The Employer and the employee are cooking". Here the employer is making arrangements to enjoy the food for himself and the employee is cooking to get his fee. Thus the question before us is "Are we to use ātmanepada suffixes after the root taking into consideration the action of the employer or to use Parasmaipada suffixes taking the action of the employee into consideration?" A root cannot take both the suffixes at the same time to express two different meanings.

1. Kesām cit kartrabhiprāye Nicā saha vikalpyate (V P 3-1-26)
2. Kṛinīśva, vāpate, dhatte cinoti cinuteṭica āpta prayoga dṛsyante yeśu hyarthobhidhiyate (V P 3-12 7)
3. Nicaśca (P 1 3 74)

Bharthari, answers this question suggesting two alternatives 1 (1) If the speaker's intention is to give importance to the employer's action then the root takes the Ātmanepada suffix (pachete) If speaker's intention is not to give importance to anybody's action, but is only to make a casual reference that they are working together then the root takes only Parasmaipada suffix, or even if the speaker wants to stress on the action of the servant, then also the root takes Parasmaipada suffix Then the sentence is "Svāmīdāśau Pacataṁ"

Another alternative is, because an employer is always superior to the employee, his action alone will be superimposed on the employee also and an atmanepada suffix is enjoined to the root as pacete Hari justifies this alternative by taking recourse to our daily usages as Chatrino yanti etc 2

CONCLUSION -

Reviewing the above, we can say that upagraha is not the name of any particular root (meaning) It is the name given to the difference in meaning brought about by a change in the suffixes viz , Ātmanepada or Parasmaipada, as suggested by the terminations The several notions suggested may be enumerated as mens' action, attribute, Samvidhāna etc The Upagraha is always only a suggested sense of the Tm suffix Also of the many ideas which come under upagraha some can be expressed by verbs only while some others e.g the idea of somebody doing the action of somebody else or of mutuality of action etc can be expressed by nouns also 3 These particular suggested senses are called Aspect by modern linguists

- 1 Yatrobhau svāmīdāśau tu prarabhete sahakṛiyam,
Yugapaddharmabhedena dhātustatra na vartate, V P 3-12-19
Yatra pratividhānārthaḥ pacistatratmanepadam,
Parasmaipadamanyatra saṁskāradyaabhīdhayim V P 3-12-20
- 2 Samvidhātusca Sannidhyāddāśc dharmonuṣajyate, Prakāśab-
dasya Sannidhyānnyagrodhe plakṣata yatha (V P 3-12-21)
- 3 Rajānaḥ saṁpraharaṇam kurvanti.

It is not peculiar to Sanskrit verb **only** to have upagraha as one of its meanings. In many other languages in the world, grammarians have recognised that verbs denote many notions apart from the actual tense. Jespersen, as quoted by Sri k A Subrahmanya Iyer,¹ deals with this topic in his book 'Philosophy of Grammar', where in he brought in the following notions under the 'aspect'

- 1) The tempo distinction between the **lorist** and the **imp-**erfect
- 2) The distinction between **conclusive** and **nonconclusive**
- 3) That between **duration or permanent** and **punctual** or **transi-**tory
- 4) That between **finished** and **unfinished**
- 5) That **bet-**ween what takes place **only once** and what is **repeated or habitual** action
- 6) That between **stability** and **change**
- 7) Between the **implication** or **non-implication** of a result

Sri k A Subrahmanya Iyer, in his work **Bharṭḥari-A Study of Vākyapadīya** says to this list can be added the distinction between the result going to the doer or to somebody else, and upagraha may be looked upon as the Sanskrit word for "ASPECT"

Here it may be concluded that Upagraha may be treated as a part and parcel of 'Aspect' as viewed by Jespersen

- 1 Bharṭḥari-A Study of Vākyapadīya, by Sri K A S Iyer P.353
- 2 Bharṭḥari-A Study of Vākyapadīya, by Sri K A S Iyer P 353 last few lines

VIKARANA SUFFIXES

Of the various suffixes that are enjoined after a verbal root, some twenty one suffixes are grouped and named as Vikarana suffixes. The word Vikarana is etymologically explained as one which causes change or modification in the verbal root to which it is appended ¹

Pāṇini did not name these suffixes as Vikarana suffixes. In fact he did not use this word at all in his *Aṣṭadhyāyī*. This is a technical word used by the predecessors of Pāṇini. Though Pāṇini used many technical words of his predecessors in his work he did not make use of this particular term, but simply enjoined the respective suffixes. It is the Bhaṣyakāra who used this word in the *Mahābhāṣya*² and since then all the later grammarians of this school used this word to represent those twenty one suffixes.

Now it should not be argued by pointing out that in the present *Dhātupāṭha* at the end of every *gana* we find the word "Iti Sabvikaranān, Bhvādayaḥ, Syan Vikarṇa Divādayaḥ" etc., so Pāṇini used the word 'Vikarana'. These sentences at the end of the *gana* *pāṭha* are not those of Pāṇini, but of later grammarians who added them for clarity. Not only these sentences but even the meanings of the roots are read along with them by later grammarians like Bhīmaśena etc. just to facilitate an easy and clear understanding to the students ³. Thus 'Vikarṇa' is a technical word used by the predecessors of Pāṇini and was later adopted by the Pāṇinian school of grammarians to denote a certain type of suffixes.

Patanjali gives us a clue to understand the nature and the position of Vikarana suffix. While commenting on P 3 1 314 he says that the suffix 'Ām' falls in between the root and the suffix (Tin) like a Vikarana ⁵. From this we understand that the Vikarana

1 Vikaroti vikarayatīti vā vikaraṇaḥ

2 P 3 1 31, Āyādaya Ārdha dhātuke vā

3 Vide Bhāṣya Kārikā "Sarvanāvayādīuām" (Kārikā 10)

4 P 3 1 31 Āyādaya Ārdha dhātuke vā

5 Ām madhye Patīsyati yathā Vikaraṇastadvat

suffix is one which follows the verbal root Here the root means either a primary root or a derivative or even a secondary root

The suffixes which go under the name of Vikarana are enumerated here under, 1 Sap, 2 Yak, 3 Sya, 4 Tas, 5 Sip, 6 Ām, 7 Chli, 8 Sic, 9 Ksa, 10 Chan, 11 An, 12 Chin, 13 Svan, 14 Snu, 15 Sa, 16 Snam, 17 U, 18 Snā, 19 Sānac, 20 Sayac, 21 Ak

Vikarana Suffixes-Meaningful or not

Now let us consider whether these Vikarana suffixes have any meaning or not The whole issue is discussed in Mahābhāṣya on the sūtra 'Sārvadhātuke yak'

Vikaranas are expressive of Sense .

Some scholars are of the opinion that these Vikarana suffixes are meaningful and they express the sense of Agent etc In support of their argument they quote the very sūtras like 'Kartari Sap' 'Sārvadhātuke Yak', 'Bhāvakarmāṇoḥ Yak' etc. They bring an analogy of the interpretation of the Sūtra 'Kartari Kit' which is explained as the kit suffix comes in the sense of Agent On the same analogy the sūtra 'Kartari Sap' is to be explained as 'the suffix 'Sap' comes in the sense of Agent' Similarly the suffix 'Yak' is enjoined in the sense of Bhava or object (Karma) when the root is followed by a Sarvadhātaka Lakara The words Kartari, Karmāṇi' Bhave in the Sūtra Lah Karmāṇi ca (P 3 4 69) do not give the sense of agent object etc The meaning of the Locative is 'in the context of (Viśaya Saptamī) Therefore the Vikarana suffixes 'Sap' etc are meaningful and they denote the agent object etc And this is the reason why in words like gaccha, vada, brūhi etc, where the Tin suffixes are not seen, the sense of agent etc is denoted by the Vikarana Suffix and the Tin suffix denotes other meanings number, Tense, Person etc In places where these Tin suffixes are elided the sense of Tense etc, are understood by recalling that suffix Of course in places where the Vikarana suffix is not at all enjoined i.e. in Lin and Lit, the sense of agent etc., is expressed by the Tin suffix, but in

... data a suffix is added, there again by the pro-
... the sense of agent etc.' is understood. And
... to accept that the agent, object etc are the
... of the Lakara, then the inconsistency of the
... of the suffix arises. Therefore the Vikarana suf-
... and have semantic importance in the import

... significant -

... stated above emphasising the denotative
... a suffixes, are weak and unstable. They
... in the following way.

... let us see what this "meaning" is, or, to be more
... to decide that a particular sense is that of a
... is often done by the method of positive and
... (Anvaya Vyatirekabhava) i.e. if a parti-
... by the presence of a word and if that know-
... in the absence of that particular word, then we
... one is the meaning of that particular word.

... we examine the Vikaranas applying this technique
... do not have any definite meaning of their own,
... meaning of the verb word is found to be independent
... suffix. The presence or absence of a Vikarana
... does not cause any special import. Normally by
... we get a knowledge of Agent or Object
... This knowledge is not effected whether
... the Vikarana suffix or not. For example
... roots belonging to the second and third
... forms of any root do not have any
... get the import of subject, person, number
... Similarly we get the same import
... have the Vikarana suffix. Thus it is

... a, Canvat etc

... etc

evident that either the presence or absence of a Vikarana suffix does not obstruct the knowledge we get from a verb word

And if we were to accept the interpretation of the Sūtra 'Kartari Sap' as given above, then there will be no coherence between Laḥ Karmaṇi Ca and Kartari Sap. It is clearly stated in the Bhāṣya that the agent, object etc are the meanings of the Lakāra itself and it is also asserted there that we cannot do away with the Sūtra Laḥ Karmaṇi etc. Therefore the word Kartari in the Sūtra 'Kartari Sap' does not mean "in the sense of agent"

Hence the Vikarana suffixes do not have any meaning of their own to express

The View of Patanjali

This question of the denotative potentiality of the Vikarana suffixes, is thoroughly discussed by him while commenting on the Sūtra "Sarvadhātuke yak". The Bhasyakara states that instead of accepting two suffixes viz. Vikarana and Tin to express the agent etc, at different places let there be only one suffix (to express the agent etc) in all the verbs and also let that one suffix be Tin only¹. In fact this simple statemet contains a rich arguement. It may be explained as follows

- 1 Neither the Vikarana suffix nor the Tin suffix is present in all the verb words. Though the absence of the suffix due to elision is same in both cases, the Vikarana suffix suffers from an additional defect that it is not at all enjoined in certain Lakaras (Lin and Lit)
- 2 In the case of elision a recourse to the recalling of the elided suffix, is inevitable in either case

1. Idam Vicāryate Bhāvakarmakartāraḥ sarvadhātukārthāḥ vā syuḥ vikaranārthāveti. ...Evam ca kṛtvā ekapakṣibhūta mevedaṁ bhavati, Sārvadhātukārthā eveti (M.B. on P.3.1.67)

So if we accept that *Tin* suffixes alone are expressive of the agent etc., at least we will be free of the defect of non-enjoyment of the suffix in certain *Lakṣras*

In *Lin* and *Lit*, the opponent also has admitted, that it the *Tin* suffix which denotes the agent etc

Hence taking brevity into consideration it can be concluded that the *Bhāṣyakāra* clearly affirms that the *Vikarāṇa* suffixes are not significant

The Views of Bhaṭṭoji and Kaundabhaṭṭa

Bhaṭṭoji and Kaundabhaṭṭa are of the view that the *Vikarāṇa* suffixes are suggestive but not expressive. This is made clear in the *Vaiyākaraṇa Bhūṣaṇa* (and *Bhūṣaṇa Sāra*) and that *Vaiyākaraṇa matonmajjanī*. They too agree that *Kartā*, *Karman* or *Bhava* are the expressed meanings of *Tin* suffixes, but, when a doubt arises whether, in sentences like *Devadattaḥ pacati*, the *Tin* suffix expresses *Kartā* or *Karman* etc., then to clarify the position these *Vikarāṇa* suffixes help us. If *Ṣap* is the *Vikarāṇa* suffix, then we have to know that *Kartā* is expressed by *Tin* and if *yak* is the *Vikarāṇa* then it is *Karma* or *Bhava* that is expressed by *Tin*. And in place where the *Tin* suffix is elided e.g. *Gaccha Piba* etc., the sense of agent is expressed by recalling the suffix. Such possibility of recalling the *Vikarāṇa* *Ṣap*, *Yak*, etc., is not possible in *Lit* and *Lir*. They further opine that, at the most, when the *Tin* has to express the agent, the fact is indicated (suggested) by *Ṣap*. It is the same case even with other suffixes like *Yak*, *Cin* etc. They are only suggestive¹ (*Tatparyagrahakāḥ*)

1 Phala vyaparayostattra phale tan yak cinādayaḥ, vyāpāre ṣap śnamadyā stu dyotayantyāśrayānvayam (*Vai. Bhu. Karika-3*).

Tatha ca sarvadhatukasya kartṛtvā vasyakatve,
śābādīnam dyotakatva mātram kalpyate laghavāditi (ibid)

THE VIEW OF NĀGEŚA

According to Nāgeśa, the Vikarāṇa suffix limits the expressive sense of the T_{in} suffix. Normally a T_{in} suffix denotes either agent or object or even an impersonal sense. Thus in a sentence like 'Devadattah pacati', the Vikarāṇa suffix restricts the meaning of the T_{in} suffix and allows only the sense of agent to be denoted by it and not the object. Thus the Vikarāṇa suffixes are indicative by restricting the meanings (agent, object impersonal sense) of the T_{in} suffix.¹

Nāgeśa continues his argument that the Bhāṣya 'Sārvadhātu kārthāḥ Kartardayaḥ' means that the Agent etc (i.e. object, impersonal sense Bhāva) are merely suggested by it (i.e. by the Sārvadhātuka affix). And in that case the Vikarāṇa suffixes are only to grant grammatical correctness to the word. Nāgeśa says that, if we accept that Vikarāṇas are meaningful, then they are meaningful to the extent of suggesting them, but not expressing them (Agent object etc).² He says both the theories are valid, since they are only indicative. After all it is due to (the nature of the power of) the word (Sabdasakti) that in some places (in some words) the suggestion of the meanings is made by the Sārvadhātukas in association with the Vikarāṇa suffix. And in some words this Sārvadhātuka suggests it even without the Vikarāṇa suffix.³

Thus in the view of Nāgeśa Vikarāṇas are either to grant simply grammatical correctness of the word or to be meaningful through their suggestiveness.

- 1 Dyotakatvam caisām tinsu kartrārādhyaṛtha matra niyāmak-
vena bodhyam (Bṛhat sabdenudu Sekhara Vol 3, P1593)
- 2 Sārvadhātuke yak iti sūtrasthasya Sārvadhātu kārthāḥ
kartrādaya iti Bhāṣyasya taddiotyā ityevārthāḥ Vikarāṇast-
vatrapakṣe sādhitvārtha eva Vikarāṇārthā iti pakṣe vikarāṇa
dyotyā api (Ṭaghu Mañjūsā (k k) P 1, P 780, P 1)
- 3 Tatra sabda sakti svabhāvat kvacidvikarāṇa sahitasya
taddiotyakatvam Kvacit tatsahāyyenārtha Pratīteḥ
arthavatvayavnnāropi. (ibid P'781).

The purport of all this is that neither the *Sārvadhātuka* nor the *Vikarāṇa* denotes the meanings of agent, or object etc. They can only suggest them which are, really speaking, the meanings of the root itself.

REVIEW

Regarding the meaning of the *Vikarāṇa* suffixes it is observed that there are three theories (1) *Vikarāṇas* have no meaning except for the fact that they are for grammatical correctness of the word (2) *Vikarāṇa* denotes Agent object etc (3) The Agent, object etc, are the meanings of the *Sārvadhātuka* and the *Vikarāṇa* is a *dyotaka* in the absence of the *Ti* suffix.

Now after a close examination of the various arguments put forth by the respective scholars, it can be observed that each has some point and logic in his argument. But of all the theories, it seems the first one is more logical. *Vikarāṇas* do not have any expressive meaning. The sense of agent, object etc, are the meanings of the root alone but not of the *Sārvadhātuka* or of the *Vikarāṇa* suffixes. The reason is that we get the import of the agent etc, even in the absence of *Vikarāṇa* or *Ti* suffix in some cases or when even both are present.

It is also not sound to accept that in places where these suffixes are dropped, the import of the agent etc is caused by recalling the dropped suffix (i.e. by a *Lupta Smarāṇa dvāra bodhaḥ*). This argument as stated by *Nāgessa*, is refuted by *Bhāgvan Patañjali* in the *Mahābhāṣya*.² The reason is that a man who does not have a knowledge of this "lopa" and "Lupta Smarāṇa"

- 1 Tatra "kutsite (P 5 3 74), Bahusu bahuvacanam (p.1 4 21) ityādi sūtrastha bhāṣye pañcaka pakṣasyaiva siddhāntitātvena sūptinām dyotakatva pakṣa eva Bhāṣya sammataḥ (P 290-Tattvadarsanī)
- 2 Lupta smaranadbodhaḥ iti tu ekaseṣa sūtre pratyaya lakṣaṇa-kāryasiddheḥ lopaphalātvam vadatā Bhāṣyakāreṇa tīraskṛtam, Lopamajānatām tathā bodhānāpatteḥ. (Lagh Mañjūsa (k k) Part 2, P.719)

etc. also gets the same import as one who has this knowledge. Hence in getting the knowledge of the agent etc. neither the suffix (existent or dropped) nor a recalling of it (smarana) is the cause. It is purely due to the natural power inherent in the word (Śabdasaktisvabhāva). Hence it is reasonable to accept that all the meanings i.e. agent or object, activity, time, person and number are the meanings of the root alone, and the suffixes simply reveal or indicate them. Hence the arguments of Nāgārjuna are laudable and are close to the reality.¹

Jagadīśa, the author of the Śabda Śaktiprakāśa also is of the same view that Vikarāṇa suffixes are not having any meaning.²

Thus it may be established that the Vikarāṇa suffixes do not have any meaning of their own.

Now it may be a point of interest to know why they are used if they do not have any meaning or in what way they help us. To this we reply they serve in contributing to the grammatical correctness of words (Pada Sādhutva Sampādanārthaḥ), and secondly these Vikarāṇa suffixes from Śap to Śna help us in dividing the roots (about two thousand) into different conjugations.

- 1 Tatra śabdasaktisvabhāvat Kvacidvikarāṇasahitasya taddyotakatvam kvacidkevala sārvaśatukasyapiti (ibid P 781)
- 2 Śap syan ādi vikarāṇo numadyagamasca prakṛtyadinam sahayopī svārthosthītīdvāra yena tamādaya caturādi vidhāḥ sārthopsthitīdvāra yena tamādaya caturādi vidhāḥ sarthakāḥ syāt (Śab Śak Pra under Kārika-6)

TENSES AND MOODS

Introduction

In the last chapter we arrived at the conclusion that there is something called 'time' with reference to which we can differentiate actions as past, present, future etc ¹ This time element is denoted by the verb word as an attributive to the action denoted by it. The Indian Grammarians adopted a system to convey besides this time element, some additional knowledge i.e. the mental state or mood of the person speaking. Thus each of these notions of time and mood (or modality) is conveyed through a different suffix called 'Lakāra' enjoined after the verbal root. Though Time is unitary in itself, it is spoken as distinguished like past, present, future etc by superimposing particular actions on time. The pastness etc exists only in activity. Thus when an activity has its means nearby and its emergence is expected, then time having such an activity mentally conceived and super imposed on it is called Future time. Similarly when there is an action which has been begun and completed, and when it is super imposed on time, the particular time which is the substratum of such an action is called past time. Likewise the present is the time which is the substratum of an action which has begun but not completed ² Thus Time having activity as its superimposition becomes past, future, present etc. This division is purely a mental concept. Time, though broadly divided as past present and future, in daily life people are found to use eleven types of time division in describing the various activities. This fact is recorded by Bhartṛhari who says that past is of five kinds, future is of four kinds and present of two kinds. Thus altogether there are eleven divisions of Time ³ How is this possible? It is explained as follow

1 Kriyābheda ya kalastu sākhyā sarvasyābhedika V P 3 9-2

2 Kriyopādhisca san bhūtabhaviśyadvartamanatā^h,
Ekādasabhirakarair vibhaktā^h pratipadyate (V P 3 9 37)

3 Bhūta^h pañca vidhastatra bhaviśyamśca caturvidha^h,
Vartamāno dvīdhakyāta ity ekādaśa kalpanā^h (V P 3 9-39)

One type of broad division of Time is Adyatana Anadyatana and Samanya

Adyatana

Adyatana means 'Today' i.e. the day in which the person speaking exists. Generally speaking it is a period of twenty four hours. Of course there exists difference of opinion as regards the concept of Adyatana. Some scholars are of the opinion that Adyatana means a period from Sun-rise to Sun-rise. Some are of the opinion that Adyatana denotes the period beginning with the period beginning with the latter half of the previous night and including the first half of the following.¹ Some other scholars define Adyatana as a period beginning with the last quarter of the previous night and ending with the first quarter of the following night.² Thus Adyatana in general means the day on which one is speaking or acting.

Anadyatana

From the very word it is clear that what is not Adyatana is Anadyatana i.e. the period exclusive of the day in which one speaks or acts. Hence Anadyatana does not mention specifically whether it is past or future, it may be either, but what it specifically denotes is 'not the day when one is speaking or acting.' Hence there can be Anadyatana Bhaviyat (Future exclusive of today)

Samanya

It refers to the time where a specific mention of the time aspect i.e. Adyatana or Anadyatana, is not made. That is, the

- 1 Ahna nabhayatordharatrame'so'dyatanah kalah (Padamanjari under Sutra P 3 2 15)
- 2 Ekasya ratrescaturtho yamo divasca sarvo
Dvitiyayasca ratreh prathamo adyatana ityahuh.
(Pradipa on M B under P 3 2 110 3)

speaker does not attach much importance to the particular period but to action only referring to future or past in a casual (or general) way. Thus when we apply these differences to past, present and future, there result eleven kinds of time divisions. The eleven divisions are explained by Helaraja as follows ,

1 Past in general (P 3 2 110) 2 Immediate past (Adyatana bhūta) 3 Past exclusive of today (Anadyatana bhūta P 3 2 111) 4 Combination of the two previous one (Adyatanaadyatana samudaya P 3 2 110) 5 Future treated as past P 3 3 132) 6 Future in general (P 3 3 13) 7 Immediate-future (adyatana bhavisyat P 3 3 164) 8 Future exclusive of today (Anadyatanabhavisyat P 3 3 15) 9 Combination of the two previous kinds (P, 3 3 13) 10 Present actual (real) (P 3 2 123) 11 Near Future or past treated as present (gauna, P 3 2 131) Thus all these divisions of time have been mentioned only to explain the tense distinctions mentioned in the science of grammar

Of these eleven divisions Adyatana bhūta is generally denoted, not by a lakāra but by Nīṣṭha suffix vide P 3 2 102. Adyatana bhavisyat is denoted by a mood suffix LIH vide P 3 3 164. The remaining time divisions are denoted only by five different suffixes called lakāras. Besides these time divisions with respect to the past exclusive of today (Anadyatana bhūta) there is another subdivision as unwitnessed by the speaker (Paloksa, anadyatanabhūta) as governed by P 3 2 115. This is denoted by a separate suffix. Thus there are mainly six types of time denoting suffixes (Lakāras)

Besides these six lakāras denoting the Time, the Sanskrit Grammarians accepted another four lakāras which, mainly refer to indicate the mood of the speaker, i.e. whether he commands, requests, anticipates, gives benediction etc. Of course all these four Lakāras more or less, relate to future tense only, but the importance is not for the time element but to the mental state of the speaker. In all these four types a mild sense of desire appears in common. Thus in Sanskrit verbal system there are six time-denoting and four mood-denoting lakāras totalling to Ten Lakāras

Each Lakāra is differentiated physically from the other by adding some special mute letters which have some special operational purpose in grammar. These ten Lakāras are named as 1 Lat, 2 Lit, 3 Luṭ, 4 Lṛt, 5 Let, 6 Lot, 7 Lan, 8 Lin, 9 Lun, 10 Lin. Of these the fifth one i.e. Let is used only in Vedic language and as far as classical language is concerned it is obsolete. But the Lin suffix is sub-divided as Vidhi Lin and ĀsiriLin. Thus again in the classical language, by omitting Let and accepting two Lin suffixes, again the total number of lakāras comes to Ten. With this back-ground now let us study each lakāra in detail.

LAT :

Panini enjoins this suffix Lat after a verbal root to denote present tense of the action denoted by the root¹. When the action is in the present tense, the Suffix Lat is used but not when the result denoted by the root or the agent is in present time. If the time notions are with respect to the Agent, then whenever the cook is present (available) even without any act of cooking we have to use the present tense as "He cooks" (Pacati). And similar is the case with respect to result expressed by the root. This reasoning applies even to the past tense or future tense. Hence if we can decide what is meant by 'present time' we can decide the other two times i.e. past and future. Let us examine what is meant by presentness (Vartamānatva) of time.

The Bhāṣyakāra dealt with this topic while commenting on the Sūtra P 3.2.123, Hari in the Vakyapadīya-kālasamuddesa verses 81 to 102, Kaundabhaṭṭa in the Bhūṣana-Lakārāratha nirṇaya, Nāgesa in his Laghumāñjusā-Tīnarthavada. All other disciplines also discussed the matter in their works.

Normally a student of Grammar when asked to define Vartamānatva says 'the fact of being begun but not yet completed'. This is how Kaundabhaṭṭa defines it, i.e. when an

1 P 3.2.123, Vartāmane Lat

activity is commenced and is being continued till the result is produced (or not completed) we say it is the presentness. For instance let us examine common experience. A boy starts going to school and studying at the age of six and continues till he gets a degree. If any one questions him what he does, he replies 'I am studying.' Similarly an employee says he works in the office from say ten a.m. to five p.m. In all these cases neither the student sticks to his books always reading without taking rest, meal, sleep etc. nor does the employee from Chit-chatting with co-workers or going on short relief for tea etc. Yet we use the present tense only in such cases e.g. 'he studies (is studying)' etc. We do not consider the intermediary activities as separate activities which cause breaking the main activity of studying. Here the presentness is justified because as the Bhāṣyakāra says the result has not been achieved.²

Now the opponent raises an objection that in such cases as above (one studies etc.) we should not make use of the present tense because the main activity is broken and also because when an intermediary action begins, the previous action ends. So in all such cases only a past usage is to be made and present tense is to be used only in instances where present action actually exists (i.e. without any break) such as one writes, or eats etc.

This is replied in two ways. One is already explained that all the intermediary activities such as taking bath, dressing, eating, sleeping etc. are but parts of the main activity 'study'. Further these intermediary activities are aids in helping continuance of the main action till the result is obtained. Similarly what the opponent thinks as a real present action, without breaks, such as eating, writing etc. is not a single action. The opponent must note even the action of eating consists of many intermediary actions such as drinking water, Chit-chatting with

1. Prārabdhaparīsamāptatvam vartamānatvam (Vai. Bhu. under verse 22)
2. Nyāyavyatvesā vartamānakalāta, Kutah? Ārambhanapavargat (M.B. on P 3 2 123)

action of falling has ceased' And similarly the conception of time as future arises only when the action of falling is about to happen. Consequently the conception of present time results when the action of the thing is perceived as going on at the time. Further if a man does not have the knowledge of an action as going on at the time, he can conceive nothing as having ceased or as going to happen. Another important thing is that both in past and future the object is devoid of action but in the present we apprehend the actual existing conception of the object and action. Thus unless we have this conception of the object actually associated with action (i.e. present) the conception of other two types of time (Past and future) would not be possible.³ Hence the existence of present time established.

We find a similar argument in the Mahābhāṣya also. There the Kṣārabhangavadin argues that time is of the form of kṣāna. In this universe, matter exists in its state only for kṣāna and perishes in the next kṣāna. Hence there is nothing as Vartamānakāla i.e. an activity of the present time, because matter perishes in every second kṣāna as such there is no inherent cause (samavaya-karana) as a result no activity can be produced. Similarly another intelligent Mīmāṃsaka also says though we accept that matter is permanent i.e. does not change at every moment one cannot explain the existence of present time of action. He says Time is of the form Kṣāna. Thus only a single Kṣāna is actually perceived but not the previous one (which has already lapsed) nor the following one (which has not come into being). Thus Anupālambhī is the authority in establishing the absence of presentness of action and hence of the presentness.

These two types of objections are replied to as follows. Here the unity of activity is the aggregate of moments and this aggregate is achieved by mental fabrication.⁴ To be more clear we say that the moments possessing the regular prior-posterior relation and producing a result are called activity. Due to

1 Vastyaṇa's N B. on II 1 40

2 Helārāja on V P. 3.9-89

Ā K H Y Ā T A

the hand from the plate to the mouth and eating

And as such there is no real activity which is
But, just as in the case of the load to be carried
a third man who gets in there by chance is also
one of the load carriers,³ in the same way all these
actions are deemed to be a single unit and hence
the present tense is justified

opponent raises a very fundamental objection
regarding presentness. There is only either past-
ness, because a thing may be either existent or
Hence there is no possibility of the third alterna-
across a similar discussion in the commentary on
is. There Vātsyāyana the commentator of the
refutes the mādhyaṃika theory which says that
at any time apart from the past and future. Here he
says that if the past is defined as that which
has passed and the future as that which succeeds it, then
neither past or future even, because there is nothing as
the Grammarian tries to define past and future
without present such definitions are not possible. For
consider an object falling. When the object falls we
know it by it traversing a certain distance and then
again by it traversing the remaining distance, and
the remaining distance which the object can be said to
traverse in present time. Thus the space traversed gives the
idea of the past and the space to be travelled gives the idea of
the future. Hence there is no third space which could give rise
to the present.

the objector raised the objection intelligently
looking at a fact that time is manifested by action but
(dhva) Vātsyāyana establishes present time as
the conception of time as past arises only when the

the difference in the result we differentiate activities too. It is immaterial whether the moments are both existent and non-existent because we define presentness as the incompleteness of a commenced activity. The aggregate of moment alone is capable of producing an effect. Thus activity or presentness etc. is to be inferred from the fact a person being at one place now exists at another place after some time. Thus both activity as well as the time are the results of mental abstraction or fabrication. This is one way of establishing the presentness of time and action as a pure mental fabrication. The Bhasyakara now proves in a different way that there exists real present time and activity.¹ He says that there is real present time and activity in a subtle state. It cannot be perceived due to its subtlety just as one cannot see the movement in the Sun at every moment but can infer that he moves. Because he reaches the other extreme point (from east to west). Further if it cannot be perceived it is due to some impediments like distance, or minuteness etc. Because a thing cannot be perceived (due to the defect in a person) it is not logical to argue that the thing itself does not exist. For instance observe a dry lotus stalk. It has fine threads inside, we know it. Now if the stalk is burnt one sees the external stalk burning but cannot see the inside threads burning. It does not establish that all the fine threads are unburnt. Thus though it cannot be seen there exists real time and activity. Hence the presentness of activity is defined as an action which has been begun but not completed. And the substratum of it is called present time.

Nagesabhaṭṭa defines present time as the substratum of activity begun but not completed.³

The Mīmāṃsaka defines Vartamāna as a time non-different from the time expressing the Lat suffix.⁴ The Logician also defi-

- 1 Astivartamānakālah Ādityagativannopalabhyate etc (M B on P 3 2 123)
- 2 Bisasya nāla iva dahyamānā etc (ibid)
- 3 Prārabdhāparisamāpta kṛyāśrayatvam vartamanatvam
- 4 Laṭuccarana kālābhinna kālatvam (Bhā. Rah.).

ness present tense in a similar way that present time is one which is the substratum of the utterance (of the Lat suffix) ¹ Thus in order to express this present time, the suffix Lat is enjoined after a verbal root


The Mahābhāṣyakāra, alternatively defines presentness as one different from the pastness and futurity. Some scholars like Pancoli commentator on the Bhūṣaṇasāra etc. are of the opinion that this definition is not free from faults, because it suffers from the fault of mutual dependency ² It is like this. When one is asked to define presentness the answer is in terms of the other two (i.e. pastness, and futurity). Similarly when one is asked 'what is pastness' the reply is in terms of the other two (i.e. present and future). Similarly futurity also is defined. Thus there is the fault of a mutual dependency in the definitions. Hence Kaundabhatta prefers the other definition viz. Prārabhdāparisamāpta kriyātvam vartamāntvam. This contention of the scholars is untenable. The alternate definition offered by the Mahābhāṣyakāra is free from any fault. Here we define the pastness as 'the property of being the counter-positive of consequent absence at the present time or it can be defined as' the property of an action which the counter-positive of the absence existing in the present ³

Similarly the future tense also can be defined as 'Having the the property of coming into existence in a time which is the counterpositive of the prior absence existing in the present ⁴ Thus definition given by the Mahābhāṣyakāra is free of the fault i.e. mutual dependency

- 1 Vartamānakālasca tattatsabdaprayogādhikarāṇa kālārūpaḥ (Vy Vā)
- 2 Atravāsabdo'nāsthāyām (Anādare) Pūrnoktapoksayā asyaiva gurutvāt Kimcaivam bhūtatvāderapi vaktum sakhyatayā anyonyāśrayāpattiḥ (Prabha on Vai Bhū Sā)
- 3 Vidyamāna dhvamsa pratiyogitvam bhūtatvam or Vartamāna dhvamsa pratiyogiriyopalaksitatvam bhūtatvam
- 4 Vartamāna prāgabdhāvapratyogisamyotpattimatvam

Further the present tense suffix, as opined by Gāgabhatta is used after a verbal root to indicate a habit, continuity of action, in the sense of near future of past etc ¹ The last type of presentness is from a secondary signification. However this type of present usage i.e. in instances where the state of this present time is extended to the nearby future or past time, is ratified by Panini's sutra P 3 3'131 ² Thus present tense, as already stated is of two types

1. Apravṛttau parścaiva vṛttau Vrata eva ca Nityaḥ pravṛttaḥ samīpye vartamanāscaturvidhah (Bhā Cīn)
2. Vartamanasāmīpye vartamanavadvā (P 3 3.131).



LIT

This suffix Lit is enjoined after a verbal root to indicate a time (associated with an action) which is past, and exclusive of today and not witnessed by the speaker (paroksa).¹ This suffix Lit excludes the other two suffixes used to indicate past time exclusive of today. Thus to use the Lit suffix three conditions are laid down. Omission of any of the three results in the fault of over application of the definition on other times. If the first condition i.e., that it should express past, is omitted out, it will also apply to future exclusive of today. If the second condition i.e. exclusive of today, is dropped out then it would also apply to past pertaining to today. If the third condition i.e. not witnessed by the speaker, is not there then it would apply to past witnessed by the speaker also. Thus all the three conditions are necessary to give the precise use of Lit.

Adyatana as already explained is the day accompanied by

- (a) of the night that is past + 1/2 of the night yet to come or
- (b) 1/2 of the night that is past + 1/3 of the night yet to come or
- (c) from sunrise to sunrise

As regards the Parokṣatva (imperceptibility) the Bhāṣyakāra records many views such as (a) one hundred years ago (b) one thousand years ago (c) two or three days ago or (d) even obstructed by a wall etc.,² However "not being witnessed by the speaker" is a common factor among all these different alternatives. Kauṣālabhāṭṭa defines Parokṣatva as "the property of not being the object of knowledge" such as "I perceive" that resides in the mind of speaker.³

1 Parokṣe Lit-P 3 2 115

Bhūta anadyatana parokṣārtha vṛtterdhātōḥ Lit syat

2. M.B. on P 3 2 115

3 Parokṣayatvam prayoktvā vṛttiśākṣātkaromi ityētādisa viśaya-tarālignāna avīśayatvam (Vai. Bhu P 75)

The other disciplines¹ also accept the use of the Lit suffix as governed by P 3 2 115. Thus the sentence 'Caitraḥ papaca' gives us an import that the activity of cooking is past, and is not a matter of to day (Adyatana) and that the speaker also did not witness the agent while cooking. Thus to put in other words that knowledge (that Caitra cooked something sometime exclusive of today) possessed by the speaker is not obtained by direct perception but through some other agency.

Now let us examine the import of the sūtra. There it is said 'when activity is not witnessed by the speaker, as one of the conditions for the use of Lit suffix'. Here are doubts whether action is visible at all. It is made clear by the Bhaṣyakāra at many places that action is so minute that it cannot be seen but is to be inferred². Further the activity denoted by the root has many intermediatory activities of which each exists one or two moments only. Thus no real activity is denoted by the root, but it denotes the total of such intermediary activities mentally fabricated as a single unit. Hence when the activity is not at all perceptible the use of the phrase 'Parokṣa' is purposeless.

To this objection Kaṣīdhalla author of the 'Vaiyākaraṇa Bhusana' gives a two fold reply. He interprets that Parokṣatva refers to the agent associated with the action. Thus though action is not perceptible its substratum is perceptible. Hence the word Parokṣatva means "when the agent associated with activity is not actually witnessed by the speaker (S dānaparokṣatva)". However he does not feel satisfied of this reply. He fears of the fault of prolixity because in such a case the word Dhātū is to be explained as of the substratum of action which is denoted by the root. But if he can explain Parokṣa as referring to activity then there

1. Līlārthopabhiṣṭanadyatanatva viśiṣṭa parokṣaṇīpāḥ (Bhārah) and Atītyam anadyatanatvam parokṣatvam ca Līlārthāḥ (vyūḥa).

2. Kṛīṇimēyamatyantaparidīṣṭa śakya pindibhūta nidarsayitum Śaśi vanumanagamyā (M B on P 1 3 1).

will be brevity in explaining the word 'Dhātōḥ' as of action expressed by the root

Hence he prefers the interpretation that "when the action is imperceptible" 1 Now one may ask about the objection raised in this connection. So Kaundabhatta replies that the words of the Bhaṣyakāra are to be carefully understood. The Bhaṣyakāra means that 'mentally conceived as a whole the individual constituent activities arranged in a temporal sequence, conceived as whole is not visible, but the individual component is perceptible in its component form. Otherwise the statement Pasya Miṃo dhavati (Behold the animal runs), cannot be justified. In the above sentence the object of verb Dīś (see) is the action of running. Though "running" as a whole is not visible its component parts such as moving fast both the legs neck etc. can be visualised. Thus though activity as a whole (Samudayakriyā) is not perceptible it is perceptible in its constituent parts (Avayava kriyā). So taking this into account, we can justify the use of 'Paroksa in the sūtra. Thus Kaundabhatta prefers Kriyāparokṣatva to Sadhana Parokṣatva.

There is another reason for Kaundabhatta to accept Kriyā-parokṣatva. This facilitates an easy justification of the usage of Lit in the first person. Since it is decided that Lit is to be used only when the action or the means of achieving that action is not perceived by the speaker it becomes evident that Lit cannot be used in the first person. Whatever one does must be perceptible to oneself and thus the condition of imperceptibility is not fulfilled. But Kaundabhatta does not totally accept this version. One may not be aware of what one does when the one is absorbed in something i.e. under the influence of liquor, erotic intoxication etc. Thus there is scope for one not to perceive one's own activity and then is inferred from its result. Thus the famous usage in Śisupālavadha is justified 2

- 1 Idam tvavadheyam Kriyayā eva parokṣye bhūtyartho lāghvāt (ibid P 75)
- 2 Bahu jagada purastattasya mattakīlāsam (Śisupālavadha 11 39)

Nāgesa says that the root 'Dis' has the meaning of knowledge in general (jñāna sāmānya) but not perceptibility with eyes (Cākṣusa pratyakṣa). He suggests that the root 'Dhāvī' denotes only result but not activity, in which case the objection of the opponent can be set aside. Otherwise this objection cannot be answered because any action whatever it be (Avayava or samudāya) is in turn a group of smaller components only and as such it cannot be visualised. If any one says he is perceiving an activity, it is not the activity that one perceives but constituent parts of the result continuously brought into existence by the activity in a temporal sequence, which finally remains as a substance or only a mental impression. Bhartṛhari also confirms the view that there is no pure activity that can be seen and every thing has still parts in it self. And in this case of Pasya Migo dhāvati the real object is running (Dhavana) but the animal gets the objective case being a perceptible means (substratum) of the activity of running. 3

Now there are certain instances where the action cannot be admitted as unseen by the speaker but he (the speaker) uses Lit in the first person. For instance Udayana, author of Kiranāvalī says "Vyātene kiranāvalīmudayanah". Here Udayana being the author of the Kiranāvalī cannot say that his work is unperceived by him. In such cases how is to justify the usage of Lit in the first person.

To this question excepting a few persons like Vardhamāna, Upāyakāra and his followers, other scholars like Nāgesa justify the

- 1 Avayava rūpeṇa samudāya rūpeṇa ca apratyakṣetyarthaḥ, Pasya migodhāvati ityādi prayogaḥ tatphala samyogadarsanābhīprāyena Diservā jñānasamānye lakṣanā (Uddyota on P 3 2 102 Vartika 3)
- 2 Na ca vicchinnarūpopi Soviramānnivartate, Sarvaiva hi kriyānyena samkīrtanavopalabhyate (V P 3 9-83)
- 3 Na hyatra migah karma Dvitiyāprasangāditi saranakriyāiva karma Tasyāśca sādhana pratyakṣatāyām pratyakṣatābhīmanāt 'Pasya' iti darsanakriyopattiḥ (V.P.3.8 51, Helārāja)

Nāgesabhatta, who always strictly follows the Mahābhāṣya-
 āra, does not agree with the theory of 'Kriyaparoḥśya' propo-
 nded by Kaundabhatta. Kriya is always imperceptible, be it in
 s component form or its aggregate singleness. What one means
 , component part of the main action has, in turn, many compo-
 nt parts in it. Thus if one goes on analysing what is thought of
 an Avayavakriyā, it, in turn, becomes a samudayakriyā with
 spect to the component parts in such an 'avayavakriyā'.
 ence no activity can be perceived. That is why the Bhāṣyakāra
 ys "action, totally imperceptible (Atyantaparidṛṣṭa) is not
 ssible to show". Further if a constituent part of an action is
 ible the Bhāṣyakāra would have not said "Sasāvaṇumanaga-
 a i.e. an action is always to be inferred from its result". Hence
 an intermediatory component parts of an action are not at all
 ible.

Further the Bhāṣyakāra says that Parokṣatva is an attribute to
 result. Though activity is not perceptible the result is percep-
 le. So as it is generally admitted that if the result is not wit-
 sed it amounts that activity which produces that result also is
 witnessed. Thus Lit can be used after a verbal root in the ins-
 ces where the result is not actually witnessed by the speaker.
 is the Sūtra amounts past, exclusive of today, result not
 nessed. When the result of past action exclusive of today is not
 nessed by the speaker, then to indicate that sense the Lit
 ix is enjoined after the verbal root 1.

Thus Bhāṣyakāra does not make any mention of the non-
 nessing of constituent activities (Avayavakriyā). As such,
 esa contends that Kaundabhatta is mistaken in his conclusion
 intvavadheyam etc."

Now one may question how Nāgesa can justify the usages
 hold' the animal runs (Pasya Mrgodhāvati)

usage accepting the superimposition of imperceptibility. They accept superimposition because they explain the intention of Udayana as to convey the ease, quickness etc with which he has completed the work (i.e. with such a speed) that he (Udayana) himself feels it as unperceivable. Thus he completed the act of writing the book.

Vardhamana and others do not accept it and they justify the first person usage on the jñāpaka of the sūtra P 7 1 91². That is Pāṇini says that in Lit the first person suffix behaves optionally like a Nit. Therefore if Lit is always to be used in Parokṣa, then this sūtra becomes purposeless. But it is not admissible that Pāṇini writes purposeless Sūtras. Hence these scholars define Parokṣatva as 'having agent-hood different from that of the speaker'. But as the Sūtra Naluttamōva accepts Lit usage in the first person also, it is said to remind us that Lit is possible to be used even if there is no Parokṣa as defined above³.

To justify the usages of Lit in the first person on the plea that P VII 1 91 reminds us of such usages, is not correct. A sūtra reminds us of something when it becomes inapplicable (Vyārtha). But in the present cases the sūtra VII-1-31 has its utility in many other places where Lit is justified without any restriction of Parokṣatva, e.g. Atyantapahnavā ca⁴. And in the case of Lun, and Lan, Lit also is enjoined by the Sūtra P 3 4 6⁵. So in all these instances the Sūtra "Naluttamo vā" applies. Hence we cannot take recourse to jñāpaka presuming that the sūtra becomes purposeless. Thus in the instances Vyatene kīraṇāvalīmudayanah, we have to justify by accepting superimposed imperceptibility (Parokṣatva). But Bhṛṣanākara does not justify the usage and says 'Ayuktameva' (it is irregular).

1 Vyatene kīraṇāvalīmudayanassattarke Tejomayīm

2 P 7 1 91, Naluttamo vā

3 Kēcīt vaktṛbhinnakartṛkatvameva parokṣatvam (Vyu Vā).

4 Vārtika 5 on P 3 2.115.

5 P 3.4.6, Lun Lan Litah (Chandasī)

LUT

his suffix Lut is enjoined after a verbal root to denote action expressed by the root is neither past, nor present refers to a time exclusive of today (Anadyatana) We have explained the words Adyatana, Anadyatana, Vartamana, and Bhavisyat

he word 'Bhavisat (future)' is defined as 'having the of coming into existence in a time which is the counter of the prior absence existing in the present' ¹ Thus the 'Svo gantā' means an activity (of going) which comes tomorrow Thus this suffix excludes that particular futurity which may be like this One may say in the 'my father comes in the evening' Evening is a future time reference to the morning time Hence this suffix Lut does not speak of such futurity but expresses futurity exclusive

his suffix Lut is enjoined after a verbal root on the author-
ānini Sūtra P 3 3 15 ² Further this suffix is used where
yatana anadyatna future is mentioned as in sentence
vo vāgamisyam' Thus it denotes two types of future

LRT

his suffix Lrt is enjoined after a verbal root to indicate "the general" That is here the speaker is not concerned the futurity belongs to this day or not He just wants by the futurity of the action Thus Lrt can be used to future pertaining to this day And it is also used after a express future when there is action That is why Kaunda-
ays "future in general"

Pāṇini enjoins this suffix after a verbal root through a Sūtra
P 3 3 13 1

However sometimes Lut is used in the sense of Lit when the speaker wants to convey worry or disgust. For instance, a lady is walking too slowly. Then one may exhibit his worry "at this rate when will she reach" meaning when she would reach the goal. Here no reference is to the particula futurity but Lut is used. Such cases are justified on the authority of the Vartika "Paridevane Svastanī Bhaviṣyantiyarthē"³

L E T

This suffix Let is enjoined after a verbal root to indicate the same sense to express which, Lin is enjoined after a verbal root. The suffix Lin¹ is enjoined after a verbal root to indicate injunction (Vidhi), assigning a duty [nimantrana], accord permission to do as one likes (Āmantrana), a respectful command (adista), request [Prarthana] etc. The Lin suffix expresses inducement. The separate mention of the four meanings is just for the sake of clarity of the basic meaning.

This suffix Let is enjoined on the authority of the Sūtra P 3 4 7 5. The use of this suffix is limited to the Veda only and in classical Sanskrit the usage of this suffix is not found.

- 1 P 3 3 1- (Lit Sese ca)
- 2 Iyem nu kadāgnta yaivam padau nidahaati
- 3 Paridevanam = anusocanam. Svastanī is the technical name of old Grammarians what Pāṇini now calls Lut. Similarly Bhaviṣyanti is synonymous to Lit.
- 4 P 3 4 7 Linarthe Let
- 5 Vidhi nimantrana mantranadhīśa samprasnaprarthaneṣu Lin P 3 3 161. The meaning of Vidhi is separately discussed in the following pages.

LOT

The suffix Lot is enjoined after a verbal root in the same sense as the suffix Lin i.e. Vidhi etc. and also Benediction (Āsi^h) Benediction means the wish of the speaker that a certain 'good may happen'. This suffix is enjoined by two sutras i.e. P 3 3 173¹ and 3 3,162.²

LAN

It has been already explained that the suffix Lut is enjoined after a verbal root to indicate the future exclusive of today. Now this suffix Lan is its counterpart in the past tense. It is enjoined after a verbal root to indicate "the past exclusive of today" (Anadyatna bhūtakāla).

As already said pastness is the nature of being the counter-positive of consequential absence of existing in the present time.³ This pastness refers to action and not to the locus of that action. Thus interpreting we can modify the definition of pastness as the nature of an action which is the counter-positive of the consequential absence existing in the present time.⁴ Thus this suffix indicates the pastness exclusive of today on the authority of the Sutra P 3 2 111.⁵

1. P 3 3 173 Āsi¹ Linlotau
2. P 3 3 162 Lot ca
3. Vidyamānadhvaṃsa pratīyogitvam bhūtatvam
4. P 3 2 111 Anadyatane Lan.
5. Vartamānadhvaṃsa pratīyogī kriyopalaksitatvam bhūtatvam

LIN (VLIN—VĪDAH)

(Meaning of the Potential Mood)

In this world we find that, when a person wants another to act, he conveys his intention in the form of either an order or a request. In Sanskrit Language this order or the request is conveyed by using a verb word ending in a potential mood affix or an imperative mood affix etc. As already established, this order or request is not the meaning of the verbal root hence it is of the suffix. The medium of conveying this intention is of two types i.e. with the help of classical sentences or Vedic injunctions. Whatever it be, it is further observed that immediately on hearing such a verb-word one does not act. It is only in certain cases he acts and in some other cases he does not. For example, when we order a person "to eat poison-mixed food, or to bring the Moon, or run through the streets, one does not act, but when we order or request for a cup of water, or to read a book or to perform a certain yaga, one may act immediately. So it is evident that a mere hearing of a verb-word ending in a potential mood affix or imperative mood affix is not the cause in inducing a person to act. Besides this, there is something which actually causes one to act. Now "what is that something" is the question which engaged the attention of many scholars belonging to various disciplines particularly Tarka (logic), Mīmāṃsa, and Vyākaraṇa (Grammar). Now in this chapter we will examine their arguments and conclusions briefly.

LOGICIAN'S VIEW

Usually we find on hearing a verb word ending with a potential mood affix, one is induced to act. In so getting induced, the hearer must necessarily possess three types of knowledge, viz. (1) that the particular object (for which one induces him to act) is capable of being achieved through effort, (Kṛtisadhyatva) (2) that the particular activity (to perform which one is induced) is the means to attain the desired end (īkṣasadhanatva) (3) that (the particular activity) does not entail any serious untoward effects (Balavadanīstānanubandhitva). For instance when we say

“Bring the Moon” the hearer does not act, because he does not have any of these knowledges. To be clear, he knows pretty well that it is not within his capacity to bring the desired object (the Moon)· he does not have the means to achieve it, and also he knows that many untoward serious evils may result even if he tries to bring the Moon. Hence he does not act. Similarly when we order ‘Eat the poison-mixed food’ one does not act because he knows well that such an act (eating the poison-mixed food) brings him an untoward effect or undesirable evil effect (death). Therefore the Logician is of the opinion that a knowledge of inducement to act has a three-fold meaning: i.e. the knowledge of the fact (1) of not entailing any serious evil effects (2) of capability to attain the desired object by effort and (3) of the means to attain the desired end.¹

All these three types of knowledge are the signified potentialities of the *Li* affix. This suffix has the denotative capacity simultaneously in all these three meanings in the same way as the word “Puspavantau” signifies both the ‘Sun and the Moon’ simultaneously. We can not decide due to lack of a deciding criterion, which of the three meanings is principal and which is attributive. Therefore the Logician accepts that all these three meanings are signified simultaneously by the potential mood affix. Of course this is the generally accepted theory of the Logician. But there are many Logicians who differ from this view. So we will examine some of their views in the following pages.

General View

Now it may be argued that the desired objects, say heaven (svarga), food (odana) etc., are many and the means to achieve them, say sacrifice (yaga) cooking (Paka) etc. are many in number. So if we accept signification to this suffix in each of these, then it will be a matter of prolixity and also there prevails confusion. Therefore the common characteristic of the nature of “being the

1 Balavadanīstānanubandhitvam, kṛtisaḍhyatvam,
īstasādhanaṭveṇ ca vidhyarthah.

object of desire (īstasādhanaṭva) and desiring to be attained by effort (kṛtsādhyaṭvam) are treated as the meanings of the Lin affix. And the nature of not entailing serious untoward effects is also denoted by the Lin suffix. It is but judicious to treat the same as the meaning of the affix, and not the individual objects of the desire or the individual means to achieve objects.

Of course one may question, because the Lin suffix denotes īstasādhanaṭva in general, how the specific object desired and the means to achieve it are known from a sentence like 'svargakāmo yajeta'. And also why an irregular import, as svarga is the desired object and Paka is the means to achieve it, is not caused. In reply to this the Logician says that no such sort of wrong import is caused, because, normally the meaning of the root, after which the Lin affix is added indicates the means to achieve the desired object. And the noun word nearer to it (i.e. from the compatibility) gives the object desired. Thus from the sentence Svargakāmo yajeta it will be evident that svarga is the desired object and the means is the activity in which the sacrifice is the object. Similarly in the sentence 'Udbhida yajeta pasukamah' (one desirous of cattle should perform Udbhid-yaga), the desired object is Pasu (cattle) and the means is the activity in which the sacrifice called 'udbhid' is the object (īstasādhanaṭva) is also the meaning of Lin affix.

Now, are we to accept all these three as the meanings of the potential mood affix. The Logician replies in affirmative. He justifies his stand as follows

Here is a sentence "Mandalīm Kūryat" (Make circle). This is a sentence of Buddhists who normally sit in a circular form to contemplate on God. But to those who are not Buddhists, to pray or to sit in a circular form is not the desired object nor is the means to achieve anything. So on hearing that sentence we are

1 Istatvam samabhiyāhita padopa sthapita-
Kāmanā viśayatvam (Vyu. Vā.)

not acting due to lack of *īstasādhana*tva. But on hearing a sentence like 'Bhojanam Kuryat' one acts because he has the knowledge of *īstasādhana*tva. Thus from concomitance in agreement and its absence (*Anvaya vyatireka*) we have to admit that *īstasādhana*tva is the meaning of the *Li*_n affix. Similarly from the fact one does not act on hearing a sentence like "Bring the moon" or "Eat the poison mixed food" it becomes evident that the other two types of knowledge i.e. *ḷi*_n *īstasādhya*tva and *Balavadanīṣṭa ananubandhitva* are also to be accepted as the meanings of the *Li*_n affix.

In sentences like "Swarga kamo yajeta" the *Li*_n suffix denotes all the three meanings i.e. Swarga-the desired object and Yaga is the means of the achievement of the desired object, the fact that it is also capable of being produced by effort (*ḷi*_n *īstasādhya*) and it does not entail any untoward evil effect. Therefore one, being equipped with the knowledge of the above three types, naturally, acts on hearing 'sentences like *swargakamo yajeta*'. And all these three meanings agree with the meaning of the verbal root.

Again in sentences like 'Syenena yajeta' the *Li*_n suffix denotes only two meanings i.e. *īstasādhana*tva and *ḷi*_n *īstasādhya*tva and these two meanings agree with the meaning of the verbal root. It does not signify the third meaning, because, by killing another person, one gets sin which is an entailment of serious untoward evil. So it cannot be accepted as the meaning of the affix in inducing a person to act.

Now let us take a negative prohibition like "Na kalañjam bhakṣayet" (one should not eat *kalañja*). The *Li*_n suffix does not signify all the three meanings in this case but only one that is "*Balavadanīṣṭa ananubandhitva*". And this one meaning agrees not with the meaning of the verbal root but with the meaning of negative particle *Na*ñ. On the other hand if we are to accept all the three meanings as the denotations of the *Li*_n affix, the negative particle has to express the absence of all these three meanings. But as far as *Kalañja bhakṣana* is concerned, it gives satisfaction (*Tīpti*) the desired object, and is also achievable. So we


cannot speak of their absence. Therefore, in order to prevent one from eating Kalañja, the L_{in} denotes only Balavadanista ananubandhitva¹ which agreeing with the meaning of the negative particle Nañ, gives an import of the absence of the same. In other words it causes the knowledge of entailing a serious untoward effect. So one desists from acting (i.e. eating Kalañja).

Some Logicians are of the opinion that, in the case of negative injunctions, both istasāadhanatva and Balavadanista ananubandhitva are the expressed meanings of the L_{in} affix and the former is qualified by the latter. And the verbal import will be of the form Balavadanista ananubandhitva visista istasāadhanatva abhāvavat². But Gadadhara does not accept this. He says there is no criterion in treating one of the meanings qualified.

Thus the potential mood affix denotes three meanings in sentences like "Swarga kāmo yajeta" two meanings in sentences like syenenabhīcaran yajeta and one meaning in the negative injunctions like 'Kalañjam na bhaksayet'. Thus we can conclude the Logicians' views in general with respect to the denotation of L_{in} suffix.

- 1 Na Kalañjam bhaksayet ityadi nisedha vidheḥ prāmnyānau-rodhataḥ balavadanista ananubandhitvasya vidhyarthatva pravesah (Vyu Vā)
- 2 Vastutastu visistasaktau visesya vseisana bhāve vinigamanāvirahāt pithageva balavadanista ananubandhitayaḥ vācyatvam. (Vyu Vā)

— : o . —



THE VIEWS OF JAYANTABHATTA

Jayantabhatta who belongs to the section of the old Logicians explains the meaning of L_{in} affix in a different way. According to him Vidhi, the meaning of the L_{in} affix, is an activity otherwise called *Sābdībhāvanā*, conveyed by the L_{in} affix¹. The character of 'Vidhi' is to exhort a person to work (*Apravṛtta pravartanam*). Of course various doubts such as 'whether the word form L_{in} itself exhorts or the activity or *kṛtisa-dhyatva* or *īstasādhanaṭva* etc. have been raised. Hence Jayantabhatta says that by the grace of Vidhi alone the relationship between the desired object and its means is made known to us². This relationship is made known by stating such and such is the fruit for such and such an action. Thus Vidhi exhorts a person to act. As regards the non-applicability of this postulation, i.e. in spite of exhortation of this nature we observe people do not act. Jayantabhatta replies that those who have implicit faith in the *Vidhivākya* do act. What is meant by 'Exhorting a person to act' is just to produce a knowledge in him that he is directed to act. One may actually act to achieve the fruit, or may not act due to other impediments such as shortage of funds etc. Similarly in the negative sentences the L_{in} suffix causes the knowledge that doing such and such an action produces evil effects. Of course we find many people indulging in such prohibited acts without caring for the evil results. Hence it may be doubted that 'Vidhi' can neither make one to act nor can it prevent one. So much so Jayantabhatta pleads that having that knowledge is different from performing the induced action. He claims that the L_{in} affix causes the knowledge that such and such an action results in such and such a result. Once such a knowledge is understood by the hearer it

-
- 1 *Līnarthāvagame satitpravṛttirīśyate iti tatpāpī Līn vyaparāḥ prabhavati, sa cāyam līnādīvyāpārāḥ sabdabhāvanā namadheyo vidhiriti yucyate sa eva ca pravartakah* (Nya Man)
 - 2 *Tasmādesa visisthah sādhyā sādhana sambandhah vidhiprasāda labhya eva bhavati.* (ibid)

means he is exhorted by 'Vidhi' to work. Whether he actually gets himself to work or not is a different thing but he has the knowledge that he is induced to work. Thus to have such an understanding is different and performing such an action¹ is different.

Here some people may argue that a person, suffering from hunger, eats a particular thing only on knowing it satisfies his appetite. One desirous of good health, on knowing from the doctor that Āmalaka gives good health, eats Āmalaka. Thus from these instances it is evident that it is the knowledge of Iśasādhana¹ alone that exhorts a person to act. To this Jayantabhatta replies that the opponent is thoroughly mistaken. Strictly speaking it is the 'word' which conveys that such and such is the means to attain a particular result, actually exhorts a person to act. By the word 'word' in the previous sentence, it is not the mere word form. In causing knowledge a word is an instrument (Karana). An instrument is a kāraṇa. Kāraṇa means one associated with a certain activity. And this activity known as Śabdībhāvanā, subsisting in the *Li* affix, is called Vidhi, and it alone exhorts one to act. Thus according to Jayantabhatta the *Li* suffix means a particular (Śabdī) activity which can exhort a person to act.

THE VIEW OF UDAYANA :

Among the old Logicians, Udayana is the most powerful. He is recognised as the last among that generation and also a source of inspiration to the beginning of a new generation. According to Udayana "Vidhi" means the intention or desire (icchā) of the speaker. He does not accept any of the said three meanings (i.e. Iśasāadhanatva etc.), either individual or as one qualified by the other two, to be the denoted potentiality of the *Li*.

¹ Anyohi pravartanāvagamah, Anyasca bāhyo vyāpārah.
 Evam vidhivasadeva sādhyasadhanabhāva dhīh,
 Sā hi prathama nirvṛtta preranājñānapūrvikā
 (Nya Man),

suffix He opines that the said three meanings can be presumed or inferred, on knowing the intention of the speaker Udayana presents many detailed arguments in the fifth chapter of his work 'Nyāyakusumāñjali' He puts forth five reasons to reject the *Istasāadhanatva* etc as the denoted potentiality of *Vidhi* ¹ According to him (1) this *Istasāadhanatva* is inferred through the knowledge of the speaker's desire or intention (2) This knowledge of *Istasāadhanatva* etc is already known from *Arthavāda* passages like 'one gets relieved from death or *Śin* by performing *Asvamedha-yaga*' etc Therefore no additional purpose is served by accepting *Istasāadhanatva* etc as the denoted meaning of the suffix *Lin* (3) And also there are usages as 'because it is the means to achieve my desired end, I do it etc both in the first person and second person (4) We observe that the intention of the speaker alone is made known to us by this *Lin* suffix Either in a command (*Ājñā*) honour (*Ādhyekāṇā*), permission (*Anujñā*) question (*Samprasna*) request or benediction (*Prārthana*) we find that the intention of the speaker is made known and no *Istasāadhanatva* etc is understood (5) The fifth object is that in the instance of prohibitive or *vikalpa* injunctions *Istasāadhanatva* etc cannot be the meaning of the *Lin* affix, e.g. take the sentence *Brāhmaṇaṃ na hanyat* (one should not kill a *Brāhmin*) If we accept *Istasāadhanatva* as the meaning of *Lin* affix, then from the above sentence we get an import to the effect that "act of killing a *brahmin*, is not the means of achieving the desired object but never do we get an import of the form 'the act of killing a *brahmin* is the means to some undersired end (*Anistasāadhanam*) It cannot be said that whatever is not *Istasādhanā* automatically becomes *Anistasādhana*

Another objection as pointed out by Udayana is--if *Istasāadhanatva* is the denoted sense of the *Lin* suffix and one acts only on having such a knowledge, one should act on hearing even a sentence like 'sacrifice is the means to achieve Heaven (*Yagaḥ*

1 Hetutvat anumānacca madhyamādau viyogataḥ,
Anyatra Kṛpta śāmarthyat nisedhanupa pattitāḥ (Nya. Ku. V. 14)

svargasāadhanam). But no such inclination is found on the part of the hearer of that sentence. Hence Iṣṭasāadhanatva cannot be the meaning of 'Vidhi'. Udayana gives very lucid, strictly logical arguments, refuting the theory of Iṣṭasāadhanatva as the meaning of the Liñ affix.

Thus taking all these points into consideration, Udayana rejects Iṣṭasāadhanatva or in fact any other meaning such as Kṛti-sādhyatva etc. as the denoted potentiality of the Liñ affix. So we can conclude that according to Udayana, the Liñ affix denotes the 'Desire' of the speaker in the form of inducing a person to act in certain cases or to prevent him from acting in some other instances. And the so called Iṣṭasāadhanatva, Kṛti sādhyatva etc. are inferred from this 'Desire' of the speaker.¹

The Views of Gaṅgeśa, Pakṣadhara Etc. :

The neologicians like Gaṅgeśa, Gadādhara, Pakṣadhara do not accept the above views of Udayana or Jayantabhaṭṭa, Nor do they admit that the Liñ suffix denotes all the three meanings (i.e. Iṣṭasāadhanatva etc.) simultaneously. They think it is a matter of prolixity. Further they do not accept that the Liñ suffix denotes each meaning individually, because in such cases we can get only a particular knowledge, devoid of other meanings at a time. Hence they suggested to accept only two meanings, the third being an attribute to Iṣṭasāadhanatva. Hence Gaṅgeśa defines Vidhi as 'being the means of achieving the desired end in conjunction with the meaning of not producing a strain more than that which inevitably accompanies it (the desired end), as well as being capable of being achieved by effort.'²

-
1. Vidhirvaktrabhiprayaḥ pravṛtyadau Liñdibhiḥ,
Abhidheyonumeya tu karturiṣṭābhyupayātā. (Nya. Ku.).
 2. Kṛtisādhyatve sati iṣṭotpatti nāntariyaka duḥkhādhika-
duḥkha ajanakatvaviśiṣṭeṣṭa sādhanatvam. (TTV, Cin).

Similarly Paksādhara Mīśra, with a slight modification in the definition of Gangesa, states that Vidhi is 'being the means of achieving the desired end in conjunction with the meaning of not producing a strain which is not necessarily associated to the production of the desired end' ¹

Gaḍadhara, who closely follows Gangesa defines Vidhi on similar lines. According to him Vidhi means 'Being capable of being achieved by effort' as well as 'being the means of achieving the desired end' in conjunction with the meaning of not entailing any untoward effect ². Thus these scholars prefer a qualified potentiality to the Lin suffix.

Now when we try to explain the sentences like Na Kalañ-jam bhaksayet' etc. in accordance with any one of the definitions, there results a fault of the meaning of word Nañ agreeing with a part (syntactically connected) of the meaning of the Lin affix, i.e. Balavadanīśa ananubandhitva a part of the meaning of the Lin affix with the meaning of the word Nañ. But Paksadhara Mīśra replies to it, that is not a fault so much to worry about, because such type of partial agreement is seen in many instances as Caitramatā, Caitranaptā etc. ³ Gaḍadhara also is of the view that there is no partial agreement at all. In the verbal import we do not get any knowledge which speaks of 'the absence of not entailing any untoward effect'. Here also the meaning of Nañ being substantive agrees with the total meaning of the Vidhi suffix and which in turn qualifies 'Eating'. Thus the verbal

- 1 Kṛtisādhyatve sati istotpattyanantari yaka du, kha ajana-
katva visistesta sadhanatvam
- 2 Kṛtisādhyatvam balavadanīśa ananubandhitvasahitv istasa-
dhanatvam ca (Vyu. Vā.)
- 3 Caitranaptā ityadau caitrasya pautravacaka naptipadarthaika-
desena putrena Caitraputrasya putre ityevamanvayasya ca
darsanāt (Tar. Tan. Vol II)
- 4 Balavadanīśānanubandhitvasyesthasadhanatva visesanataya
vācyatve visistābhāvasyaiva sābdabodhebhānam....etc.
(Vyu. Vā.).

import of a sentence "Na Kalañjam bhakṣayet" is of the form "Eating of Kalañja is possessed of the absence of iṣṭasāadhanatva (the means of achieving the desired end) as qualified by" not entailing any serious untoward effect.¹ From this the entailment of evil effects is inferred. In this way according to Gadādhara the negative knowledge of the absence of a serious untoward effect culminates in the sense of the positive inference of its entailing serious consequences. As a matter of fact, either an induce-ment or prevention is not directly denoted by the Vidhivākya. It is understood, not directly but in succession (Paramparayā).²

This acceptance of qualified potentiality to Vidhi suffix does not solve the problem of prolixity to the Logician, because in sentences like "Śyenenābhicaran yajeta" the Logician has to forego the qualified potentiality in Kṛtisādhyatva and iṣṭasāadhanatva.³

THE VIEW OF JAGADĪŚA :

Jagadīśa is very critical of the qualified potentiality to the Liñ suffix. Hence he gives an alternative definition "whichever is the attributive in the knowledge which (knowledge) is the cause of the desire of the inducer to act is called vidhi".⁴ And this Vidhi is of the form of (1) Being capable of achieving the desired end through effort (kṛtisādhyatva) (2) Being the means of achieving the desired object through effort (iṣṭasāadhanatva). (3) Non-entailment of an untoward serious evil effect (Balavadaniṣṭānanubandhitva). All these three are the denoted potentialities of

-
1. Kalañjabhakṣaṇam balavadaniṣṭānanubandhitva viśiṣṭasāadhanatva abhāvat.
 2. Pravartakamiva nivartaka mapi jñānam srutivākyat paramprayaiva Na tu sakṣāt (Vyu. Va).
 3. ibid.
 4. Vidhistu....pravartaka cikīrṣāyam yat prakarakajñānasya hetutvam sa tathā. (Sa. Sa. Pra. under Kārika 109).

the Vidhi suffix, of course all individually;¹ but not a qualified knowledge of any of these three in any way

Now Jagadisa criticises the theory of accepting a qualified potentiality in the *Lin* affix. The opponent may argue that by accepting such a qualified potentiality in the *Lin* affix the invalidity of sentences like 'One should beat water' (*jalam tādayet*), etc can be proved. But this is not a proper argument because here one has to create six types of *Karyakāraṇa bhava*s to justify the six types of potentialities which results by changing the three meanings as attributives and substantives alternatively. And even if it is admitted that "justified proximity is not a matter of fault",² still an injunction like "*Syenenabhicaran yajeta*" cannot properly be explained. And it cannot also be maintained that in such cases the *Lin* suffix denotes the meaning of *Istasāadhanatva* alone through implication.³ Therefore Jagadisa reaffirms that the *Lin* affix has denotational potentiality in all the three meanings individually. And whichever meaning suits the particular context, that meaning alone should be considered as the expressed sense of the *Lin* affix in the particular instance.⁴

The Views of Vyāsārtha

Vyāsārtha differs from all the afore said scholars. He argues that *Istasāadhanatva* alone, without being qualified by any other attributes, is the meaning of the *Lin* affix.⁵ He does not accept *Kṛtisādhyatva* and *Balavandanistānanubandhitva* as the

1. Thus to him *Yajeta* signifies *yāgaḥ kṛtisādhyāḥ istasāadhanam Balavandanistānanubandhī ca*. However, *Kṛṣṇakānta*, the commentator on the *Śabdasaktiprakāśa* defines *Vidhi* as "*Pravartaka cikīrśajanakatvāvacchedaka prakāratasrayatvam*, (ibid)

2. *Prāmāṇikam gauravam na doṣāya bhavati*

3. *Na Vidhau parassabdārthaḥ*

4. *Yadrūpen nvyadhīḥ tanmātraprakaraka saktijñānatva apekāyā laghutvena tatprakaraka saktijñānatvenaiva tatra hetutvat* (*Sa Sa Pra*)

5. *Kintu Istasāadhanatvameva* (*Tar Tan Vol Vol-3*)

meanings of the *Lin* suffix. He does not admit the desire of the speaker (*iccha*) as the meaning of *Vidhi*. He refutes the various arguments put forth by Udayana in refutation of *Istasāadhanatva* etc as the meanings of *Vidhi*.

Vyāsātīrtha says that, if the intention of the speaker (*Vakt* -*urabhiprāya*) is the meaning of *Vidhi*, then there are many instances where one does not act even on knowing the intention of the speaker, because he has no interest. And interest comes only from the knowledge of *Istasāadhanatva*. If it is argued that one acts after presuming the knowledge of *Istasāadhanatva* etc from the intention of the speaker (as in the case of son taking food on the desire of the father), then better accept *Istasāadhanatva* as a direct denotation of the *Lin* affix instead of presuming it from something. Any way, it is an admitted fact that one acts only after possessing the knowledge *Istasāadhanatva*, but the question is whether this knowledge of *Istasāadhanatva* is obtained through presumption from the intention of the speaker or directly from the denotation of the *Lin* affix. This being the position it is always better to have it through direct denotation rather by presumption.

And now as regards the five main arguments put forth by Udayana to negate *Istasāadhanatva*, Vyāsātīrtha says that the same arguments can be advanced against his (Udayana's) theory as well. The arguments can be summarised briefly as under.

1. Hetutvat

Udayana points out that whenever a question is put as 'Why do you do it, the reply that is generally given is of the form 'because it is the means to achieve my desired end' (*Istasāadhanatva*). Thus '*Istasāadhanatva*' is a reason which is outside the meaning of the *Lin* affix and not included in its body of denotation.

If Udayana advances such a reasoning, with a similar reasoning one can negate the "Desire" as the meaning of the *Lin* affix. When we put a question "why do you do it" the reply is

in the form of "because it is intended (or desired) by my well-wisher (idam kartavyam aptabhipretatvāt) Hence 'Desire' also cannot be the meaning of L_{in} suffix as $īstasāadhanatva$ is for Udayana

2 Anumānacca

Udayana's second objection is that the said $īstasāadhanatva$ is already understood from Arthavada passages like 'one gets relieved from death or sin (Brahmahatya) on performing an Asvamedha sacrifice " Hence there is no need to accept $īstasāadhanatva$ as the meaning of L_{in} affix

In refuting this argument, the opponent says, even so argued "Desire" also can be understood or inferred on the same lines, from the Arthavada passages

3 Madhyamadau Vīyogataḥ

The third objection of Udayana is that there are usages as "This is the means to achieve my desired object " Let me do it etc So in such cases it is not possible to say the L_{in} suffix in first person (Kuryām) and second person (Kuryāḥ) denotes $īstasāadhanatva$ And it is only the desire of the speaker that one understands from the verbs 'Kuryām' and Kuryāḥ' So much so the L_{in} affix does not express $īstasāadhanatva$

This objection is replied to like this In the case of first and second person also there is nothing improper in the L_{in} suffix denoting $īstasāadhanatva$, to achieve one's own desired end

4 Anyatrakṛptasāmarthyat

The fourth point in favour of Udayana is the Paṇinīyan aphorism Vidhīnimatranāmantranādhīstasamprasnaprārhanesu L_{in} (P 3.3 161), in which all the various meanings denote a sort of the desire of the apta (of the speaker) in common There is no valid reason to over look this common character and accept only $īstasāadhanatva$ as the meaning of the L_{in} affix

To this objection Vyāsātīrtha rejoins that just as he (Udayana) includes Āptatva in the potentiality of the Lin affix, he (Vyāsātīrtha) also would include iccha in the meaning as such there is nothing wrong with his definition

5. Nisedhānupapatti

We have seen Udayana arguing that in injunctive sentences prohibiting a person the Lin suffix cannot denote Iśasādhnatva

Vyāsātīrtha does not accept this contention. He replies that in the negative injunctive sentences he would like to accept Lakṣanā as "being the means of producing an evil end" and as such there is nothing fallacious in accepting Iśasādhnatva as the meaning of potential mood affix ¹

Thus Vyāsātīrtha concludes that the Lin suffix denotes "means of achieving the desired end"

Now as regards the qualified potentiality of the form "being the means of achieving the desired end by effort in conjunction with the non-entailment of an untoward evil effect" scholars opine no special purpose is served by such an acceptance. It, in no way, helps in inducing a person (to act) to perform Yaga and the like. The knowledge of Iśasādhnatva itself serves the purpose. Nor can it be argued that, to ward off the entailment of untoward serious effects, such a qualified potentiality is to be accepted, because it cannot be established that the performance of Yaga results in an untoward evil effect. Further it does not pave way for the prohibitive injunctions like "Na Kalañjam bhakṣayet" because such a knowledge can be had even by other means such as arthavāda sentences etc... Nor does it (the knowledge of qualified potentiality) help in preventing a person, who is fully aware of the evil resulting from adulterating due to lust etc., from indulging in such activities

1. For further details Tar Tan Part 2 etc

Further it is not the means which induces one to act but it is the knowledge of being the means to achieve one's desired fruit. No one acts even if one has the knowledge of the means by which others get benefited.¹

Now as regards the *kr̥tisādhya* as a meaning of the *Lin* affix, it is not necessary to consider it as one of the meanings. The capability or incapability to achieve a particular thing rests in the person and it cannot be made known by the *Lin* affix. We find many people desiring *svarga* and also knowing the means to achieve it, do not act for various reasons such as shortage of funds etc. i.e. incapability which cannot be made known by the *Lin* affix.

Similarly the other one i.e. *Balavadanīṣṭānanubhṇḍhitva* also cannot be the denoted sense of the *Lin* suffix because this can easily be inferred from previous experiences etc. Thus *Vyāsatīrtha* concludes that the *Lin* affix denotes *īstasādhana* but not other meanings.

Thus the various views prevailing among the various Logicians regarding the denotational potentiality of the *Lin* affix can be summarised as under

- 1 Logicians *Jagadīśa* and his followers accept signification to the *Lin* in all the three meanings viz. *īstasādhana*, *kr̥tisādhya*, *Balavadanīṣṭānanubhṇḍhitva*,
- 2 *Jayantabhaṭṭa* and his followers accept *Vyāpara* of the form of *Sādhya* as the signified potentiality of the *Lin* affix.
- 3 *Udayana* and his followers are of the opinion that the *Lin* suffix signifies mere intention of the speaker.
- 4 *Gaṅgeśa*, *Gadādhara* and others accept only qualified potentiality to the *Lin* affix.
- 5 *Vyāsatīrtha* firmly pleads that *īstasādhana* only is the signified potentiality of the *Lin* affix.

1 *Pareṣṭasādhana* *mīṭi jñānepyapravīṭṭeḥ*. (Tar. Tan. Vol 2).

MEANING OF THE LIN AFFIX

MĪMĀṂSA SCHOOL

As among the Logicians, so among Mīmāṃsakas too, there prevails a diversity of opinion regarding the meaning of the Vidhi affix

Mandana Misra advocates Iśasāadhanatva only as the denoted sense of the potential mood affix

Pārthasarathi Misra, though he finally falls in line with Mandana, advocates Abhidhabhavana as the meaning of the Lin affix

The Prabhakaras enunciate that Kāryatā Apūrva or Niyoga is the meaning of Lin

Khandadeva tries to establish Pravartanatva or icchatva as the meaning of the Lin affix

Thus there prevails diversity in deciding the meaning of the Lin affix. Hence in the following pages we will examine them in detail

Kumārīlabhaṭṭa is the first among the Mīmāṃsakas who opined that Iśasāadhanatva is the meaning of the Lin affix, but not kṛtisādhyatva or Balavadanistānanubandhitva. This theory is followed by Mandana who devoted an entire booklet "Vidhiviveka" to prove this or to justify Kumārīla. Of course every one admits that Lin denotes pravartanā only but what is the nature of this pravartanā is the question. To this Kumārīla and Mandana propound that it is Iśasāadhanatva only. Because it is generally found people act only after possessing the knowledge of Iśasāadhanatva. And people do not act in the absense of such

knowledge ¹ Thus by the process of Anvaya-vyatireka we can establish the meaning of the L_{in} affix, to be *Istasāadhanatva* only. The details of arguments are more or less similar to those of the Logicians who argue *Istasāadhanatva* as the meaning of the L_{in} affix. This knowledge of *Istasāadhanatva* is conveyed by the elders in non-vedic sentences. But since Veda is *Apauruṣeya* there is no person to convey this knowledge and hence it is conveyed by the L_{in} affix.

Parthasarathī Mīśra, takes a different stand. He opines that "Abhidhābhāvana" is the meaning of the L_{in} affix by which *Istasāadhanatva* is inferred ² Abhidhā is nothing but the significative capacity of the L_{in} (affix) which signifies *pravṛtti* or the effort for achieving some object. This Abhidhā is also called *Bhavanā* because one gets the incentive to act on hearing the verb word ending with L_{in} affix. The L_{in} words in Veda express this significative force by which *pravṛtti* or *Arthabhāvana* is known. However in his *Nyāyaratnamālā* Parthasarathī Mīśra changes his opinion and finally accepts *Istasāadhanatva* only as the meaning of the L_{in} affix ³.

The View of the Prābhākaras :

Prabhākara Mīśra enunciates that verbal knowledge is obtained by youngsters only through conversation. Let one command the others to do something. The youngsters, who

1. Pūṃso nestabhyupāyatvāt kriyāsvanyāḥ pravartakah
pravṛtṭihetum dharmam ca pravadanti pravartnam,
Karturīstabhyupāye hi kartavyamiti lokadhīḥ, viparīte tvakar-
tavyamiti tadvisaye tataḥ. (Vi Vi. Karikas 29, 30)
2. Abhidīyate ityabhidhā pravartanā, Saiva ca puruṣa pravṛtṭim
bhāvēyatīti Bhāvanā māhurīti (Nyā Rat.)
3. Tadidaṃ kartavyatārūpam pravartanrūpam va samīhitaSādha-
natvameva L_{in} adibhirabhidhīyata ityetaṃ devavaramanīyam
(ibid). Also vide Sās. Dip. 6-1-1.

observe the elders to command the other to do something and when the others thus commanded act accordingly, they learn that particular activity is the meaning conveyed by the sentence. Thus the meaning of the *Li* in that sentence is learnt by youngsters as *Kārya* (that which is to be achieved by duty) since people do act on hearing the words with *Li* affix used by elders. This is otherwise called *Niyoga*, because one gets oneself engaged (*Niyukta*) in performing the action, thinking "This is my duty, so I have to get myself engaged in doing it". This *Niyoga* or *Kāryatā* cannot be known by any other *pramāṇa* hence it is called *Apūrva* also. Thus in the *Prabhākara* school the meaning of the *Li* affix is *Kāryatā* or *Niyoga* or *Apūrva* all of which are synonymous.

This theory is further explained very lucidly by *Salikānātha* in his 'Prakarana pancika' from which we can have a very clear idea of this *kāryatā*²

Salikānātha says one acts after possessing the knowledge of *Kāryatā* only. *Istasāadhanatva* is different from *Kāryatā*. Now the question is what is this *Kāryatā* or what is that which actually induces one to act. Is it *Istasāadhanatva* or *Kāryatā*? The knowledge of *Istasāadhanatva* cannot be a cause in inducing a person to act, because this knowledge of *Istasāadhanatva* exists in related even to the past or future things. That is why a person who took his meal does not eat immediately though he has the knowledge *Istasāadhanatva* of the form 'Taking meal satisfies one's appetite'.

Further *Kṛtisādhya* also is not the meaning of the *Li* affix, because we do not find people, eating the food mixed with honey and poison, though there exists *Kṛtisādhya*. It is due to the absence of the knowledge of *Istasāadhanatva*. Here the person

1. Tacca pramāṇāntarāpūrvatayā apūrvamītica, svātmani puruṣam niyunjanam niyoga itica khyāyate. (Nyā. Rat.)
2. Also Vide explanatory notes of A. Subrahmanya Sastry (Pra. Pan. P 431, 432)

does not have a knowledge of Kāryatā. One looks for the means, only after deciding that he has to do a particular thing. Because on hearing the *Lin*-word, he understands there is Kāryatā in it. Thus *Istasāadhanatva* is only a means while Kāryatā is the end. Hence the means and the ends cannot be one and the same. Therefore Kāryatā is the Happiness¹ which, one gets on performing certain action, which is different from *Istasāadhanatva* which helps one to bring in the action into being.

It may be argued that normally one feels, a knowledge of *Istasāadhanatva* itself is the knowledge of *kāryatā*. It is true that is how one looks at *Istasāadhanatva*. But there lies some difference between the two. As already said one is the end, the other is the means. It is only after knowing the Kāryatā that one thinks of the means to undertake that particular action. Thus it is the knowledge of happiness that is otherwise called Kāryatā.² We observe people acting after possessing the knowledge of the quantum benefit or happiness they get by performing a particular action and then only decide whether it is worth doing or not. This worthiness of activity (*kṛtyarhatvam*) is the Kāryatā. And this knowledge is caused by *Lin*. Hence it is its (*Lin*) meaning. Thus Śālikānātha refutes the view that *Istasāadhanatva* is the meaning of the *Lin* affix. *Kṛti* is nothing but 'effort' existing in a person. So this Kāryatā is that which can be achieved through this effort and also it must be primarily be that for which this effort is used.³ This character of primiriness is mentally cognised, whereas the final result is directly perceived.⁴ So the knowledge of Kāryatā is arrived

- 1 Sukhama hi sarvaḥ kāryataya avaiti,
Na tasya phalasāadhanatām apeksate. (Pra. Pan.)
(and also Explanatory notes on P. 429)
- 2 Atāḥ samīhita sādhanātīrīktasya sukhasya kāryatā.
(Ibid P. 429)
- 3 Tathā ca kṛtisādhyatve satī kṛtīnirūpitoddesyata sālitvamiti
kāryasvarūpam parimitisthātī (Pra. Pa. 432).
- 4 Sa ca (Kṛtipradhānatvam ca) mānāsapratyakṣa vedyā itī
viśiṣṭa prayojanatāpī prayatnasya pratvakṣa vedyāiva,
(Pra. Pan. P. 431.).

by means of manasopratyakṣa and anamāna put together. Thus Śalikanātha, having refuted istasāadhanatva, kṛtisādhyaiva, and the Balavadanistānanubandhitva, proves that Kāryatā is the denoted potentiality of the *Li* affix.

Refutation of Prabhākara's theory

This theory of the Prabhākaras is unfortunately put to severe criticism by one and all. Śalikanātha has adequately replied to all the possible objections, still his theory could not gain much popularity. It cannot be established that one acts only after possessing the knowledge of Kāryatā. If by Kāryatā is meant kṛtyarhata then it is generally observed that people say "we do not know whether it is worthy to do or not, but we act due to this doubt only." Thus it is clear that Kāryatā cannot be the cause in inducing a person to act.

Further even if it is accepted that Kṛtyarhata is Kāryatā, yet of what from is it? Naturally it assumes that form for which one strives i.e. Happiness or at least absence of unhappiness. If it be so Pārthasārathī Mīśra says that in sentences like "Bring the cow" (Gamanaya) there is nothing like that happiness or the absence of unhappiness in bringing the cow for which he strives. Hence in these sentences the Vidhi (*Li*) denotes istasāadhanatva only. Therefore even in the Veda also *Li* denotes istasāadhanatva only.²

Now Pārthasārathī Mīśra refutes that Apūrvā also cannot be the meaning of the *Li* affix. He brings a very peculiar argument. Apūrvā is only an intermediary state, just like the flame. We say the firewood is the means of cooking. We never say the flame is the means. As a matter of fact the atoms of flame enter

1. "Na vidmah kimidaṁ kāryamakāryam va" iti vadanti Sandehādeva Pravartamahe' iti (Nya Rat)
2. Tathā ca vede apyapūrvasya .. apūrvābhidhāna *Li* saṁhita sādhanatāmeva abhidhādhyāditi .. Kalpanīyam syāt (Nya Rat).

the rice and cause Vikṛitti. So it is argued that firewood is not the means for cooking. Such a contention contradicts the popular usage,¹ kṛsthaḥ pacati etc. Hence it is better to accept istasā-dhanatva only as the meaning of the Lin affix and Apūrva is only an intermediary action.²

Vyāsātīrtha, author of the 'Tarkatāmlava' puts some fifteen questions enquiring what is meant by 'Kāryatva'.³ And refutes every possible reply. His firm contention is that 'Kṛtisādhyatva of any type "cannot be the Kāryatva which is said to be the meaning of the Lin affix

Every scholar like Dīkṣita, Kaundabhaṭṭa Nāgesa refuted and said that Apūrva or Niyoga cannot be the meaning of the Lin affix. Now according to the Prābhākaraśāstra 'only the means which directly precedes the desired object and is not the same as the desired object, can be the goal of action'. Thus only Apūrva which is a means directly preceding Heaven (Svarga) in the link of causation (i.e. sacrifice-apūrva-Heaven) can be a goal of action and therefore it is the meaning of the Lin. Kaundabhaṭṭa now objects to this argument of the Prābhākaraśāstra on the basis that there is prolixity involved in this. Further he says that it is more simple to say that just a knowledge of the property of being a means to the desired end "is sufficient as an instigator. Hence the additional tagging 'only that means which directly precedes the desired object' is unnecessary.⁴ And it has no support. Thus

- 1 Sarvaloka prasiddhi virodhāt, kṛsthaḥ pacatīti nirvivādo prayogadarsanāt (Nya Rat)
- 2 Tenā sambhava tyeva apūrvasya karmāvāntara vyapāratvam (ibid)
- 3 Tar Tan Vol 2, on words. Here the comentary runs as "Kimidaṁ kāryatvam Kṛtisādhyatvam va, svakṛtisādhyatvam va... Tadeva vā iti pañca dhavikalpyādyaṁ nirahakāryatvam hi ityādinā". (ibid)
- 4 Na tu avyavahitatvāmsa jñānam tatha, Gauravāt, Mānabhavā -tcca

Kaṇḍalabhaṭṭa, Vyāsaśiṛṣṭha Parthasarathī, Maṇḍana, Kumārila etc are of the opinion that *Lin* denotes only *I-tasādhana*tva. The knowledge of it only induces or engages a person to act

The Views of Khaṇḍadeva

Khaṇḍadeva does not admit the *Lin* affix to denote *Istasā-dhanatva* *Kṛtisādhyatva* and *Balavadanīstānanubandhitva* as its potentialities. He fears the fault of prolixity. Further, in engaging one's self to perform sacrifice or cooking, the knowledge of entailment of an untoward effect (*Balavadanīstānanubandhitva*) is only an impediment in one's own way to act. And the absence of such an impediment by its very existence is the reason in engaging one's self in the act of cooking or performing a sacrifice¹. Further in explaining the verbal import from the injunctive sentences in the presence of a negative participle, we have to create as many as seven cause and effect relations which is a matter of high prolixity.

Now Khaṇḍadeva takes up the word "*Balavadanīsta*" and discusses its meaning. He does not accept the Logician's explanation viz. "Not producing strain which is more than the minimum required without which (strain) the desired object cannot be achieved" (*īśtotpattinantarīyakadukha-dhika-dukhajanakatvam*). He argues that Caitra, in spite of the fact of possessing the knowledge of *Balavadanīstānanubandhitva*, may not act on hearing the sentence "*Swarga kamo yajeta*" because of the fear of spending money or due to laziness. This is a common experience. Thus the 'knowledge of the fact of not entailing any serious untoward effect' cannot be a cause in invariably engaging in action. Similarly the knowledge of *Balavadanīstānatva* cannot be a cause in making one desist from action (like *Kalañjabhaksana* or *paragama*). We find people are indulging in sinful acts though they

1. Ato balavadanīstānanubandhitva jñānam pravṛttibandhakam, tadabhasvasca svarūpasanneva karanam (Bhā. Rah.)
2. ibid Para-2

are aware of the serious untoward effects such as going to hell etc. In this way, the Mīmāṃsaka, both by the affirmative and negative inference argues that a knowledge of Balavadanistānanubandhitva need not be accepted as the meaning of the Lin affix

Further Khandadeva explains the word "Balavadanista" as that which is 'the object of great aversion'. And this aversion is not directly perceptible since it is a particular genus which can be inferred from the result alone ¹. This aversion is the result of his actions in his previous birth. Therefore some one may engage himself in performing yaga and some one does not inspite of all the possibilities. Similarly in the case of eating Kalanja or in performing the Syena sacrifice one does not act if he has aversion; but where such an aversion does not exist one naturally gets induced in performing such sinful acts. Since this knowledge of Balavadanista has failed in prohibiting a person from indulging in sinful acts, we need not accept potentiality for the Lin affix in it (Balavadanistānanubandhitva)

Now the Logician apprehends that unless Balavadanistānanubandhitva also is accepted as the denoted meaning of the Lin affix, even the classical sentences like Tīptikamaḥ alañjanabhaksayet" become valid and contradicts the Vedic injunction 'Na Kalañjam bhaksayet'. If Balavadanistānanubandhitva is not accepted as the denoted potentiality of the Lin affix, then the suffix denotes only the remaining two meanings. These two meanings i.e. Kṛtsādhyaṭva and istasāadhanatva' are easily explained in the case of the non-vedic sentence said above hence the sentence 'Tīptikamaḥ kalañjam bhaksyet' becomes Valid and authoritative. But it contradicts the vedic injunction. So the Logician argues this Balavadhanistānanubandhitva is to be admitted as the denoted potentiality of the Lin affix. To this Khandadeva replies that the Logician apprehends such an incongruity

1 Ato aniste balavatvam-utkatadvesavisyayatvam,
Autkatyam ca jativisesaḥ, phalaikonneyaḥ (Bhā. Rah.)

from his stand point, i.e., taking it granted that the *Li* suffix has denotational potentiality in all the three meanings. However, since the *Mīmāṃsaka* (Khaṇḍadeva) does not admit any of these three as the meaning of the *Li* affix, the fault pointed out by the Logician does not arise in his theory.

According to Khaṇḍadeva the *Li* suffix denotes 'Pravartana' (action of inducing), i.e., the action of inducing conduct etc. under-taking of the person engaged. And this knowledge of 'iṣṭaśā, dhanatva' is only an inferential one. In injunctive sentence, like 'Svarga kamaḥ yajetaḥ' etc. where *iṣṭaśā* dhanatva is not known through any other means, the same is conveyed by this 'Pravartana' through inferences. In the case of prohibitive sentences, this pravartana in conjunction with the meaning of 'Naiḥ' causes 'Aniṣṭaśā dhanatva' (property of being the means of achieving the evil ends) through implication. And also in certain cases this pravartana does not imply either 'iṣṭaśā dhanatva' or 'aniṣṭaśā dhanatva' but conveys the absence of *aniṣṭaśā dhanatva*, as in instances "Hutāyān vapayeti Daksitāya annaḥ senīyat". Thus the *Balavadanīśānanubandhīva* cannot be the meaning of *Li* affix.

Khaṇḍadeva now refutes the argument that "Kṛtiśā dhyatva" is the denoted potentiality of the *Li* affix, because this can be known through other means such as experience (*Lokataḥ*) or presumption. For instance the meaning of the root *say* 'paṇi' (in paṇi) agrees with *kṛti* denoted by the suffix "Ti" by the relation of *Anukūlatva* (congeniality). *Kṛtiśā dhyatva* is also cognised in *paka* by presumption (*Samanaḥ samvit-sarvadyataya*). Thus the knowledge of *kṛtiśā dhyatva* is secured by presumption but not by direct denotation by the *Li* affix.

1. Pravartana Vidhyarthavadimate tadānupattēḥ. (Bha. Rah.)
2. Ato na taved balavadanīśānanubandhitvam liḥarthēḥ. (Bha. Rah.).
3. Na pi kṛtiśā dhyatvaḥ Tāyaḥ. Liḥśā dhyatva 'anupapattēḥ. (Ibid.).

Y Y T A

Y i k m l k th y k l p y
l d l i d K m l i (w l h th y d d t) il
b p t) A l b t y t i l g h t
g y t

i l l th t d l t l i f t
Th t y d i k m l k t l l y j
t l th t u l i g d p t t g
d t t r t f t t l w h l l t
f t d t t l

I U O N

P f l l l q l th t l d t l
i l j P t t l d g t P l l
l i l l l t l t f f t t
t m p l H th p f p l
b t g f d j t j b th t p t d

A th m r t t l g t t t d d l t u
l l y d t p d f f t l m t h
m l l y p F t h f l l t th
i t p t l f t j y d w t
k h m l l y th f f L t t l
y w f d m l t g th w j f g
l w h th t t d t f t l l p t
i f d P h d l l t
b t f y p t t t b j t f
j t f p l m p f t l p t
g th g b y p p h t l S t
d h r t y y l (f j 4 l) th l j
t j O f th

i S l S l P d l N y y t
P t l l d A k (P 3 2 q)

a d ly f avt bity t j t
 g t h i wh h tw ld i
 h d i m g b d th p i m i
 G mm y high Phil ph t ll
 d t li g A d K i bh tl y
 d t l m t sh d t t f t i i
 w d F d fl t m l g f g mm t i t
 (t th fl t) h g thi
 t Th pl t f th
 if p d h th t b t t
 g lly pt d d w li tt l d t d t
 All th t h b pl d h ly b f
 h t

M l t t d d k p d m t (V Bh

11711

